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This thesis is a study of monetary sanctions, in particular the 
fine, set in the broader context of the relationship between 
punishment, money and legal order. The purpose is to analyse the way 
in which money enters into penal relations. 
The thesis is divided into two main parts, the first of which 
begins by identifying a paradox in the structure of contemporary, 
sociological explanations of punishment. This paradox may be rendered 
thus; why is the fine much used but little studied? Why do 
contemporary sociological accounts endeavour to explain the penal 
system with little or no reference to the most commonly used of all 
penal sanctions, the fine? A number of factors accounting for this 
paradox are suggested, but most important of all, it is argued, the 
paradox reflects a broader, cultural estrangement of punishment from 
money. By this is meant that money is unable to fulfil our cuJ t.ural 
expectations of what punishment ought really to be like. The nature 
of this process of estrangement is explored via an analysis of why, in 
serious crimes like rape, fines are seen as inappropriate sanctions. 
It is argued that this process of estrangement captures hot:h dn 
historical process and a contemporary reality. Historically, money 
was once used to deal with the full range of crimes and offences. 
However, for reasons which are explained, this relationship has been 
shattered. In the modern penal system, punishment and money are 
estranged. The phenomenon of estrangement is clearest only at a 
certain level of the penal system - that level at which grand claims 
for its legitimacy are debated and discussed. Beneath this, the 
system relies on the fine in an increasing number of crimes and 
offences. 
The second ·part of the thesis uses concrete, empirical data, 
gathered by a variety of methods, to explore the place of the fine. in 
the contemporary Scottish criminal justice system. The explanation is 
carried out in the light of the more general themes developed in the 
first part of the thesis. By analysing official data, it is shown 
that fines are now used in fairly serious crimes, particularly the 
property ones. The thesis then turns to an examination of how a group 
of sentencers, sheriffs, use the fine. This analysis is conducted by 
using data collected by the interview method. 
The thesis concludes by considering the significance of its 
findings for the contemporary sociology of punishment and for our 
understanding of modern penal practice. 
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General Introduction 
Themes and Purposes of the Inquiry 
Imagine we commission a stranger - say a Martian (the same one 
who haunts so much philosophical and sociological literature) - to 
undertake a survey of our penal system so that we may better 
understand it. Suppose also that the Martian reasons in a broadly 
similar way to us (otherwise the exercise is a non-starter) and that 
we provide, as primary sources, the officially published criminal 
statistics but no general commentary of an academic or policy kind. 
(We voluntarily adhere to this restriction precisely because we want 
to gain the benefits of a "fresh mind" looking at our problems.) In 
these circumstances, it seems to me the Martian would deliver a 
report containing a view of our penal system probably very different 
from that in the contemporary literature. The difference, I suggest, 
would be this. If the Martian characterised our penal system by 
reference to its most frequently occurring and regular part, it 
follows he would spend a considerable time discussing the fine, as it 
is by far the most commonly used sanction. Indeed, he would probably 
say it is a system in which earthlings punish people by taking money 
away from them for the crimes and offences they commit. 
If we were now to compare his account with that in the relevant 
literature there would be a stark contrast. Although there cannot 
fail to be some mention of the fine, its overwhelming focus centres on 
what may be called the "bodily punishments" - those punishments 
inflicted on the body, the mind and the character of the offender. In 
particular, the focus is directed on the prison as the exemplar and 
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paradigm, of contemporary punishment, with some considerable attention 
also being spent on various forms of treatment or rehabilitation. 
In a strict sense the situation described in this example is 
beyond proof, precisely because it is imaginary and hypothetical - we 
do not know, after all, if Martians exist. In other respects, 
however, and with allowances for necessarily incurred simplification, 
it does highlight a central problem faced in the study of the fine 
and, it is contended, in contemporary explanations of punishment. 
The problem is that there appears to be a paradox in the way we 
understand and explain punishment. Reduced to its simplest terms, the 
paradox may be rendered thus - why is the fine much used but little 
studied? Why, if the fine is the most commonly used of all penal 
sanctions, do there exist so very few studies of it? And, finally, 
why do we take as the exemplar of modern punishment the prison, when 
it is a relatively little used sanction? (For details backing this 
latter claim, see chapter 4.) 
The answer to these separate but related questions is that fines 
- or other types of monetary sanction - are little studied because 
they do not appear in any major way on the explanatory agendas of any 
of the disciplines that are concerned with crime and punishment -
criminology, philosophy, law, sociology and history. Although the 
agendas of these disciplines differ in many ways all share one trait 
which accounts for the non-appearance of the fine on them. They 
exhibit what may be called a "cultural estrangement" between their 
conceptions or images on the one hand of punishment and of money on 
the other. By cultural estrangement is meant, quite literally, the 
two concepts "turn away" from each other;. they face away from each 
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other like strangers. We can see the results of this estrangement at 
work in the criminal court. While, for instance, it is generally 
regarded as legitimate to use fines to deal with the minor regulatory 
offences that make up so much of the work of the criminal court, there 
is a resistance to using them, save in exceptional circumstances, for 
serious crimes. Reflect on how dificult it is, for example, for 
sentencers to use the fine in rape cases - who dares fine the rapist? 
Now, while legally fines could be used in these circumstances, there 
exists a well known practice that makes it a near impossibility. Why 
should this be so? Why, if fines are a possible sanction, is it not 
permissible to use them here? Later we will discuss the·matter in 
detail, but our essential argument is that even very large fines are 
not used in such cases because money fails to fulfil general cultural 
expectations of what punishment ought really to be like. 
We shall argue later that the reasons for the existence of the 
estrangement of punishment from money are essentially cultural and 
historical. They have to do with the emergence, over a long period, 
of the typically modern view of the nature of punishment as a harm 
(normally imprisonment) visited upon offenders who have broken rules 
presumed to be public and enforceable only by the representatives of 
the collective, the state. But at this stage of the argument, our 
suggestion is that the intellectual disciplines mentioned above work 
with a view of punishment that accepts its estrangement from money. 
Fines and other monetary sanctions in consequence drop out of sight, 
they remain beyond the conceptual and empirical scope of the 
disciplines. As a result these disciplines exhibit the explanatory 
paradox referred to; they endeavour to explain the nature of 
punishment with little or no reference to the sanction most connnonly 
used, the fine. 
This makes the position of our Martian most difficult. His 
description of our penal system as one founded in the use of money has 
been generated by methods we conventionally consider to be good. 
Normally, in the social sciences, empirical regularity is taken to be 
a necessary, although not always a sufficient condition of 
establishing the significance of a topic. Crudely put, the more 
common a thing is, the more importance and significance attributed to 
it. For example, theorists identify periods of history or types of 
society and social structure by characterising them in terms of the 
regular dominance of certain types of social relationships. Modern 
society is characterised as a capitalist society, not just because 
there are a few examples of capitalist social relations, but because 
these relations are the most connnon ones. Durkheim uses just this 
logic in his rules for distinguishing between normal and pathological 
social facts. The first rule, to paraphrase, states that if something 
is a regular feature of every society, at every stage of its 
development, it meets one (necessary) condition to qualify for 
normality. In other words, crude, regular and statistically 
recordable occurrence is typically taken as a prima f acie ground for 
establishing the importance of an object as being worthy of study. 
In our example, the Martian acts, as it were, as the disciplined 
social scientist; he establishes the significance of different penal 
practices by using just the sort of empirical reasoning normally 
reconnnended - and the result is the hypothetically different account 
of our penal system. But, judged by the lexicon of contemporary 
literature the Martian is importantly wrong. On this basis, we would 
say "yes, your account is empirically accurate in certain ways, but 
you have just not understood what we earthlings mean by punishment; 
fines are not really punishments; this is why our attention centres on 
the prison, and methods of treatment - the bodily punishments". In 
saying this, we would in effect be telling the Martian that he is not 
familiar with the rules we use to identify and define certain acts as 
punishment. His status as an outsider has deluded him. The poor 
Martian, at the same time, is both a disciplined social scientist and 
a magnificent cultural dupe. 
There may be some ungenerous souls who experience no surprise at 
this situation in the sense that they believe all social scientists to 
be dupes, cultural and otherwise. But the example, and our commentary 
on it, illustrates the very complex, empirical and conceptual issues 
to which study of the fine gives rise. Studying the fine then, in 
anything other than a circumscribed and technical way, involves one in 
discussing some very complex questions without the benefit of much 
previous literature. There is no equivalent of a Foucault on the fine 
or of the rich tradition of sociological and historical studies of the 
prison. There is, it is readily admitted, some literature, but this 
tends to be overwhelmingly technical in nature, concerned with narrow 
administrative problems in the collection, enforcement or 
effectiveness of fines (Latham, 1973; Bottoms, 1973; Smith and Gordon, 
1972; Sparks, 1973; Morgan and Bowles, 1981; Softley, 1973, 1978 ; 
GrQbing, 1981; Millar, 1985). Of course, such studies do provide 
valuable information and we should not blindly disregard them, but 
b 
their self-imposed limitations mean that broader and arguably more 
fundamental questions do not get asked. There are a few, scattered 
studies which do endeavour to "go deeper" - such as the one chapter in 
Rusche and Kirchheimer's Punishment and Social Structure (1938), the 
highly condensed section on money and personal values in Simmel's 
Philosophy of Money (1978), and, most recently, Bottoms' paper which, 
indicatively, is entitled "Neglected Features of Contemporary Penal 
Systems" (1983). These are innovative and interesting, but do not 
constitute extended treatments of the relationship between punishment 
and money, not least because in each the topic is subordinated to the 
assessment or demonstration of a more general thesis. This, of 
course, is not wrong but it does mean that knowledge of the fine and 
particularly of its broader, social and sociological significance 
remains rudimentary. The best one can say of these three pieces, to 
adopt Kuhnian language, is that they constitute the first anomalies to 
the dominant paradigm within which punishment is discussed and 
analysed. 
To propose to study the fine in the broader context of the 
relationship between conceptions of punishment, money and legal order 
is therefore not only to work in partial light, but, just as 
importantly, is to go against the grain. At the very least, it is to 
question the explanatory agenda of the most immediately relevant 
discipline, that of criminology, and possibly also those of sociology, 
law and history in as much as they are concerned with crime and 
punishment. I do not claim to be the first to realise the potential 
of the fine to question agendas and orthodoxies. For example in 1939, 
Hermann Mannheim wrote, 
"Both as regards the public interest it arouses as 
well as in the amount of scientific study devoted 
to it, the fine is the Cinderella among penal 
methods. We should not, however, overlook its 
great social significance." (Mannheim 1939, 
p .127) 
Mannheim did not go on to demonstrate either its "great social 
significance" or to devote much time to the study of it, and this 
might seem peculiar in a book explicitly on "the economic factor in 
the penal problem" (Mannheim 1939, p.33). Rather, he retreated by 
employing what I understand to have been one of his rarer traits -
humour - to diffuse the point. Talking of the fine, he said, 
"There is an entire lack of sensation, mysticism 
and romance around this method of punishment. It 
is said to be not too difficult to make money out 
of prison memoirs, but who would buy a book with 
the title, 'How I paid my fines'." (Mannheim 
1939, p.127) 
My task in this book is to try and demonstrate what Mannheim 
failed to do and others have only partially succeeded in doing. That 
is, to show how and why fines - or more generally the ways in which 
money enters into penal relations - are of great interest and 
significance and that criminology is impoverished because of its 
ignorance of them. 
My thesis reduced to its bare bones can be expressed in the 
following clusters of propositions: 
(1) that existing histories and sociologies of punishment are too 
narrow by far. Their core theme has been to trace the history 
and practice of punishment as it has worked along one vector only 
- the relationship between punishment and the body. They have 
shown how punishment takes the form first of physical attacks on 
the body of the individual and then, second, of attacks on the 
"inner attributes" such as character and soul, mostly by placing 
limitations on the liberty of the individual. It is in this 
context that the concentration on the prison and methods of 
treatment is understandable. 
(2) However, to this must be added the story of another· vector along 
which punishment has developed. Along this second vector, 
punishment takes the form of the exchange or enforced deprivation 
of resources, normally money (but sometimes other material 
resources as well), as a way of paying for harms done. The 
history of the second vector has yet to be adequately explored or 
developed but its significance ought to be clear. Fines and 
other monetary sanctions belong within it, so to understand and 
explain their significance we must come to terms with the social 
conditions which form this vector's structure. The title of this 
thesis alludes to these conditions; to explain the fine, we must 
unravel the complex and changing connections between punishment, 
money and legal order: we must note the ways in which different 
legal orders arise, their structure and nature, the reciprocal 
connections they have with conceptions of punishment, and how 
money enters into the equation as a force in its own right. 
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(3) Supporting these broad, master themes, there are a number of 
other more focused and concrete ones. Perhaps the most 
significant of these surrounds a notion that has already been 
introduced - the idea of the cultural estrangement of punishment 
and money. This notion plays an important role in my argument. 
It captures both an historical process that is claimed to have 
occurred and describes also a present reality that is proposed to 
exist. In the chapters that follow I argue that once it was quite 
common for money to be brought into a direct relationship with 
criminal harms and for this to be seen as legitimate; historical 
actors would have evinced no surprise at situations in which money was 
used to deal with the most serious of criminal harms. This once 
intimate relationship between money and punishment has been shattered, 
with the result that money is now estranged from our conceptions of 
punishment. But this estrangement exists most clearly only at a 
certain level of the modern penal system - in the general, discursive 
one in which grand claims for the legitimacy of the system are made 
and debated. Beneath this level, however, in the day-to-day running 
of the penal system, there is an ever increasing reliance on the fine. 
Quite clearly more will have to be said about this notion of 
estrangement and about how the modern system while dissociating money 
from punishment yet relies heavily upon the fine. The second part of 
the thesis is concerned in particular with the latter issue. 
These then are the broad themes of my inquiry. It ought already 
to be possible to see that it works on a number of different levels or 
planes. It tries, first, to put right an anomaly - the more or less 
complete ignoring of the fine in contemporary accounts of the nature 
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of punishment. But it also endeavours to raise a number of 
explanatory and empirical issues that challenge the way theorists have 
gone about their task. In particular, as will be shown, it argues for 
a revival of certain aspects of a more traditional vocabulary in which 
punishment has been discussed. One of the strange features of much of 
the contemporary sociological literature on punishment is its 
suppression of a theme with deep roots - the relationship betwen penal 
practice and what Adam Smith called the "moral sentiments". As we 
argue in the following chapter, the sociology of punishment has tended 
to play down the significance of the moral and the symbolic in its 
analyses. Rather, it tends to see punishment and the penal system as 
instruments used by a superordinate~ more powerful agency to control, 
repress and divide a subordinate, less powerful one. The reasons why 
it does this are complex but we try to analyse them. A note of 
caution is called for before we proceed further. Arguing for the 
revival of a certain diction in which punishment has been discussed, 
does not mean we have to throw overboard all that sociology has taught 
us. This work is intended as a contribution to sociology. Nor does 
it mean that we have to adopt a particular established vocabulary, 
whether that of Smith or of anyone else. Not only do there exist a 
number of sociolo~\_cal vocabularies that can be used - such as 
Durkheim's - but also it would be quite wrong to tear an eighteenth 
century way of looking at things out of its historical context and to 
suggest it has a direct explanatory relevance now. Rather, the 
contemplation of these older ways of theorising the issue works simply 
to remind us that more recent traditions can blind as well as 
enlighten. 
II 
It is perhaps ironic that it has taken an analysis of what at 
first sight looks like the least symbolic punishment - the fine - to 
raise this sort of problem. Nevertheless, I am aware that much of 
what follows does challenge the now established view. The 
justification of this, if one is needed, is not founded in any desire 
to cause a revolution, a paradigm shift, in the area. Such a 
momentous task is best left to others more capable and better 
equipped. Rather it is a case of: 
Und ist der Ruf mal ruiniert, 
So lebt man weiter ungeniert. 
which roughly translated means: 







Criminology, Punislunent and Money 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider a puzzle raised in the 
introduction. It was argued there exists a paradox in the 
contemporary sociology of punislunent1 ; the discipline explains the 
nature of punislunent with little or no reference to the most commonly 
used of all sanctions, the fine. This is paradoxical because it seems 
to break, or ignore, existing canons of good practice. As was said, 
these canons take regular empirical occurrence to be a necessary, 
although not always a sufficient, criterion for establishing the 
importance of a phenomen9'as being worthy of study. Statistical 
ubiquity also forms part of the criteria we use to assess the 
viability and strength of an explanation; the more empirically 
comprehensive an explanation is, the more we are likely to say it is a 
good one or at least one to be preferred2 . 
My ultimate aim is to reflect on the significance of this 
paradox. One rather global suggestion has already been made. It was 
proposed the paradox points to the existence of a general phenomenon 
called the cultural estrangement of punishment from money. By this we 
refer to a process which results in monetary sanctions being seen as 
unable to fulfil general cultural expectations of what punishment is 
really like. This is not because fines fail to cause pain, suffering 
or disadvantage to the guilty, but because there exists a cultural 
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resistance to recognising money as the appropriate conunodity to 
deprive an individual of if punishment is to be done. Rather, the 
prevalent conception of punishment is closely tied to pain inflicted 
on the body and person of the offender, and the prison most clearly 
symbolises this. 
This argument deserves fuller treatment which will follow in the 
next two chapters. My inunediate objective is more confined. I want 
to discuss the effects of this estrangement on and within the 
contemporary sociology of punishment. This presumes two things. 
First, that the estrangement exists and, second, that the literature 
reflects it. And, as neither of these propositions have yet been 
fully substantiated it may seem presumptU.ous to begin this way. 
Moreover, what is the rationale of beginning a thesis on fines by 
studying a body of literature which I have claimed ignores them? 
My answers to these queries are as follows. First, having made 
certain claims, I must now test them. This necessarily involves 
reviewing the literatur~ in the contemporary sociology of punishment. 
Secondly, if on this basis, it can be shown that a paradox exists, it 
should allow a clearer idea to emerge of what the process of 
estrangement is like. This holds true only if the former is related 
to the latter, but this is the only reasonable conclusion to draw 
without falling-back onto irrational and untenable arguments such as 
the ignoring of the fine is to be explained by the presence of a 
mysterious amnesia amongst sociologists and criminologists. My third 
justification is, in beginning my study this way, I start at a point 
where the two master themes outlined in the introduction touch. A 
discussion of why the contemporary sociology of punishment is obsessed 
with one vector of punishment ought to throw light on the nature of 
the other. In understanding the shape of the literature we will 
compare those objects which have been discussed to those which have 
not. This amounts to building conceptual bridges between the two 
vectors along which punishment has developed. 
More specifically, I shall try to show (a) why the literature 
focuses mostly on the prison, (b) that this prison-centred literature 
has acted as a sort of conceptual lens filtering out concern with the 
fine, and (c) how, as a result, the fine has, at best, found only a 
marginal place in the conceptual vocabulary within which the 
contemporary literature discusses punishment. Although this must 
appear a mostly negative exercise, it can illuminate. It sheds light 
on the way in which the modern sociology of punishment conceives of 
its object of knowledge and on the vocabulary used to analyse it. It 
allows perception of the discipline as a particular way of talking 
about punishment and also to realise the limits of this. The lack of 
attention to the fine LS one such limitation. 
This can be put in different terms. My suggestion is that much 
can be gained by perceiving the contemporary sociology of punishment 
as a historically and cultura~ situated conceptual vocabulary. As 
such, it has built-in limitations; one of them being in Veblen's 
terms, a "trained incapacity" to think of fines and monetary sanctions 
as falling naturally within the scope of inquiry. Rather, the 
concepts used to discuss these sanctions make; them marginal. Fines 
are discussed in the burgeoning literature associated with the 
"victim movement", but in a vocabulary centred on concepts like 
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restitution or compensation - and these are seen as non or only quasi 
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penal. Again, the use of fines is discussed in the literature on 
white-collar crime, but only to show that their use is an index of the 
extent to which the powerful can place themselves beyond incrimination 
- beyond the full punitive effect of the criminal law. There thus 
exists an unspoken assumption that "proper punishment" consists of 
imprisonment, so we end up with the idea that the use of fines somehow 
equals non-punishment: Moreover, the almost complete lack of 
attention paid to the minor regulatory of fences that we discuss in 
Chapter Four, is another example of this same tendency. 
It is a desire to understand this trained incapacity that has 
prompted my attempt to trace the contours of the conceptual framework 
prevalent in the discipline. This requires me to apply to the 
contemporary sociology of punishment itself a framework of analysis it 
otherwise uses in its explanations of penal measures. It requires 
recognition that its explanatory agenda is subject to culturally 
embedded conceptual constraints. The old Burkean adage - that a way 
of seeing is also a way·of not seeing - bites with particular force. 
These, then, are the reasons justifying my apparently obtuse 
starting point. Before proceeding to a synoptic review of the 
literature, there is, however, one qualification to be made and 
subsequently borne in mind. My argument is not aimed at claiming 
that the singular concentration on the prison is either without 
foundation or completely misplaced. It would be difficult to imagine 
a description of the penal system that did not at some point consider 
the use of imprisonment. Rather, I wish simply to question the 
presumption that we can understand the system just from this vantage 
point. Once this is accepted, however, different sorts of questions 
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about the nature of the penal system and its historical development 
arise and vie for attention and one of them posed anew is the nature 
of the relationshp between the use of the prison and other 
statistically more significant sanctions. Perhaps the key question to 
ask is not whether the prison is used a lot to deal with crime, but 
rather why it is used so little, yet has come to dominate our view of 
the nature of punishment in general. And, correspondingly, the 
question to ask about the fine is why is it used such a great deal yet 
hardly registers in our conception of punishment at all. 
'* The Contemporary Sociology of Punishment: Themes and Purposes 
Themes 
The sociology of punishment is a relatively new discipline, in 
the sense that it has only been in the last decade or so that 
sociologists and criminologists have turned their attention to the 
issue of explaining the relationship between punishment and social 
structure. To be more exact, this is better understood as a revival 
of interest in a theme that had received considerable attention from 
at least one of the classical sociologists, Durkheim. Also, the 
preoccupations of the contemporary literature have to be placed in the 
context of their immediate intellectual environment. Ap~rt from the 
sociologically inspired studies of prisons and prison culture, the 
predominant intellectual framework in which the penal system was 
studied was one couched in the terms of criminological positivism. In 
Britain and America between, say the 1940s and the late 1960s, the 
main concern was with the success and failures of treatment or 
"corrections". As I have argued elsewhere with David Garland (1983), 
this lent to "penology", as it was known, a very technical edge. The 
broader explanatory question of how and why different penal measures 
emerge tended not to be raised as criminologists sought after what 
they saw as far more pressing issues of practical import. 
These matters of intellectual history are important because they 
help one to understand the nature of the issues with which the 
contemporary sociology of punishment is concerned. In part, the 
latter has to be understood as a reaction to what were seen as the 
narrow intellectual limits of penology. Instead of the questions of 
whether penal measure work, for instance, to reduce crime~ the 
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sociology of punishment has been preoccupied with a question posed in 
a "classical" sociological way - that of the relationship between 
types of social structure and types of penal measure. To be more 
precise, it has focused mainly on the question of the relationship 
between one type of social structure, capitalism, and one penal 
measure, the prison. For example, in his recent review of the 
contemporary literature, Stanley Cohen argues - while recognising the 
emergence of the prison as "only one of the complex pattern of changes 
... "that occurred - that he nevertheless intends to concentrate on 
it, because the prison is "the paradigm for understanding the whole 
picture" (Cohen, 1985 p.15). 
This concentration on the "birth of the prison'f is the bed-rock 
of the discipline. It is seen as the key to unlocking the broader 
issue of the relationship between capitalism and its mode of 
punishment. The presumption seems to be that an explanation of why 
the prison has emerged will be the answer to the broader theme as 
well. Hence, even when the empirical focus moves beyond the prison, 
and attention, for instance, is given to methods of treatment, the 
concern with the prison is never far away. Foucault, for example, 
ties methods of treatment to the prison via the broader notion of 
"discipline". According to Foucault, disciplinary techniques - the 
"normalisation" of of fenders by the training of their bodies - arose 
first in the prison and then became extended and diffused throughout 
the social fabric. But the prison is the hub of the "carceral 
archipelago", and methods of treatment can be seen as an extension of 
the basic power relationship crystallised in and by the prison 
(Foucault, 1978; Garland, 1985). Similarly, the analysis that Cohen 
(1985) and Mathiesen (1983) give of what some see as the next 
revolution in penal practice - the development of hidden disciplining 
or of dispersed, disciplinary techniques - has a very similar 
explanatory structure. These new penal methods - exemplified by the 
decarceration movement (Scull, 1977), the emergence of community based 
sanctions (Cohen, 1985) and new technological devices of surveillance 
(Mathiesen, 1983) - are all explained in terms of the ever-increasing 
extension of prison type power relationships into the community. As 
Cohen himself has pointed out, the basic thesis that runs throughout 
the literature (with the possible exception of Foucault) describes the 
relationship between capitalism and punishment as being mimetic 
(Cohen, 1985 p.30). The prison is s2en to mimic the nature of 
capitalist social relations, and other penal methods to mimic the 
prison. Hence, if the first of these can be understood, then it is 
assumed the secret of the whole must follow. 
It would be quite wrong to create the impression that the 
contemporary sociology of punishment is a monolith. There exists a 
plurality of perspectives and explanations which give the discipline a 
welcome vitality and diversity. Three predominant styles of 
explanation however can be discerned. The first marks the pervasive 
influence of Marxism and the second the equally profound impact of 
Foucault. The third and less influential framework is traditional 
social history. The influence of the first two perspectives has been 
profound because - pace Foucault - they have been seen to provide both 
a general theory of society as well as a set of techniques with which 
to study it. The third only really offers a method. These three 
frameworks have been used in a rather eclectic fashion to mould 
different accounts of the relationship between punishment and social 
structure, some of which stress traditional Marxist categories 
(Ignatieff, 1978; Melossi and Pavarini, 1981) while others make more 
use of Foucauldian ones (Garland, 1985; Cohen, 1985). 
Nevertheless there are three important points of contact. First, 
as has been noted, the central organising question of all three 
frameworks focuses on.the relationship between capitalism and its 
penal system. The point is to explain the uniqueness of the modern 
system. Second, the accounts are all explicitly historical; a 
developed historical consciousness pervades all of the most 
significant pieces of work. But, third, this consciouness takes a 
particular form. Penal history is p0rtrayed as a series of dramatic 
changes and ruptures. To use Marxist categories, each mode of 
production is seen to have its own unique mode of punishment. An 
assumption of historical discontinuity is thus built into 
explanations. This has important consequences; for example, the 
treatment of the pre-capitalist or pre-modern system is primitive. 
Earlier systems of punishment are dealt with in excessively simplistic 
and over general terms; they are used simply as a broad point of 
comparison against which to show the presumed uniqueness of the 
modern. An example of this tendency is to be found in Foucault's 
work. We are asked to accept that the pre-capitalist penal system 
was based more or less solely on the use of physical punishments -
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capital sanctions, torture, whipping, branding and so on. As will be 
shown in chapter 3, this is an extremely misleading account. These 
methods were used but have to be placed in the wider context of a 
system that gave priority to non-violent means of settlement such as 
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penance; and, as we shall show, this was directly associated with the 
widespread use of monetary sanctions. 
Much depends, of course, on starting points. Foucault begins his 
account with the rise of the absolute monarchies. Admittedly there is 
evidence to show an increase in the use of physical punishments in 
this period (Spierenburg 1985), but to take this as an accurate 
portrayal either of the system as a whole or of yet earlier practices 
is misleading. 
The tendency to over-simplify is connected with this assumption 
of discontinuity. The past is seen as important only in as much as it 
is a yardstick against which to measure the present. This leads to 
the repetition of simple formulas that supposedly capture the essence 
and direction of penal change such as for example the purported move 
from the corporal to the carceral. Longer term continuity in penal 
practice is rarely considered and rarely studied. Yet as 
Spierenburg's (1985) recent book shows and as we shall endeavour to 
substantiate - continuities do exist and recognition of them can 
markedly affect our view of the nature of penal practice, including 
the presumed uniqueness of the modern defined as it is in the 
literature, in terms of the prison as the imm~ent feature of penal 
change. 
The above sets out, rather schematically, what I take to be the 
explanatory agenda of the contemporary sociology of punishment. It 
also indicates the style of analysis found therein. I do not pretend 
it is an exhaustive account. It concentrates on only a few cardinal 
texts but, as with most disciplines, there are but a handful of 
central pieces which set the tone. And, as the sociology of 
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punishment is relatively new, the number is quite small. In many 
ways the concerns of the discipline are those established by the 
master-works of Foucault and Rusche and Kirchheimer, with a good dose 
of the spirit, rather than the substance, of such Marxist historians 
as E. P. Thompson and D. Hay (1975). There are other names with which 
to reckon, such as Rothman (1971, 1980), Ignatieff (1978), Scull 
(1977), Mathiesen (1983), Cohen (1985) and Garland (1985) but with the 
exception of the first, the work of the others can be seen as 
sometimes very splendid adaptations or extensions of themes raised in 
the master-works. This is not intended at all to disparage, but more 
to indicate lines of continuity and continuance. 
There are a number of other works which ought to figure large but 
do not. Above all, the modern sociology of punishment lacks a 
sustained Durkheimian tradition (cf. Cotterrell, 1986 pp.27-28). 
Although there have been a number of publications (Garland, 1983; 
Spitzer, 1975) including the Lukes and Scull (1983) collection of his 
work in the area, these have not stimulated the production of 
substantial theoretical or empirical works which trace their genealogy 
to him. This is peculiar, because of all the "founding fathers" it is 
Durkheim who spends most time discussing punishment. Indeed, 
according to Durkheim, punishment belongs to those wider social forces 
of constraint that make the "social" possible. In this sense, 
punishment comes as close to being a sociological a priori as Durkheim 
would allow. 
Given the proclivity of sociologists to argue from authority, to 
sustain analysis by the invocation of an authoritative figure, it is 
exceedingly odd that there are no modern Durkheimians in the area 
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(unless one wants, provocatively, to see Foucault in this light). The 
relative neglect of Durkheim cannot, I think, be explained just by 
contending that the content of his theory is wrong. As Spitzer and 
others have demonstrated, Durkheim seems to have got his penal history 
back to front; contrary to what he says repressive law appears to be a 
characteristic of modern organic societies, while restitutive law 
belongs to more primitive, mechanical ones. But sociologists 
generally manage to live with such errors in the other classics. 
Indeed in the case of Marx, there exists a major industry that 
attempts to shore up analogous failings. And, anyway, the classics 
remain relevant not just because of the truth or falsity of the 
propositional content of their theories, but because of the viability 
of the general explanatory framework they exemplify. There are no 
theorists who argue convincingly that this general aspect of 
Durkheim's work is irrelevant; that Durkheim can now be consigned just 
to the history of the discipline. 
To understand the neglect of Durkheim's work we must therefore 
look elsewhere and doing this helps, as shall be shown, to highlight 
another feature of the contemporary sociology of punishment. My 
contention is that the significance of Durkheim's work is ignored 
because he uses a conceptual vocabulary that is in many ways at odds 
with the one predominant in the modern sociology of punishment. For 
Durkheim, the key to explaining the sociological significance of 
punishment and also changes in its content, lay in tracing its 
relationship to the collective conscience. He argues punishment 
functions to reinforce the moral and cultural norms that make 
collective social relationships possible. This leads Durkheim to 
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place, as Parsons (1949) notes, great emphasis on the symbolic; 
punishment is essentially a symbolic collective representation based 
in the passionate response of members of a group to those actions seen 
to threaten the sentiments they share. As is well known, according 
to Durkheim, these core aspects of sociability are invested with a 
particular importance - they are regarded as sacred. They have 
religious connotations, not just in the literal sense of being 
enshrined in theology, but also in the broader sense of apealing to 
the spiritual; to the presumed need for individuals continually to see 
there to be "something" which lies outwith and beyond them, but 
nevertheless also resonates in their everyday lives. 
My point at this stage is not tc contest this view but to note 
the style of analysis. Although Durkheim was conscious of historical 
change and differentiation, of the fact that punishment changes 
through time, there is a sense in which he tries to escape the 
relativising strictures that this has sometimes placed on sociological 
explanation. His aim was to capture the basic principles which 
underpin social organisation, one of which is the constraint that 
leads to integration. The individual is bound to the collective, not 
by the rational expression of will - but by transcendent forces which 
constitute the social as a thinkable category. There are problems of 
circularity and reductionism in this way of approaching matters but 
they do not concern us here. Rather, our concern is with the place 
which this scheme of things gives to history and historical knowledge. 
Although Durkheim was, as has been said, conscious of change, it does 
not form an epistemological category in his work. The contingent and 
changeable nature of the content of social life is fully recognised -
this theme runs throughout his work from the Division of Labour (1964) 
to Primitive Calssifications (1963) - but contingency and change are 
not treated as explanatory categories. Rather, history provides a 
method by which complexity can be stripped away so as to show the 
"essential traits" of social life. This is the method he uses in the 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life; aboriginal religion is studied 
because it provides a."simple" example of more complex religious 
belief; it offers, in microscopic form, evidence of the basic 
characteristics of all religions and it is these basic traits Durkheim 
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seeks to identify (Durkheim 1976, pp.1-20). 
Durkheim formulated a type of explanation in which the contingent 
and the necessary are brought together in order to construct a 
positive science of the social. This contrasts with the type of 
explanation used in the contemporary sociology of punishment. Here, 
as we saw, there is a presumption of discontinuity: contingency and 
change form an epistemological category; this is one reason these 
explanations pay so much attention to exploring the history of their 
subject-matter. 
There is, however, another, and more significant, contrast to be 
drawn between the conceptual vocabulary Durkheim uses and that in the 
contemporary sociology of punishment. As was said, for Durkheim the 
key to understanding punishment lies in tracing its moral and symbolic 
resonances, it is the relationship to the 'moral sentiments' that are 
given priority. With the notable exception of Ignatieff's auto-
critique (Ignatieff 1981, p.153ff), this line of exploration is more 
or less absent from the contemporary sociology of punishment. This 
does not mean there is no mention whatsoever of morality and symbols -
it would be difficult to escape using these terms altogether - but 
that such concepts are given at best a marginal explanatory status. 
The concept that occupies centre stage in these accounts is power. As 
Ignatieff puts it, the literature contains "three basic 
misconceptions: that the state enjoys a monopoly over punitive 
regulation of behaviour in society, that its moral authority and 
practical power are the binding sources of social order, and that all 
social relations can be described in the language of subordination" 
(Ignatieff 1981, pp.156-157. See also Young, 1983). 
The last of these three inter-related "misconceptions" is, 
perhaps the basic one. Ignatieff's point is that the modern 
sociology of punishment presumes the language of punishment is 
primarily, if not only, a language of power and that punishment is 
most adequately described as a repressive act. Moreover, he argues it 
is also presumed that there must be some "agent" who wields this 
power, either as an end in itself or as a means to a wider one, such 
as the maintenance of ruling class hegemony. 
Shortly we will investigate why these presumptions are made; why 
the sociology of punishment assumes this to be the best way to 
describe its subject-matter. But, the contrast with the Durkheimian 
scheme ought, already, to be clear. Durkheim's conceptual vocabulary 
is seen to be out of tune, because he is generally regarded as either 
having misunderstood the nature of power or of paying insufficient 
attention to it. There is only one place where he directly links 
power to punishment - in the Two Laws of Penal Evolution (1983) - and 
this is in the context of a description of a forced, pathological 
division of labour. Durkheim argues that punishment generally becomes 
less severe over time, with the exception of the development of 
"absolute power", where there is a return to a quasi-mechanical 
division of labour. Clearly, Durkheim evolved this notion of absolute 
power to account for the increase in the severity of physical 
punishments, the blood sanctions, during the absolute monarchies, 
particularly in France (remember this is where Foucault begins his 
story). For Durkheim, absolute power indicated a forced, as opposed 
to a spontaneous, division of labour, and is 'non-natural' in the 
sense that it constituted a period of reversal or ab4tration in the 
otherwise naturally developing order of history. 
Of course, much can be criticised here, but our point is that, 
for Durkheim, power and punishment are only directly linked in 
exceptional circumstances. There is no need to tie them together when 
explaining the state of "normal" social arrangements, power is not 
essential to the explanation of punishment. Such a framework simply 
lacks appeal to those who begin from the presumption that power is the 
key to understanding. 
My point in exploring this comparison is neither to resuscitate 
Durkheim unalloyed nor to suggest that there exist two mutually 
imcompatible conceptual vocabularies which we have to choose between. 
Rather, it is to note their existence and to observe that the current 
predominance of one in the contemporary literature has led to the 
other being largely overlooked. Durkheim's work is not the only 
example which could be used to make the same general point. The now 
rather forgotten essay of George Herbert Mead, "The Psychology of 
Punitive Justice" argues a very similar case. For Mead, punishment is 
based in the hostile, defensive passions which govern how penal 
institutions work and places limits on the success of attempts aimed 
at change or reform. As he puts it, "it is quite impossible 
psychologically to hate the sin and love the sinner" (Mead 1964, 
p.597). Again as Ignatieff points out, Adam Smith's analysis of 
punishment is carried out with little direct reference to the concepts 
of power or the state. Rather, punishment is analysed in terms of the 
"moral sentiments", the "dispassionate observer" and dissemination of 
the "sympathy" which Smith took to be the basis of all social 
relationships. And to go beyond Ignatieff, it is surely worth 
remembering that Smith, crudely understood as the founder of laissez-
faire economics, sub-entitled his most famous work, The Wealth of 
Nations, where this doctrine is purportedly set forth, an essay in 
"States Craft". In other words, in those situations where, to the 
modern way of looking at things, the state is assumed to be central -
the institutions of criminal law and punishment, no great mention is 
made of them, yet by comparison in the sphere of laissez-faire 
economics where the state is presumed to be absent, the term is 
explicitly used. 
In the next chapter we will explore the relationship between 
these two vocabularies further. Here, the comparison has helped bring 
out an important characteristic of the modern discipline - the central 
place it gives to power in explaining punishment. This characteristic 
also accounts for another feature of the contemporary literature 
mentioned in the introduction, what we called its instrumentalism. 
The contemporary sociology of punishment portrays penal institutions 
as "instruments of power" used by a superordinate agency to repress a 
less powerful, subordinate one. The prison, for example, is variously 
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analysed as a class or state tool or as a modality of power in its own 
right. "Agents" are seen to use punishment to achieve ends which lie 
outwith and beyond it. The criminal law, the prison, as we noted 
earlier, are perceived to shore up the hegemony and force of the 
ruling class. Or in Foucault's work, the prison disciplines offenders 
in order to turn them out as cogs in a capitalist machine, as well as 
reproducing an underclass of miscreants by continually failing to 
achieve its official objectives. In all cases and circumstances, the 
prison, methods of treatment, the criminal court, the complete penal 
apparatus, has a direct, instrumental function understood in terms of 
the dynamics of power~ 
At this point we need to ask two sets of questions: (a) what has 
all this to do with the ignoring of the fine? Of what relevance is 
our analysis of the contemporary literature to the existence of the 
paradox within it?, and (b) why does the literature analyse punishment 
in this uni-dimensional way? Why is it so concerned with power? 
The issue which lies behind the first set of questions is this. 
One could accept the analysis of the literature given above but 
observe that there is no reason why it should not be applied to the 
study of the fine. There are not immediately obvious reasons why the 
focus on power, the characteristic instrumentalism, ought to rule out 
concern with it. Indeed, if we are reminded of what lies behind 
Hermann Mannheim's characterisation of the fine - its lack of 
sensation and romance, its routine, instrumental nature - there exist 
good grounds for anticipating that the literature ought to take the 
fine very seriously indeed. But it does not and this is why the 
paradox exists. 
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It would be tempting now to rest our case by re-introducing the 
idea of estrangement. As there appears to be nothing in the framework 
of the contemporary sociology of punishment that in principle accounts 
for the lack of attention paid to the fine, we could point to the idea 
of estrangement and claim it explains all. We could say that the 
discipline gives no place to the fine on its explanatory agenda 
because it accepts the end product of the estrangement - the 
dissociation of money from punishment. But to rest here would be only 
to tell half of the story. As we set it out, the paradox is composed 
of two elements; one is the ignoring of the fine but the other is the 
central place given to the prison. While I think it has been shown 
that the contemporary literature doe3 take the prison as the object to 
be explained, no case has been argued for why this should be. 
The answer to this brings into focus the second set of questions 
outlined above, those asking why the contemporary literature is so 
concerned with power. My suggestion is the concentration on the 
prison is to be explained, in part, by the central place given to 
power. The connection between the prison and power is forged at two 
levels. First, in a society such as ours, whose master-theory of 
political obligation is liberalism, there is a 'natural' link between 
power and the deprivation of liberty. By this I mean there is a 
(modern) tendency to think of power always in terms of it as a force 
which sets limits on what people do. Foucault's theory of power 
endeavours to go beyond this conception by highlighting its positive, 
creative aspects as well as the negative ones recorded above, but the 
fact that he sees this as an extension of the conventional view is 
evidence of the extent to which the latter has monopolised modern 
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political theory. The idea of legitimate political power as ''negative 
liberty" (cf. Berlin 1969, Skinner 1984, Pocock 1986) gives to the 
prison, and theories of punishment generally, a central place. The 
description and justification of the conditions under which that most 
valuable of all conunodities, liberty, can be deprived occupies a 
pivotal role in political theory. There is an apparent natural 
connection between power - liberty - and the prison, quite simply 
because the study of the prison can tell us much about the nature of 
political power itself. 
With the exception of Foucault this connection between power and 
punishment is rendered in the literature as one between the state and 
penal sanctions, particularly the prison but also, as we argued 
earlier, those other disposals seen to mimic the type of power 
relationship the prison represents. The state, as Ignatieff noted 
(1981), is seen to monopolise the power to punish. Some theorists 
have made great play on this, in the sense they see the study of 
punishment as providing a very special vantage point from which to 
launch an analysis of the state and power generally. As Cohen (1985, 
p.15) puts it, the histories of punishment he reviews are "a history 
of Leviathan itself rather than a simple history of prison reform". 
This may be seen to rather overstate its case, but it is 
representative of a view that permeates much of the contemporary 
literature. As indicated, Foucault's work is a major exception to 
this trend, but only to the extent his more complex theory of power 
challenges the assumption that agents - be they individuals or 
collectives - can "own" power. For him power is a force in its own 
right. It is its own agent and occupies the same conceptual position 
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that the notion of the economy does within marxism - it is the prime 
mover. Foucault's work thus does not dissolve the conceptual linkage 
between power, punishment and the prison, but rather displaces the 
state or any agent from centre stage. 
The emphasis on power and its connection with the prison may seem 
overblown in its more ambitious theoretical claims, but that the link 
is made seems reasonable. The prison is about deprivation of liberty; 
in western societies the right to liberty is as close to an absolute 
as any right can be, liberty is at the core of much modern political 
theory, so to make the link between power and the prison is 
understandable. With this as the broad conceptual backdrop, one can 
see why the prison is given priority. To be very direct, there simply 
appears to be almost endless theoretical mileage in studying the 
prison. It is the criminologist's equivalent to the philosopher's 
stone, promising to turn base metal into gold. 
If this constitues a theoretical rationale justifying the focus 
on the prison there exists another important dimension to explore. 
The second level at which the link between power and the prison is 
forged has more to do with the practical, political purposes that 
underpin much of the contemporary sociology of punishment. Although, 
as was said, the modern discipline endeavoured to break out of the 
narrow "correctional box" it saw traditional penology as being 
confined within, it would be quite mistaken to believe that all 
concern with the practical and the political was in consequence 
dissolved. On the contrary, the modern sociology of punishment is 
deeply concerned with the practical, political implications of its 
subject-matter and this is directly relevant to understanding the 
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roots of its obsession with power and the prison. 
In contrast to traditional penology, the modern sociology of 
punishment has evinced a significantly different conception of the 
political. As well as the broadening of the theoretical quest we 
have looked at, there was an accompanying expansion in the range of 
political questions asked. If traditional penology can be seen as 
working within an assumed consensus between academics and policy-
makers, the modern sociology of punishment can be seen to have 
challenged this and to manifest a basically hostile attitude towards 
the use of power, and towards policy-makers and administrators. This 
is a somewhat simplified rendition of what has happened but the 
details of the story are well known and are told elsewhere (Cohen 
1974, Garland and Young 1983). It does, however, convey a sense of 
the changes that are perceived to have taken place. The fundamental 
attitude of many of those who work within the modern sociology of 
punishment can be summarised thus - beware of power, distrust those 
who hold it, resist its exercise, attack its institutions. 
An appreciation of this "radical" stance is quite fundamental to 
understanding the texture and scope of the modern discipline. To 
borrow a phrase from Frederick Jamieson (1981), the modern sociology 
of punishment exhibits a "political unconscious" which markedly 
affects its form and content. The questions posed, the structure of 
the explanatory agenda, reflect the political desires which are 
sometimes pushed underground and at other times are clear for all to 
see. Rothman's second book, Conscience and Convenience (1980) is an 
excellent example of the reciprocal relationship between political 
purpose and concrete inquiry. As Cohen notes (1985), Rothman clearly 
intends "lessons" and "examples" to be drawn from the way in which the 
good intentions of reformers were first accomrnodated and then blunted 
by the penal bureaucracy and the experts. Similar themes are 
explored, with the same intention, in Scull's work (1977, 1979, 1983) 
and perhaps most explicitly of all in Foucault's and Cohen's. 
Viewed in this way, the modern sociology of punishment can be 
understood as a muted, and somewhat under-developed sociology of 
power. The aim is to come to terms with the perceived contradictions 
of power by both evolving a theoretical frameifttrk for studying it and 
by laying the foundation of a politics that can resist it. Indeed, 
one probable reason why Foucault's work has had such an immense 
influence on the discipline is becau£e it deals explicitly, almost 
relentlessly, with punishment in this way. His work is an extended 
reflection on the nature of power and how its exercise can be 
resisted. This perhaps accounts for the reaction of some of his 
followers to criticisms claiming Foucault's history is partial or 
wrong. They say, such criticisms are beside the point precisely 
because Discipline and Punish is not really a history of the prison, 
but more a history and theory of power (see, for example, Cousins and 
Hussain (1984), or for a critical view, Garland,Cl98~. 
If the sociology of punishment is interpreted as a sociology of 
power, the concentration on the prison and the power relationships it 
represents becomes understandable. As the prison is about the 
exercise of power in a very dramatic way it is entirely comprehensible 
that it should be studied. And as other sanctions such as methods of 
treatment or community sanctions are seen, as we said, to mimic the 
prison in important ways, it is also understandable why they too have 
been analysed in a similar way. Although due recognition is often 
given to the fact that the reformers who called for and developed 
these sanctions saw them as alternatives to the prison, there is a 
tendency to play down the implications of this for analysis. Rather, 
these sanctions are analysed within the same instrumentalist 
framework, conceived in terms of power. Treatment is portrayed as 
another way of achievi.ng the same end - the repression and control of 
a subordinate population by a state captured by the ruling class. 
Once this framework is applied, then one can appreciate what allows 
theorists, such as Cohen, to claim that "the prison is the paradigm't 
for understanding the whole picture" (Cohen 1985, p.15). 
The above is not an exhaustive account either of the modern 
literature or of the reasons why it exhibits the paradox by 
concentrating on the prison and ignoring the fine. But it does 
capture what arguably have been the main trends. To fully understand 
the structure of the explanatory agenda, we would need both to probe 
more deeply and be more prosaic. One such deeper issue surrounds the 
significance of the body as a theme in much modern literature of all 
types. As Foucault (again) has argued, one can understand the 
emergence of what he calls "goverrunentality" - the institutions of 
governance understood in the broadest of ways - in the modern world in 
terms of their increasing control over the body and populations. 
Techniques have developed which endeavour to control the body, by 
division and classification into different populations and by 
discipline - what Foucault calls the realm of hie-politics. This 
touches on a theme central to this inquiry but which cannot be gone 
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into in depth at this point. However if we accept what Foucault says, 
then it is but a small conceptual leap to see the concentration on the 
prison as being tied up with the central place which control of the 
body now has in modern social life. Furthermore, we would also have 
to extend a point made in passing earlier. A full discussion of the 
significance of the prison and why it has such hold on the literature 
would necessitate an analysis of the emergence of the idea of liberty 
as an almost inalienable right which individuals surrender, only where 
they offend the corresponding right of others. More particularly we . 
would need to explore the relationship between concepts of indiv2ual 
liberty and the idea of personhood and the autonomy of the self. The 
former constitutes an essential part of the conceptual vocabulary we 
use to describe the latter; we perceive "individuality" partly in 
terms of the possession of liberty. Moreover, this ties in with the 
Foucauldian argument concerning hie-politics. There is a connection 
to be made between the body, its investment with liberty and the 
perception of self. This connection can be seen in demands or claims 
that individuals ought to control their own body as in the debate on 
abortion or more generally within feminism (although it is not 
confined just to those areas). As Mauss (1938, 1985) brilliantly 
argued many years ago, this conceptual apparatus is both culturally 
and historically contingent. Consequently, it ought to form part of 
the explanation both of how and why the prison emerged and of why it 
now holds centre stage in the contemporary sociology of punishment. 
These broader, deeper issues are necessarily raised by the topic 
we discuss, but they go beyond the literature itself. With the 
exception of Foucault's own work, they are occasionally alluded to (as 
3r 
in Cohen, 1985) but have yet, understandably, to be fully explored. 
On a more prosaic level, our account of why the literature 
discusses punishment in a vocabulary of power and centres on the 
prison, would have to consider in more detail the specific social 
contexts out of which the literature has emerged before it would be 
considered a full one. For example, it needs to be pointed out that 
there is a spectrum of political views within the discipline. 
Rothman's work is more "liberal" in tone compared to the anarchism of 
Cohen or Foucault, or the more orthodox Marxism of Melossi and 
Pavarini. As this influences the texture of explanation, it is 
important at least to record it. 
There are other reasons why the sociology of punishment 
concentrates on the prison. The institutional nexus within which the 
discipline of criminology is practised (see Cohen, 1972; Garland and 
Young, 1983), affects the issue in ways we have not yet explained. It 
is important to note that the main thrust of public policy since the 
early nineteenth century has centred upon the prison, methods of 
treatment and upon what are regarded as serious crimes. By contrast, 
there has been little policy interest shown in the fine or other 
monetary sanctions or the offences for which they are used. One 
important practical result of this is there is little "primary 
evidence" in the form of blue books or government reports to study. 
This is evidenced in the publication of the massive Radzinowicz and 
Hood volume on The Emergence of Penal Policy (1986). Based in an 
exhaustive study of the primary sources, this book devotes only four 
pages to the fine, although part of their general thesis is that 
previous histories have exaggerated, as a matter of historical fact, 
the actual significance of the prison in nineteenth century penal 
policy. Given the methods these authors use one can conclude the 
brevity of the entry on the fine is related to the scarcity of primary 
sources. Recently, fines and other monetary sanctions have become 
more topical, but only due either to the problems the fine creates for 
the wider penal system - the imprisonment of fine defaulters - or, as 
we pointed out earlier, as part of the wider "victim-movement", and 
then the interest is not in fines but in compensation. This has not 
resulted in studies of the fine itself, because it is not the fine 
that is really being discussed. 
Again, the focus on the prison is due to the restricted 
historical range of much of the work in the sociology of punishment. 
As most explanations begin only with the "birth of the prison", 
earlier practices in which money played a central role, are not really 
brought into the story. Earlier penal practices are considered, as we 
have said, just as a backcloth to the emergence of the modern system 
and not as topics in their own right. Moreover, in those rare 
instances (Foucault, Spierenburg) when attention has been paid to the 
earlier practices it has been highly selective and focused on the 
"blood sanctions" such as transportation, whipping, capital sentences 
and related bodily punishments. This is to study just one vector 
along which punishment has worked. The other vector which I claim it 
is essential to analyse if a balanced picture is to emerge -
punishment as the exchange or deprivation of resources - is 
conceptualised in a vocabulary that places it outwith the terms of 
debate. Practices lying along this other vector are conceived in 
terms which make them belong more to the private law of delict and 
contract than to the law dealing with crime. (Again, the term 
compensation is a favourite.) Of course, the meaning of concepts 
~ 
changeS; punishment aew means something different than it once did. 
ft 
But this does not justify either the ignoring of earlier practices or 
the reconceiving of them in modern terms. Rather, it means we must 
study how and why meanings have changed. Beginning inquiry with 
modern conceptions and then pushing them back into history is not only 
unhelpful, it is wrong. It limits analysis, it means the inquiry 
works with a conceptual framework that selects only that evidence 
which is relevant to modern conceptions and places other evidence 
beyond gaze. 
But is it a Paradox? 
Let us now return full circle to the Martian. Have we said 
enough to explain to him our way of explaining punishment? In one 
sense we probably have. We have explained to him why we conceive of 
punishment in terms of the prison and why the literature reproduces 
this. Essentially we have been describing the rules by which we come 
to recognise a certain institution, the prison, as the exemplar of 
punishment. Contained in this is an implicit invitation for him to 
"go native" or at least to be enough of an anthropologist to empathise 
with our cultural norms and practices. But would this be enough? 
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Does the invitation to go "culturally relative" discharge the burden? 
Does it show that what has been described as a paradox is not really a 
paradox at all or that it can safely be ignored? 
It seems to me the Martian could respond in several ways. He 
could say, yes, "I understand your native practices, your norms and 
values, I even applaud your politics, but you asked me to survey your 
penal system and, according to rules of reasoning, which you claim to 
be important, I have delivered an accurate report. Why, therefore, do 
you resist my description of your system of punishment as one 
characterised by the taking away of money? Surely the paradox you 
experience is real and cannot be wished away?" Is there much to say 
in reply to this obdur?te Martian that would shore up the literature 
as it now stands? 
There are several answers, some more reasonable than others, but 
all, it is suggested, ultimately fail. One response would be to say 
that fines are not "really punishments". Several things could be 
meant by this. The strongest meaning would be the literal one - that 
fines are not "punishments" but are better classed under some other 
general heading such as "regulations". Indeed, one can discern an 
analogous case in the literature; fines levied on traffic and other 
minor offences are often called regulatory or characterised as post-
hoc licences. Again, as we saw in the literature on white-collar 
crime, there exists a certain line of argument which sees the use of 
fines as evidence that the powerful place themselves beyond 
incrimination, beyond true punishment. The literal argument can be 
strengthened. To the above, can be added the following - it could be 
pointed out that "punishment criteria" are not the only ones used in 
the penal system, for example, in sentencing. Other criteria, such as 
those of individualised treatment, consideration of mercy, pure 
expediency, and compensation are all used as well; so it is quite 
II 
unnecessary to characterise all disposals as punishments. What we 
need, it could be said, is a more subtle and discriminating framework 
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to encapsulate the differing principles in use. This fuller, broader 
account would presumably use some generic term or concept like social 
control and then differentiate between the various types of classes of 
disposal according to the criteria consistent with the generic 
concept. Alternatively, each sanction could be examined in detail in 
order to establish its characteristics, its particular type of 
rationality (a Foucauldian tactic) and then be related to some all 
encompassing notion. Which ever course is chosen the important 
analytical and empirical point is that there is no sociological reason 
to characterise the penal system by one undifferentiated single term. 
The Martian could find much to agree with in this argument. But 
he would be wise to say also that it is one which has yet to be made 
~ut in a consistent fashion in the litera;~ture. Also, he might want 
to examine more closely what is being argued and wish to point out 
some of the consequences that seem to follow. 
For example, the claim that fines are not punishments could mean 
either that, in a formal definitional sense, they lack the attributes 
necessary to qualify as punishments or it could have a lesser, 
commonsense meaning - people do not regard fines as punishments 
because of their association with the minor, less serious offences. 
There is also a third meaning that cuts across the other two. It 
could be argued that because fines do not harm the individual in the 
same way as imprisonment does, they are not a punishment. The issue 
here need not be restricted just to the degree of pain caused but to 
the type of pain. It could be argued that for an act to be a 
punishment it must inflict harm on the person's body or character. 
These are different but related arguments. The first is actually 
the least interesting 1or controversial, although it does give rise to 
some important points. If we take - and allow our Martian now to see 
- a standard, accepted definition of punishment, such as Hart's, we 
and he would conclude that the fine meets all its requirements. 
According to Hart (1968, pp.4-5), there are five elements or 
characteristics of punishment: 
(i) it must involve pain or other consequence normally 
considered unpleasant; 
(ii) it must be for an offence against legal rules·; 
(iii) it must be of an actual or supposed offender for this 
offence; 
(iv) it must be intentionally administered by human beings 
other than the offender; and 
(v) it must be imposed and administered by an authority 
constituted by a l·egal system against which the offence 
is committed. 
~ 
The fine mets all these requirements. It is painful and can only ,... 
be used in the penal system subject to the conditions described by 
points (ii) - (iv). Indeed, its use in "private" institutions, for 
example, University Library fines, meets these conditions as well. 
(The University is the legal authority, its rules, voluntarily entered 
into by individuals equal legal rules, etc.) 
So in the formal definitional sense, fines are punishments. 
Methods of treatment, however judged by this definition, are not. 
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Treatment need not involve the infliction of pain; its use does not 
require the "client" to have breached legal rules as the operation of 
the Scottish Children's Hearings System shows. 
What sense can be made of this conclusion? If fines are 
punishments, it is difficult to see why any other term should be used 
to describe them. This shifts the burden of the argument back onto 
those who would wish to use some other term, like regulation, to 
describe fines. Not only are regulations different from punishments 
(see Finnis, 1972), but it is of importance to recognise that 
sentencers do regard fines in this way. In Chapter 6, we describe 
how sentencers justify their use of the fine in the classical 
vocabulary associated with the desc~iption of punishment - retribution 
and deterrence. We should not lose sight of this point. The 
perception actors have of their practices is an essential part of any 
explanation of them. While we may not wish to restrict accounts just 
to this level, it cannot be ignored. 
The meaning of the claim that fines are not punishments must 
therefore refer to the other senses of it outlined above. In 
reflecting on these, it is clear that the type of argument involved is 
very different from the formal definitional one just encountered. 
Both the second and third meanings of the claim refer to a wider 
cultural perception of the nature of punishment and also of crime. In 
both cases, the claim is that the fine does not meet our cultural 
expectation of what punishment is like. First, because of its 
presumed association with the less serious offences, second because of 
the sort of pain it delivers. At this stage of my argument it is not 
important to despute the validity of these propositions, except to say 
that the first greatly underestimates the use of fines in "serious 
crimes" (see Chapter 4 and Bottoms, 1983). What is important to note 
is that once the argument shifts to the cultural perception of the 
nature of punishment it touches on a theme central to this study. 
Both the senses of the claim that fines are not punishment now being 
discussed are examples of the cultural estrangement of punishment from 
money. They are instances of the cultural resistance that exists to 
bring punishment and money together. 
There are other arguments that could be made in response to the 
Martian. Again, they take the form of partial defences of the 
existing literature and therefore of the wider cultural perception of 
punishment on which it is based. Some criminologists may respond 
that, as it is only recently the fine has become so popular, the 
discipline has not yet had time, as it were, to catch up. Others may 
say that as the prison carries so well the burden of the modern idea 
of punishment, there is no reason to look at other sanctions, 
especially the fine. 
The first of these responses is most unsatisfactory. It is wrong 
empirically. As we show in Chapters 4 and 5, the fine and other 
monetary disposals have always been the most frequently used 
sanctions. For a relatively short period in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries their use was limited in serious crimes, 
indeed it was displaced by the prison, but if this is compared with 
what happened before and after, it can be seen as an interruption in a 
long-term historical process. Also, it must be retorted, it is not as 
if criminology has really used firm empirical data to ground its 
historical and contemporary explanation of the penal system. 
Although criminology is often castigated and derided for its 
empiricism, it has not based its explanations on the most obvious of 
empirical sources - the officially published statistics describing 
patterns in the use of sanctions. Although there are well known 
limitations with this source of data it is easily available. In 
Scotland, for example,. statistics describing the use of sanctions in 
all crime and offences and for all procedures, are available from 
1897. Before that the material is scanty, but primary sources do 
exist. The most recent general account of the penal system, Cohen's, 
(1985) repeats this peculiar position. Not only is his study based on 
weak evidence (see Young, 1986), but he appears to put to one side 
this sort of statistical evidence. He argues the "most visible and 
open" source of data is the "actual stories and words used by the 
people who run the control system" (p.10). Although we use this 
source of data too later on, it is strange to see it described in this 
'1\ 
It is hardly "open" or "visible" and interpretation is fraught 
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way. 
with deep methodological difficulties. 
It is not ridiculous to suggest that if criminologists had used 
this most easily available of sources as the basis of their work, then 
a very dif erent picture of the penal system may have already been 
produced. In particular, the position and significance of the prison 
for our understanding of the penal system may already be quite 
different. As it stands, the at best highly selective use of this 
data is most unsatisfactory. 
The last response brings together and sunnnarises an important 
counter argument. So far the Martian's case rests on a particular 
version of how sociological explanation works. The Martian reminds us 
that empirical regularity is normally taken to be the basis on which 
sociologists characterise systems (and in that sense explain them). 
While it cannot be denied this is arguably the method of sociological 
explanation it would be wrong to suggest it is the only one. There 
exists another important version of explanation, that although not 
mutually exclusive to the Martian's, does stress different 
methodo]tt~ical protocols. This other method works by constructing 
what we may call "focal meanings" or ideal types. This is a mode of 
explanation that runs, as Finnis (1983) points out, from Aristotle 
through to Weber. It differs from the Martian's explanation as it 
contends the important thing to do in explaining social phenomencia. is 
to capture their cultural meaning by constructing their pure or 
standard case. This need have nothing directly to do with how often a 
particular phenomenon occurs, although one would expect there to be 
some relationship between regularity of occurrence and significance of 
meaning. Hence, if we wish to explain "law", Finnis argues, we need 
not go about this by noting every instance in which the thing called 
law is used. Rather, as Hart and others do, we elaborate the focal 
meaning and then compare each usage to it. As a result, there will be 
some circumstances which fully meet the focal meaning and others which 
shade into it. 
Now with a certain generosity of spirit, we could argue that this 
is what is happening in the modern sociology of punishment. That 
theorists intend the prison to be the focal meaning of modern 
punishment because it most completely carries. forward and clarifies 
its meaning. The attention paid to the prison thus is justified and 
4~ 
the Martian is not so much mistaken in his objections but rather too 
narrow. This is a strong argument, not easily put to one side. 
However, does it defeat the Martian? 
It certainly does not in the form it is put above. Even if it is 
accepted that the prison constitutes the focal meaning of modern 
punishment, this does not justify the lack of attention paid to the 
fine. The first part of the argument cannot be used in support of the 
second. :Also, the Martian may well ask how we construct this focal 
meaning without recourse to some notion of statistical regularity at 
some point. But, most important, the Martian can accept this argument 
although it may lead to some qualification in his own. The Martian 
could concede that prison does constitute the focal meaning of 
punishment, but still require the sociologist to come to terms with 
the significance the fine has because of its preponderant usage. This 
appears to be an eminently reasonable position. It suggests the 
resulting explanation will be much more complex, but this is hardly an 
objection. 
If the sociologist accepts this, then significant changes follow. 
The sociologist will be forced to rethink the nature of the 
relationship between the prison and other sanctions, particularly the 
fine. At the risk of being pre-emptive, the sociologists may well 
have to reconceptualise the prison as being primarily of symbolic 
importance. There is a potential in the existing literature for just 
this sort of theorising and analysis but it is one which is woefully 
underdeveloped. Once this point is reached, however, the texture of 
explanation alters. To put it crudely, the instrumentalism of the 
explanations will become played down and symbolism played up; the 
conceptual scheme associated with Durkheim although not restricted 
just to him comes into focus. A different sort of conceptual 
vocabulary becomes necessary. One that is able to incorporate the 
analysis of symbols and indeed of myth. Such a vocabulary has yet to 
be developed in this area. For some, Foucault would no doubt point 
the way. Whatever the direction followed, the established 
conventional picture is challenged; new questions emerge to be asked 
and answered. We could no longer be content either with an analysis 
couched just in terms of discourses or one couched only in terms of 
practices. The relationship between the two becomes crucial and needs 
to be faced. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has endeavoured to show that the study of the fine 
raises serious questions for our present understanding of the penal 
system and how we go about explaining it. The problems posed for the 
existing sociological literature by the appearance of the Martian 
cannot be wished or explained away. Rather his apearance, troubling 
as it may be, should make sociologists and criminologists think again. 
The existing sociological literature on punishment exhibits, so 
it is claimed, a paradox. It attempts to account for the nature of 
penal practice with no, or at best very little, attention being paid 
to the most coIIUnonly used of penal sanctions, the fine. Because of 
this, the literature itself, it has been argued, provides evidence for 
the existence of the cultural estrangement of punishment from money. 
That it does this is the justification for the long review of it 
undertaken. It is through acknowledging the existence of this 
estrangement that we have been able to account for the paradox in the 
literature. 
The Chapter suggests also the need to come to terms with the 
limitations of a certain style of thinking about punishment; one which 
is characterised by the conception of it in terms of power and as an 
instrument. This style, deeply embedded as it is in contemporary 
sociology, fails, so we argue, to convince. Most significantly, it 
underestimates the importance of symbolism; of punishment as a 
symbolic social act that cannot be reduced, analytically, to a means 
ends relationship. 
What we must do next is to say more about the nature of the 
process by which punishment has become estranged from money. Not only 
is this a key to understanding the structure of the modern penal 
system of its history, and the place of the fine and the prison in it, 
but also in describing it, we shall begin to lay down the elements of 
an alternative conceptual framework. 
CHAPTER 2 
The Cultural Estrangement of Punishment and Money 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the cultural estrangement of 
punishment and money, first by being more precise about its meaning, 
secondly, by outlining.its function in the criminal justice system and 
thirdly by examining its relationship to the fine. The first of these 
objectives is achieved by analysing an example where estrangement is 
particularly clear; this is of the use and non use of fines in cases of 
rape. A number of other themes and sub plots are explored as well; in 
particular, I develop further my argument concerning the need for a 
conceptual vocabulary sensitive to the relationship between punishment and 
the moral sentiments. 
The meaning and nature of estrangement 
At the risk of prolixity, I begin by sununarising what has been said so 
far about the estrangement of punishment and money. The term refers to a 
process in which money is perceived as being unable to fulfil general 
cultural expectations of the nature of punishment. To argue this in a 
slightly different and more precise way, I argue money is seen as 
• inappropriate for dealing with certain types of criminal harms and t~ is 
clearest only in certain circumstances. These are where a serious crime 
is involved and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system is in 
question. However, estrangement does have broader, but less potent, 
effects on the criminal justice system as a whole. For example, the scale 
of values used to assess the seriousness of punishment and crime is 
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organised partly around the idea that fines are not "proper" punishments. 
While the relationship between this scale and the day-to-day operation of 
the criminal justice system is complex (see part two), it does form the 
backdrop to sentencing practice and thus has an influence on the use of 
disposals generally. 
Portrayed this way, the process of estrangement is essentially a 
cultural phenomeneta. It is tied up with the way punishment and money are 
viewed and harm evaluated. At its heart lies a complex process of moral 
and symbolic evaluation. Although these evaluations take place inside 
institutions and structures, it would be a mistake, I suggest, to try and 
understand them as the simple consequences of power and ideology. Neither 
the actors who make these evaluations, nor the cultures they draw from, 
should be regarded as the passive effects, mere tragers, of overbearing 
structural forces. What follows, is not an exercise in the unmasking or 
deconstructing of ideologies. There is no hidden truth, strategy or 
purpose which I seek to lay bb..re. Rather what I intend to do is to 
unravel the complex processes involved in estrangement, and to describe 
them and their relationships to one another. Once this is done it will 
then be possible to return and consider the questions of how the process of 
estrangement is related to institutions and what its wider social functions 
are. 
Punishment, Money and Rape 
That the fine is generally seen as an inappropriate punishment for rape 
is clear. Although in Scots and English criminal law the fine can, 
theoretically be used, there exist well known and entrenched sentencing 
practices in both jurisdictions which make this a near impossibility. A 
sentencer who used the fine to "punish" a rapist would risk being perceived 
as incompetent. The public and judicial furorethat follows the very rare 
use of fines in these cases shows both how deeply this sentencing practice 
is embedded and how closely it resonates with public opinion. For 
example, the infamous, unreported, English case of R v Allen (January 
1982), in which a judge fined a man for raping a hitch-hiker confirms these 
points. In the media coverage that followed public recognition of what 
had happened, the judge was pilloried. Indeed, questions were asked in 
the House, this in turn, causing the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, to 
comment. As a result of this case and others in which inappropriately 
"light" sentences had been seen to be given (not all fines), Lord Lane 
issued sentencing guidelines which declared the normal punishment for rape 
to be a lengthy prison sentence. (The Scottish "practice" is the same: 
for a description see Nicholson (1985 pp 52-53 for coIIUnents on Conlon V. 
H.M.A., 1982, S.C.C.R. 141; Allen V. H.M.A. 1983, S.C.C.R. 182 and Barbour 
v. H.M.A., 1982, s.c.c.R. 195.) 
Now why should this be the case? Why do these sentencing practices 
exist which make the fine for all practicable purposes an entirely 
inappropriate punishment for rape, although, as has been said, it is a 
theoretical possibility? 
One answer would be that the fine is not used because to do so would 
upset the scale of values implicit in the system by which the seriousness 
of crime and punishment are assessed. This scale can be broadly 
characterised thus: For crimes which harm the body or person of the victim 
the appropriate sanction is one which, within strictly defined legal 
limits, does the same in return. As the prison comes closest in the 
British legal systems to doing this, it is seen as the appropriate 
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sanction. For those wrongful actions which are not pelceived to harm the 
body or person of the victim, other less serious punishments can be brought 
into play. Quite clearly, within current conceptions the fine exists near 
the bottom end of this scale. Other considerations, of course, affect the 
scale, such as conceptions of what is mala in se as contrasted to mala 
prohibita, as do notions of dangerousness and public safety. One reason 
rapists and other "dangerous" criminals are "locked up" is because they are 
seen to pose a threat to the public. (On this see Bottoms (1977): he 
characterises the structure as a "bifurcated" one; prison for the 
dangerous offender, fines and other lenient sanctions for ordinary ones; 
treatment considerations can be significant as well.) 
As sentence'S are required to make their decisions in terms of this ,... 
scale of values all seems to fall neatly into place. The fine is 
inappropriate in cases of rape because it belongs to the wrong end of this 
spectrum. To be plain about it, the fine is perceived to be inappropriate 
because it does not deliver an adequate quantum of pain. Ideas of 
proportionality are quite central to sentencing practice; a serious harm, 
intentionally inflicted on the innocent has to be met with an equivalent 
one equally intentionally inflicted. If any of these considerations are 
upset, the scale of values is compromised and the legitimacy both of the 
actor who caused the upset and of the system as a whole is potentially 
threatened. 
But we cannot leave the issue here. The scale of values is not a 
neutral mechanical device. It is not simply about the degree of harm and 
pain caused to victims and offenders but also about the type. If it were 
just about the former then there is no convincing reason why fines should 
not be used in rape cases or, at the other extreme, why motoring offenders, 
for parking offences should not be imprisoned for short periods. The 
levying of a very large fine can cause considerable pain to the offender. 
Depriving an individual of money - a commodity seen as essential in our 
society -can be extremely damaging. It limits choice, it restricts social 
intercourse and social interation. While it does not literally "lock 
someone away", the fine, if large enough, can cause destitution and penury 
and thereby restrict the effective exercise of liberty. But I suggest 
even if the rapist were fined his total income for ten years, it would 
stE 1. be perceived,,, as an inapproprate sanction; why? 
The answer I propose is because the fine is seen to be the wrong sort 
of pain and suffering for the type of harm rape is regarded to be. It 
seems wrong to deal with a crime which so devastates the victim by a 
commodity like money. It appears morally repugnant to suggest that 
everything about a person can be translated into a monetary equivalent. 
Rather, in contemporary perceptions: there exists a core set of values and 
personal attributes we resist being brought into contact with money or any 
other material resource. To put this another way, there are certain 
facets of being a person which are reserved - those considered to be 
constitutive of personhood and individuality. We invest these facets with 
deep emotional intensity because to do otherwise would threaten our sense 
of moral integrity and wholeness. Sexuality is now seen as one such facet 
and this is why we balk at the idea of the rapist being fined. It appears 
tantamount to declaring that "the person" can be bought and sold like a 
commodity in the market. 
The reasons why it is seen as wrong to fine rapist thus are essentially 
moral ones. Not just in the obvious sense that rape is morally wrong but 
also because we see it as morally wrong to use money in these 
circumstances. Our moral sentiments are offended by the very notion. To 
use another Smithian term, our natural "sympathy" is affronted. 
This argument can be expressed in a more analytical way. Recently 
both Dorothy Thompson (1986) and Robert Nozick (1974), have argued for the 
existence of what they call "uncompensatable for harms". What they have 
in mind is this. For most of the time and for most harms committed 
against us, we are happy to accept a "principle of compensation". That 
is, the harm committed by the offender is analogous to a debt and as long 
as payment is made to settle this debt, the relationship is restored or at 
least patched up. The payment need not be in money but usually is; as 
Thompson argues, we conventionaly accept sums of money as. the price 
individuals have to pay for damaging us. According to her, the law of 
delict and tort are based on this "principle of compensation". However, 
there are some types of harm, committed in certain circumstances, which we 
exclude from these arrangements. 
the "uncompensatable for harms". 
These harms, Thompson and Nozick call, 
How do these second category of harms 
differ from the first? Nozick's answer is that the difference lies in the 
extent they are seen to affect the individual. He asks us to imagine the 
individual as being surrounded by a "line" or "hyper plane" drawn in moral 
space. The line is a boundary which other individuals are prohibited from 
crossing or transgressing. If they do they cannot compensate us. Rather 
in these circumstances they are punished. But the punishment is 
determined not by us, but by the agency whose task it is to patrol this 
boundary and keep it in good order - the state. We need not be concerned 
for the moment as to why this task of boundary maintenance is the state's 
rather than our own responsibility. As this stage, I am more concerned to 
draw parallels between Thompson's and Nozick's argument and mine 
concerning the estrangement of punishment and money. 
If we stretch matters slightly we can describe the way the criminal 
justice system works in terms of this distinction between those harms for 
which compensation is allowed and those for which it is not. My 
suggestion is that for most of the time and in most circumstances, a 
principle of compensation is, in fact, at work in the criminal justice 
system. By this I do not mean that, in the technical legal sense, 
Compensation Orders as defined, for instance, by the 1980 Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act, are handed out in dozens, but that the heavy reliance on 
the fine is analagous to the principle tft compensation. In other words 
for most harms, the offender is allowed to pay a sum of money and matters 
end there (provided payment is made). The recipient of the "compensation" 
and the agent who is owed the debt, of course, is the court and behind the 
court, the state. However, there are some harms, like rape, which cannot 
be dealt with by this principle. These harms, these serious crimes, are 
the focal point of punishment and it is the response to them which largely 
determines the view individuals have of the nature of punishment in 
general, no matter what is happening in the rest of the system. Moreover, 
to maintain the coherence and simplicity of the message, a series of codes 
exist one of which is what I have called the cultural estrangement of 
punishment and money. As a code it works at several levels. For 
example, it crystallises the images of punishment by suggesting that what 
happens in response to serious crimes constitutes the normal practice of 
the criminal justice system. In more concrete terms, as this response is 
thought inevitably to be a sentence of imprisonment, the prison becomes the 
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"focal meaning" of the system and of our knowledge of it. At another 
level, the estrangement of punishment and money, facilitates the use of the 
compensation principle. As we saw, in the scale of values used to assess 
seriousness, the fine occupies a lowly place. The distance between it and 
the prison allow a de facto "principle of compensation" to operate. 
The parallels drawn between the notion of uncompensatable for harms and 
the idea of estrangement ought not to be taken too far. It is of crucial 
importance that the response to less serious crimes and of fences are 
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described in official language as punishments rather than as compensations. 
As one theme of this thesis is that we must pay close attention to 
conceptual vocabularies and their context of use we must be sensitive to 
this. In the second part of this work we show how crucial the conception 
of fines as punishments is for the operation of the criminal justice system 
as a whole. It is because sentencErs see fines as punishments that 
potential conflicts and tensions between the various strata or layers of 
the system are kept in check. Thus, although punishment and money are 
estranged in the case of symbolically significant crimes like rape, the 
fine comes into its own as a punishment in everyday, less dramatic 
circumstances. It is the widespread usage of the fine, that justifies my 
suggestion that a de facto principle of compensation, is at work in the 
criminal justice system. 
One parallel that we have not yet explored concerns the nature of the 
boundary in moral space which Nozick claims is drawn around individuals and 
our notion of the reserve facets of personhood. My argument is that 
"punishment" starts at the boundary line, or hyper plane. The reserve 
facets of personhood lie within the boundary and this is one reason why 
reaction to the violation of them is so emotional and intense. It is this 
reaction which is channelled into what we call punishment. 
Another interesting complexity can be brought out which relates to the 
role of the state in boundary maintenance. It seems paradoxical that on 
one side of the boundary there exist all the most "private" aspects of 
individuality yet that the agency charged with its upkeep - the state - is 
one of the most public of institutions. A good deal of modern political 
philosophy is concerned with where this boundary is to be drawn. For 
Nozick, there is an acute tension between the two sides; according to him, 
the state's control o~er the boundary should be minimal and in present 
social arrangement is too great. Liberals, too evince concern over how 
"tightly" the boundary should be drawn; they wish to provide maximum space 
within it. Arguably, a socialist would wish to take down the boundary 
altogether or, at the very least, shrink it a great deal~ 
The example of the (non)use of fines in cases of rape and the parallels 
drawn with the concept of uncompensatable for harms, helps clarify what is 
meant by the cultural estrangement of punishment from money. As was said, 
at the heart of estrangement lies a process of evaluating harm, both that 
caused by the crime and that which is to be inflicted on the offender. As 
we have seen, in certain circumstances there is a refusal to allow money to 
be bought into a close relationship with certain types of harm and when 
this happens, estrangement has occurred. Although the actual occas~ions 
on which estrangement is actively brought into play are few and far between 
- because serious crimes, by definition, are rare - it nevertheless 
continually effects the way the criminal justice system operates. It 
plays a role in the scale of values used to assess harms; "real crimes" -
those which are mala in se - deserve punishment which effectively means 
imprisonment; regulatory offences and less serious crimes - the mala 
prohibita - can be fined; effectively this means the principle of 
compensation is at work. 
Viewed this way, the phenomenon of estrangement concerns the ranking of 
values involved in the process of evaluating harms. It is like a 
shorthand statement, a code, whose message is that certain types of harm 
are inconnnensurable. In this sense, it can be perceived as an aspect of 
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the Aristotelian idea that there exists no "just measure" of punishment. 
Rather, the justice of punishment, is conditioned by cultural forces. 
These forces mould perceptions of what sorts of values can be brought into 
contact and what sort cannot. 
The functions of estrangement: a Weberian interlude? 
As I have expounded it, the estrangement of punishment and money serves 
important functions. Essentially these are all to do with legitimating 
the criminal justice system and maintaining its authority and hold over the 
populace. According to Weber, an institution is legitimate, in the 
sociological sense, only when actors accept it and any claims it may make 
on them; they feel obligated to it. Hence, Weber distinguishes power 
from authority by the nature of the relationship subordinate actors have to 
those in superordinate positions. In a power relationship, the latter 
control the actions of the former by the imposition of will, irregardless 
of the wishes of the weaker party. A relationship of authority is one in 
which the subordinate party accepts that the superordinate one has "a 
right" to make rules and issue orders; legitimacy thus presupposes 
obligation and voluntary acceptance.( w~,. q6'.). 
Weber also argued, there exist three ideal types of legitimate 
authority: the traditional, the charismatic and the rational- legal. The 
first of these is based on the acceptance of traditional and innnemorial 
custom; in the second type, legitimacy rests on the "power" of the 
charismatic leader who breaks established and traditional rules and 
patterns of behaviour. In the third type, legitimacy rests on the 
acceptance of rules as the most rational and efficient means of co-
ordinating complex social relationships and institutions. In this type, 
the idea of rule-governed, calculable behaviour is all important. The 
bureaucracy exemplfies this type of authority. 
Although Weber is ambiguous about it, there is the suggestion that this 
scheme is evolutionary. Societies develop from traditional authority 
through charismatic, towards the rational-legal. While, he never rules 
out the co-existence of one type of authority with another, his broader 
thesis concerning the emergence of rationality in the occident suggests 
that he saw the three types of authority as succeeding one another in time. 
Law and legal institutions play a very important part in this. For Weber, 
law epitomises authority at each stage of development. Hence, in modern, 
western, industrial society law, according to him, becomes, increasingly 
rational and means-end related. Substantive rationality - calculation on 
the basis of value - is superJeded by formal rationality - calculation on 
the basis of rules. 
If we now apply this framework to our subject matter, we would expect 
to be able to describe the modern insitutions of punishment and the process 
of estrangement, in a language which emphasised their formal-legal, formal 
rational attributes. We should expect to be able to describe how the 
process of estrangement contributes to the furtherance of the formally 
rational nature of the system. 
Indeed, from the Weberian point of view, the fine could be seen as an 
exemplification of the formally-rational; as the mark of its triumph over 
value and substance. However, if my account of estrangement has any 
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plausibility then it cannot be described in this way. The use and non-use 
of money in penal relations is not a cold, mechanical process reducible to 
description in terms of neutral bureaucratic rules. Rather, usage of the 
fine rests on what, is better seen in Weber's own terms, as substantive 
rationality. 
The exposition of Weber given above is a little unfair and rather text-
book like. As recent scholarship has shown (see, for example, 
Whimster and Lash, 1987), Weber was far more concerned with the role of 
values in modern society than the received accounts of his work allows. 
At the centre of his thought there lies a deep, almost romantic, conception 
of the conflict between different types of rationality; a concern with the 
social forces that threaten to destroy the spiritual and the substantive in 
modern life. But use of the text book version outlined above has been a 
useful ploy because it highlights the role values play in punishment. 
This does not mean, of course, that we must simply switch vocabularies and 
disregard the formal legal and the formal rational altogether. Rather, 
the task becomes that of describing the social contexts of different 
rationalities and teasing out how they interrelate. A good part of the 
second half of the thesis tries to do this. 
There is however, one area of law dealing with the evaluation of 
personal harms that is more easy to describe in the language of formal 
' rationality. This is the area of delict. In the law of delict, money is 
regularly used to deal with harms committed against the person. Here the 
principle of compensation is allowed to operate at every level; there 
exists no category of "uncompensatable for harms. Rather, once fault is 
admitted or proved, money is brought into a direct relationship with even 
the most serious damage done to the person. There are no "reserved 
facets" of personality which remain beyond the compensation principle. 
This does not mean there is no ranking of values, but that there is no 
break in the scale which makes the use of money impossible after a certain 
point. 
Of course there are important differences between the law of delict and 
that of crime and punishment. The latter is based upon the notion of 
intention and presupposes the involvement of the state. However, these 
differences support my broader argument. It is because "values", 
substantive concerns of a particular and distinct type, are central to the 
criminal law that the estrangement of punishment from money exists. Where 
these particular concerns are absent, money is far more easy to bring into 
the picture. 
A similar process is, in fact, at work in certain areas of criminal law 
those dealing with moving traffic offences and violation of health and 
safety regulations. In these areas, the need to prove intention is absent 
and supplanted by a doctrine of strict liability. The removal of the need 
to prove intention allows fines to be used although the actual damage done 
to an individual can be very great indeed. Motor cars and industrial 
machines are dangerous and can cause immense damage, even death. But 
because "criminal law type" values are marginal, money can be brought into 
operation much more easily. 
work. 
The principle of compensation is allowed to 
This all suggests that to understand the functions of estrangement we 
must appreciate the values for which it stands as a code. The cultural 
estrangement of punishment from money is central to the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system. It shows the system takes seriously the 
intentional infliction of pain by one person upon another. It stands in a 
symbolic relationship to the collective values that Durkheim argued lay at 
the foundation of punishment. It is part of the process by which 
punishment appeals to the moral sentiments; it encapsulates the "natural 
sympathy" we feel for our fellows by indicating that, if another 
intentionally harms some part of them that we see as central, we will 
collectively respond. 
The complexity of the process however has to be recognised. It is 
ironic to note that a language conventionally associated with money is 
often used to describe punishment. It is said that criminals have to "pay 
back their debt" to society. These debts could be conceived as moral 
ones, of course, but the idea of debt is part of the vocabulary we normally 
identify with finance. The prese1ice of ambiguity and ambivalence ought 
not to surprise us. As Pocock (1987) has argued the key concepts of 
legitimatory discourse have an inherent "polyvalency". Moral and 
political language is a complex, fractured vocabulary that is able to 
sustain a multiplicity of meanings. 
The Wider Social Context of Estrangement 
So far we have described the nature of estrangement and its 
relationship to the system of values internal to law. Although this goes 
a certain way to explain why the phenomenon exists, it does not really face 
the central issue of why money is perceived to be inappropriate. Why 
there is this resistance to treating all aspects of the individual as 
having a direct monetary equivalent? Money, after all, is perceived to be 
central to modern social life in so many way. Although it is wrong to 
reduce the whole of life to a mad rush to gain cash, a good part of each of 
our lives is spent in the dedicated and serious pursuit of wealth. While 
money is said not to guarantee happiness, most of us are mise'a.ble if we ... ,,,,, 
feel the lack of it. Why, if money is thus so important, do we refuse to 
regard it as the measure of all things? Why is the image of Shylock 
still such a resonant cultural symbol? Why do we reject - and the 
existence of the phenomenon of estrangement is evidence of this - a purely 
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economic description of human personality and social relationships? 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to exploring possible answers 
to this cluster of questions. My argument will be that the answer is to 
be found in the complex, ambiguous attitudes toward money that form part of 
traditional western political and moral beliefs. On the one hand there is 
seen to be a close symbiotic relationship between money, the pursuit of 
wealth and the values of the "good life": Money is perceived to be an 
essential prerequisite to the progressive enhancement of personal and 
collective competence. For example, this is the view that Smith and Hume 
adhered to: according to them money and commerce in general lack human 
potentialism and thus encourage individuals to be more free and in control 
of themselves. But, on the other hand, money is seen in the opposite way. 
In this view money, indeed economic relationships in general, are seen as a 
form of evil. Money is said to corrupt virtue and to debase our essential 
humanity. This line of interpretation runs from the classical idea that 
virtue was corrupted by commerce and money right through to the modern 
classics of sociological theory. Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Sinnnel all 
argued that money debases the soul. They saw capitalism as "evil" 
precisely because the pursuit of wealth alienates humans from themselves 
and from others; for these theorists money is the potent symbol of 
capitalism and of capitalist social relationships. It symbolises the 
alienating• tendencies of modern society _which all work to dehumanise people 
and the relationshiRSthey have with others. 
Some scholars see this ambiguous attitude towards money and commerce as 
being so central to modern western political culture that they have 
written, or rather called for the rewriting, of political history in its 
terms. John Pocock, for example, in a series of magisterial studies, has 
argued that the clash between wealth and virtue on the one side, and wealth 
and liberation on the other, is one of the activating forces of modern 
politics (see Pocock 1975, 1983, 1987; for a less exciting study see 
R~ddy, 1987). We need not enter into the intricacies of this debate to 
see its relevance to our argument. This profound, deeply rooted ambiguity 
underpins the dissociation of punishment from money. By this I mean, the 
estrangement of punishment and money feeds off this idea of money as 
dehumanising and alienating. It is because of this association with the 
debasement of human relationships that the estrangement exists. Simmel 
puts this particularly well. He contends that our sense of "human worth" 
and developnments in money move in opposite directions. He wrote, 
"The increasing valuation of the human soul with its uniqueness and 
indivi'tality meets with the opposite trend in the development of ,.. 
money ... " and 
"It is precisely because money represents the value of incommensurable 
things and has become colourless and indifferent that it cannot be used 
as an equivalent in very special and uncommon conditions where the 
inner most and most basic aspects of the person are concerned .... " 
(Simmel 1978 p 365) 
Simmel could well be describing the refusal to use fines in cases of rape. 
By the "innermost aspects" of the person he is referring to what we called 
the reserve facts of personality. - We can build on what Simmel said. It 
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is not only in relation to the "innermost" aspects of our lives that money 
is found wanting today. The same process can be discerned in the more 
public aspects of our lives as well. For example, the conditions of 
citizenship have effectively been separated from any contact with material 
resources. Once there existed quite definite material preconditions to 
the exercise of political liberty but these have now been removed. First, 
the possession of land, then of other sorts of property were necessary 
before an individual could vote; again, once bankrupts could not vote. 
But we now measure political progress by the extent to which we have 
overcome such obstacles. We now see liberty as an almost inalienable 
right an individual possess simply by virtue of being competent - that is 
not mentally infirm, eighteen years of age and not being resident in one of 
Her Majesty's prisons. Even the present Tory Government, who have made 
"value for money" and "cash limits" a way of life, have most exempted from 
these strictures those areas of policy they see as bound up with the 
maintenance of liberty - law and order and defense. But, at the same time, 
they have burdened one part after another of the welfare state by these 
demands, in part because they do not see welfare as essential to liberty. 
For them the poor are as free as the rich. 
Although many quite rightly object to such a point of view, their 
objections would probably not be based on a reve~sal of the fundamental 
idea that liberty and money ought to be kept apart. Instead they would 
probably point out that the effective exercise of this freedom, is 
conditioned, in practice, by how "well-off" we are. 
This is probably true but it does not constitute a counter-example to 
the idea that money and a whole set of peronal and public values are now 
kept separate. We commonly say "that money cannot buy happiness" that 
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"freedom is beyond price". We ought not to forget that in some slave 
societies there was the occasional slave who lived in luxury yet by 
definition, was not free. 
It is my argument that the cultural estrangement of punishment from 
money must be placed in this broader context and be seen as one specific 
manifestation of the more general social development we have described. 
However, estrangement is a particular expression of these developments and 
has particular conditions of existence. One of these is the relationship 
it has to the state. We have touched on this question already but we must 
now consider it again. 
To make a rather obvious point, estrangeme~t takes place 
in a criminal law context. Thus brings the state into the picture, 
because it is the state that backs up the criminal law. 
Now some may move from this observation to a conclusion which I claim 
does not follow. They may say as the state is necessarily involv~d, that 
the process of estrangement can be explained as a purely political 
phenomenon. This picks up on the tendency we described in the last 
chapter to see punishment as an instrument of power. 
argument? 
How tenable is this 
My claim is that the phenomenon of estrangement shows particularly 
clearly the restrictions and limitations of this position. Although I 
readily admit that the state is a condition of existence of estrangement, I 
contend also, that it cannot be viewed just as one of its instruments. 
The weakness of the instrumentalist position is that it assumes all aspects 
of the state are describable in the concepts of domination and 
subordination. That political relationshipSare just about these type of 
repressive forces. This is a very limited conception of politics and of 
the state. We can see its limitations by looking at ·what most people 
would admit to be an example of an extremely repressive society, say Nazi 
Germany. 
This example is illustrative because it appears that the Nazi state 
received considerable support from large sections of the German population. 
It is very difficult to see how the "success~' of Nazism can be explained 
unless we assume this. Similarly, to take another example, that of 
slavery. Again, on the surface a uniquely repressive relationship; but 
can one explain slavery just in terms of repression? 
"loyal slaves" indicate that one cannot. 
The folk-tales of 
This can be put more directly. Politics is not just about the use of 
repression; even the most extreme relationships cannot be explained purely 
in its terms. This is a rather obvious point, which, for example, a 
Foucauldian would accept. But as Ignatieff (1981) has pointed out, when 
it comes to the area of punishment it seems to be forgotten. 
This is relevant to my argument concerning estrangement. The fact 
that the criminal law is backed-up by the state does not mean we can 
explain the criminal law just by reference to it and the vocabulary 
conventionally used in the literature to describe it. Although, it might 
appear inconvenient, we cannot escape the conclusion that many of the 
values the criminal law exhibits are those which the wider populace 
accepts. In Weberian terms, they are legitimateJvalues; people 
voluntarily accept them and feel obligated towards them. For example, I 
believe most people would see it as right to deal with drug pushers in a 
harsh manner; most people do want some minimal form of protection by the 
police and so on. 
Thus, although estrangement is tied to the state it is quite wrong to 
try and explain it in terms of power. Rather, we ought to see 
estrangement as existing at the point where morality and politics converge. 
There is another argument thatjustifies consideration. There may be 
some who react to mine by saying it is too idealist; that it takes the 
realm of values, ideals and morality too seriously and that what we see in 
the criminal justice system is a gloss of ideology covering up its 
workings. Furthermore, they may say the preponderant use of the fine is 
best understood as an extension of capitalist society's tendency to turn 
everything into a commodity. Such a position can be found~- or at least 
made to come out of - the work of Rusche and Kirchheimer (1938). Rusche 
and Kirchheimer argue that the heavy use of the fine is an indication of 
the growing commercial nature of tl~e system. By this they mean, it is an 
example of the search for ever-cheaper ways of running the penal system; 
the fine raises revenue, costs relatively little to administer compared to 
the prison and thus offsets the fiscal burdens. But they give another, 
deeper meaning to the term as well. They argue the use of the fine is 
directly related to the "monetarisation" of society. This allows them to 
allude to the classic Marxist argument, that in capitalist societies a 
"cash-nexa.s" progressively bites into all social relationships; we are all 
forced to exchange parts of ourselves, for example our labour and its 
products, for money. 
This is a strong and important argument and as a portrayal of the 
nature of capitalist society it has immense appeal. Also it is not a 
specifically Marxist one; one finds the same general image of capitalism 
in Simmel and Weber (but explained differently). It would be foolish to 
try and counter the more general points of this position, and nor is it 
necessary to do so. My point, rather, is that if the preceeding account 
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of estrangement has plausibility, then it shows the limits that we placed 
on monetarisation. The estrangement of punishment and money shows that 
the values of money do not impinge on every aspect of social life, 
precisely because estrangement is a refusal to find monetary equivalents 
for certain core aspects of it. The fact that the fine is preceived to be 
an inappropriate sanction for rape, indicates that certain values are 
placed above money. One cannot explain estrangement in terms of the logic 
of monetary calculation. 
The Cultural Estrangement of Punishment and Money; the fine and the 
criminal justice system 
In this concluding section I shall pull together the various strands of 
the argument. My main points can be summarised thus: 
(a) That there exists a phenomenon called the cultural estrangement of 
punishment and money which is deeply embedded in the contemporary criminal 
justice system. The values used to assess the seriousness of harm are 
partly organised around this phenomenon and, as a result, some harms are 
seen to be inconunensurable with others. 
(b) But this process of estrangement works only at a certain level of 
the penal and criminal justice system; that within which its core values 
are legitimated. However, our image of the nature of the system, as a 
whole is coloured by what happens here. One consequence of this, is that 
we perceive the system in terms of it. To put this another way, we tend 
to view the system as a whole on the basis of what happens in a relatively 
few number of cases. These cases are thus of inunense symbolic 
significance; as it is generally thought that the prison will almost 
certainly be used in them we end up perceiving the prison as the epitome of 
punislunent. This is one reason why the prison symbolises most clearly 
what we understand punishment to be like. 
(c) I have also tried to show that the existence of this phenomenon, as 
well as being crucial to our understanding of how the criminal justice 
system works, points to the need for a form of explanation that gives 
priority to the sentiments. My claim is that to understand estrangement 
we have to put it in the context of those factors which mould our 
perception of the nature of harm and of money. With regard to the latter, 
we noted the ambiguous, equivocal way it has been discussed in traditions 
of political thought. But alongside this we observed also the modern 
tendency to separate some core values of social life from material 
conditions. In the chapter this was discussed in relation to liberty. 
However, the ambiguous attitude towards money can be seen also in rules of 
etiquette and aristocratic manners. There is a long tradition of 
despising those in "trade"; those who work to gain money and make profit. 
This was a crucial aspect underlying the rise of the "commercial classes" 
in the nineteenth century and their relationship to the established gentry 
and it has ramifications now. In more contemporary times, Mrs Thatcher 
has endeavoured to counter the "anti-entre~neurial" spirit; to try and 
make money a "polite symbol" and not an indication of bad manners. The 
fact that she has perceived the need to do this shows how deeply rooted the 
ambiguity towards money is. 
As was said, there is nothing new in a framework which emphasises the 
moral sentiments. Lord Karnes, for example, in his Historical Law Tract on 
Criminal Law, analysed punishment as being founded in the natural passion 
of "resentment". The desire to punish those who harm us, according to 
Karnes, is based in the hostility we feel towardst~our enemies. Modern 
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systems of punishment have not so much separated themselves from this 
desire as channelled and controlled it. Karnes argued that resentment was 
a strong, uncontrollable and irregular passion and thus could not 
constitute a stable basis for an increasingly complex society. Rather it 
was bought off first by the more "stable" but equally strong passion of 
"avarice" - and this is why earlier systems of punishment give a major 
place to monetary sanctions - and then was "engrossed" by the Magistracy 
and the Commonwealth. As the latter, was for Karnes, undeniably a "higher" 
form of civilisation, it further quelled the wish to cause devastating 
harm. 
Kames's account is one sided. As well as appealing to or being 
founded in resentment, punishment has traditionally been conceived in terms 
of the opposite passions of love and fraternity. This is clearest in the 
Christian tradition, where doing penance was seen as an expression of love 
both for God and his earthly community. But this same line can be seen to 
be behind, for example, more modern strategies, such as treatment and 
rehabilitation. It is surely relevant that many of the earliest prison 
reformers were committed Christians. They saw their activities as the 
natural extrension of Christian love. These can be seen as almost a 
"technology of love" - the desire to help and reconstitute those who have 
fallen from grace. The earthly paradise the reformers sought after, has 
been lately criticised, but it is quite wrong to disregard it as. it is a 
particularly interesting expression of a search for a secular form of love. 
Love for our neighbours is the basis of fraternity and as Aristotle once 
said fraternity is the focal case of all sociability. This is another way 
of putting the Durkhemian thesis that punishment is fun~cntal to the 
category of the social. 
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In this chapter I have tried both to show the complex way money enters 
into penal relations. I£ both invades them and is si&multaneously ruled 
out of court. These apparently counter tendencies mean that discussion of 
the area is fraught with ambiguity and dissonance. We must understand 
both why the criminal justice system relies heavily on the fine for certain 
crimes and offences, yet rejects their use for others. Part two of the 
thesis is largely ta~en up with unravelling this apparent contradition. 
One purpose of this chapter, as it was of the prece~tling one, has been to 
provide some idea of the type of question we must face and the sort of 
conceptual tool we shall need to construct answers. 
CHAPTER 3 
'Making fine: Being fined': Towards an historical analysis of monetary 
sanctions 
I 
ihis chapter is something of an historical interlude. Its 
.::bjei:tive is to explore the long-term historical development of 
monetary sanctions from their use in the medieval Scottish legal system 
up until the middle of the nineteenth century. The narrative is then 
continued in the next chapter by a detailed statistical description of 
the use made of fines in the criminal courts between 1897 and 1978. 
Gi·:en the time-span covered, I cannot claim that what follows in thi·:; 
cha pt.er is a. detailed or an exhaustive history; it makes no pretense to 
be :.uch; it is not a 'history of punishment through the ages' . Instead, 
my concern is to try and describe general patterns of change and 
development. Such pattern seeking may seem premature, if not downright 
dangerous. With proper caution, it might be painted out that much 
detailed work still needs to be done; that there exist many blind spots 
and shortcomings in our knowledge of legal change and changes in 
punishment. In particular, little is known about the pre-modern system. 
This shortfall is most keenly felt in relation to the pre-modern 
Scottish system, where, for the earlier periods, documentary evidence 
is anyway scarce (Black, 1975 p.47-48). 
Such caution is never misplaced but equally there is always room 
for the synthesising exercise. Detailed studies make better sense in 
the light of knowledge of patterns; it . .;..• is \,ne latter which allows 
interpretative .3ignifi.::ance to be made of the former. We need maps, if 
we are to find our way. But map building of the sort that follows can 
be a hazardous exercise. It involves making conjectures a.bout the lie 
of the land and this can be dangerous, if the wrong route is chosen. 
Nevertheless, the very fa.ct that we make conjectures allows, in true 
Popperia.n fashion, ideas to be tested and refuted. "Conjectural", 
"Speculative" or "Philosophic history", as it is sometimes known, is a 
meritorious exercise with its own pedigree <see Hall 1987, Hant and 
Ignatieff 1983, Burrows 1981). 
The pattern described in this chapter is captured by the first 
part of its title. My argument is that the use of money to deal with 
legally defined harms has ~ndergone a fundamental change. From an 
ear:ier medieval practice of 'making fine' - that is of negotiating the 
settlement of harms and disputes by the payment of a sum of money -
there has been a change to the modern practice of 'being fined' - that 
i::; the criminal court imposing a sum of money on the guilty off ender, 
theoretically without any negotiation. The reasons accounting for this 
change are complex but can be put into three categories. On the one 
hand, the change is tied up with the emergence of the state and its 
'engrossing' of the power to punish CKames, 1792 p.39-49). On the other 
hand, it is to do with equally far reaching changes in the structure of 
ideology and belief, particularly those relating to changes in 
Christian theology and teaching about sin, redemption and the role of 
penance. The third category of reasons are those to do with changes in 
the structure of law and the legal system; law has become more 
specialised and differentiated into separate spheres and there have 
been accompanying changes in legal institutions. In Weberian terms, 
there has been a protracted process of rationalisation. The 
relationship between these three categories is complex and I do not 
argue for any particular causal connection. It would simplify matters 
too much to contend, for example, that all can be explained by the 
emergence of a new system of state power. Rather, the relationship 
between them is interactive. However, the third category of changes can 
be viewed as having been squeezed out of the relationship between the 
first two, but this is not to deny it a causative significance of its 
own. 
There is another broad objective sought after here. In the 
introduction, I argued that punishment has developed along two vectors, 
while clearly the focus of attention here is with the monetary 
sanctions, the other vector, which consists of the bodily punishment, 
has to be brought into the picture. In the existing criminological and 
historical literature it is the latter vector which has been most 
studied. Most historical work in the area has been primarily concerned 
to trace the development of the bodily punishment and their 
complementary serious crimes. This is partly because, as was said in 
chapter one, writers work with a very modern notion of crime and how to 
classify it. Consequently, most attention has been on the history of 
murder and theft, the blood sanctions, other physical punishment and 
the prison. This has diverted attention away from the 'ordinary' 
punishments actually inflicted by the court. Study of the atypical has 
in many ways constituted the norm. It has influenced, for example, the 
editing of collections of primary case material, with the result that 
the serious crimes and the bodily punishments became overrepresented 
CMacTaggart, 1968 intro). The influence of this on the structure of 
historical knowledge cannot be overrated. One result particularly 
worthy of note is the overwhelming attention paid to royal justice. 
Partly because the crimes mentioned above belonged to the pleas of the 
Crown, and partly because, as Wormald points out, it was royal justice 
that was most rer:orded, we have ended up with a somewhat narrow view of 
the nature of medieval legal systems <1983p.109). Historians are only 
now beginning to focus on medieval 'local' justice and thereby 
constructing a fuller and more balanced account <see for example 
Worrnald, 1983; Bossy, 1983; Reynolds, 1984; Lenman and Parker, 1980). 
Moreover, one can discern a line of continuity between this 
concentration on royal justice and the explanation of punishment in 
terms of a vocabulary of state and power. Because investigation begins 
with a modern, state based view of crime, law and punishment, only such 
evidence as fits with this becomes selected and thus part of 'history'. 
This history is then used to support the idea that law, crime and 
punishment follow a road signposted by royal justice at one end and the 
' modern state at the other. 
One task of this chapter is to counter this imbalance. This 
necessitates looking at the administration of justice beyond the 
'state' in the localities; it also requires that we show just how often 
fines and other monetary sanctions were used, not just for the lesser 
crimes and minor offences, but also for the serious crimes. And, to 
fully understand how deeply money was embedded in penal relations, we 
need to appreciate that the avoidance of penalties by the payment of 
money was an essential aspect of medieval criminal justice. The 
medieval system has its own forms of 'diversion' that depended upon 
being rich or at least comfortably well off. 
The risk in all this is of developing tunnel vision and a tunnel 
history, but if doing this brings to light a broader conception of the 
history of punishment, then the risk is worthwhile. We ought from this 
vantage point, anyway, to be able to gain a better perspective on the 
relationship between the two vectors along which punishment has 
developed. 
II 
There is a conceptual problem that stands in the way of 
appreciating the role money has played in the history of penal 
relations. This is the tendency of historians and sociologists alike to 
categorise the use of money as a type of compensation. On those few 
occa~ons when the use of money has been recognised, its significance 
is played down. Once it is seen that a sum of money is paid to the 
victim of a crime or to the victim's kin, it has been assumed to have 
very little to do with the history of crime punishment. 
For example, there is a well entrenched view that assigns the use 
of money to the proto-history of criminal law proper. The story that is 
told goes something like this; once all harms, with the exception of 
the pleas of the Crown <murder, arson, theft, rape and treason), were 
conceived of essentially as private harms, even if they were called 
crimes. The response to these harms was either to enter into a bloody 
feud or to pay a sum of money to the injured party or to do both. Crime 
thus was dealt with either by vengeance or compensation or a mixture of 
the two. These payments are known in the literature as 'compositions' 
and the process of payment as 'compounding'. However, the story 
continues, with the development of the 'state' 1 in the form of royal 
justice, these 'compositions' became divided into two sorts; one sort 
continued to be paid to the victim, the 'state' getting none of it, and 
payments of the other sort went to the state. From the first sort 
developed the law of delict, tort and remedy, and from the second the 
law of crime and punishment. Only those payments made to the 'state' 
are said to deserve the title of fines. But, once this division came 
into existence, and for reasons nobo1y is quite sure of, the state 
stopped using money to punish people and used physical punishments 
instead. One common variation in the story is that the 'state' only 
kept the fine because of its revenue raising possibilities. However, if 
fines continued to be u:~ed then it was only for minor breaches of rules 
'l.. 
and regulations. 
This is, of course, something of a parody, but, nevertheless, it 
represents a view that underpins much legal history. It is the story 
that law students are very often told and it reverberates more widely 
in the literature although admittedly sometimes with greater 
complexity. For example, one can find this story prefacing the study of 
the fine in twenty one different countries by Gerhardt Grebing. After 
reviewing the earlier history of monetary sanctions, tied as they were, 
he claims, to the principle of lex talionis, he says, 
"with the emergence of state administration of criminal justice, 
monetary penalties finally lost their compensatory character and 
~o 
took the form of genuine fines in most countries" <Grebing, 1982 
p.6; underlining in original). 
Schaffer tells the :5ame story in his, The Criminal and his Victim 
(!..~and even rhapsodises about the lost 'golden age of the victim' in 
' the period of compensation. Again, in a slightly different vt~n, one 
finds the same essential picture portrayed by Michael Weisser. He 
argues, the medieval system is best characterised as a system of 
'private criminal justice', which 'rested upon the necessity to 
compensate the victim' and in which 'the basic form of punishment was 
the fine' CWeisser, 1982 p.62-63). The same story is told by van Bar et 
al., in the massive volume six of the Continental Legal History Series 
CPart one pp.4-372). 
What is wrong with this well established and apparently well 
researched view? The problem lies with the organising concepts. There 
is a basic misconception. It is assumed that because in modern law 
compensation i:5 ambiguously related to criminal law and punishment, the 
same must be true of earlier periods; that, because in modern law 
compensation is conventionally tied to civil law and the law of delict, 
our progenitors must have seen it in the same or very similar way. 
Thus, it is implied, medieval criminals and victims would not have seen 
the payment of sums of money as in any meaningful sense a form of 
punishment. Hence, these 'compositions', the practice of 'compounding', 
are seen not to belong to the history of punishment or to have at best 
a marginal status within it. As a result, it is further implied, that 
the history of punishment does not really begin until the period after 
these 'compensatory' payments have died out or at least been demoted tc 
81 
a subordinate position below the physical puni:;hments which form the 
proper place at which to start. 
If we return to the metaphor of maps used before, the significance 
of this view for our understanding of the history of punishment is 
immense. We use maps to guide us on journeys and starting points are 
all important. I suggest, the above is an inaccurate rather than a 
completely wrong starting point; but that if we accept it, our sense of 
historical patterning becomes blurred. The core of my counter-argument 
is to suggest that medieval actors would not have recognised the 
distinction between punishment and compensation that we make and upon 
which the above view is based. As Maine put it, "The distinctions of 
the later jurists are appropriate only to the later jurisprudence" 
(Maine, 1905 p.230). To understand the type of distinction, if any, 
medieval actors would have made, we need to recover their jurisprudence 
and, to do this, we must understand their legal system. 
I I I 
Although it had its distinctive features, the medieval Scottish 
legal system shared many traits with others in Europe, with the 
?> 
exception of the English one. It was decentralised, administratively, 
with a patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions and a variety of courts; 
the law was undifferentiated, in the sense that there existed no clear-
cut distinction between civil and criminal law and, thirdly, there was 
an emphasis on what today would be called "negotiated justice" - at 
least for those who were rich and powerful enough to be listened to. 
The administrative structure of the system reflected a society 
that was small scale and local. Also, it reflected a society in which 
kinship groups were a source of great social power. The Scots Sovereign 
had to listen to his nobles, negotiate with them and also very often 
arbitrate their quarrels. Although it would be an exaggeration to say 
that there was no royal justice and that the sole responsibility for 
pursuing all crimes lay with the kinship group <Brown, 1977 p.63-64), 
it is certainly true that prosecution was largely a private matter. 
With the exception of the pleas of the Crown <murder, theft, rape, 
·3.r·;on and trea::;on>, for which the Sovereign took some responsibility, 
it was the individual or the family group who raised the prosecution 
and pursued it to its end either in one of the franchise courts or the 
King's court or very commonly by negotiating a settlement through feud. 
Although by no means unique to Scotland, the franchise courts -
the heritable jurisdictions - played a central role in the 
administration of justice. The Sheriff courts, the regalities and the 
baronies could all be passed down along the family line, as could the 
position of Justiciar until the resignation of the last heritable 
Justice General, Archibald, Earl of Argyll in 1628. And beyond that 
date, Archibald reserved the office of Justiciar of Argyll for his 
heirs until all heritable jurisdictions were abolished by the 1747 
Abolition of heritable Jurisdictions <Scotland) Act. 
These franchise courts were created by royal grant, very often in 
exchange for a large sum of money. At their apex was the Regality which 
ha:; been likened to "sub-kingdoms" <Davies, 
~ 
1980p.145). The larger 
regalities such as Orkney, Argyll and Dunfermline, had their own 
administrative structure with a chancery that issued brieves. If the 
original grant included the power "of pit and gallows", the regality 
court could hear the pleas of the Crown and execute guilty offenders. 
The relationship between the holders of these grants and the 
Sovereign is a matter of some controversy. Davies, for example, 
contends, the regalities placed "large numbers of the King's 
subjects ... outside his jurisdiction" <Davies, 1980 p. 141) 
1 
while Lord 
Karnes, saw the question as "uncertain" and was "incline(d] to think 
they were not" <Karnes, 1792 p.204). VIGrmald, points out that the 
selling of grants did not betoken a weak Sovereign because the whole 
process rested upon the presumption that the Sovereign held the 
jurisdiction to sell in the first pla~e. Thus, she argues, this lent 
support to the Sovereign's position; the noble could only purchase the 
grant by recognising the Sovereign's power <Wormald, 1983p.129). 
The other heritable jurisdictions, the Baron and the Sheriff 
Courts, did not have such extensive jurisdictions. Sheriffs could not 
hear the plea·s of the Crown, except when a thief was caught 11 with the 
fang" Cin possession of stolen goods) or when slaughter was publicly 
committed in hot blood. Then the murderer could be hanged, if the whole 
process was over within twenty four hours of the original crime. 
Originally introduced by David I, the Sheriff court was an Anglo-Norman 
institution and supposedly part of royal justice. However, in practice, 
control was lost as the heritable shrievalty developed <for details see 
'( 
Dickinson, 1928 intro). 
The Baron Court had similar powers to those held by the Sheriff. 
It could hear "minor" criminal cases, but most of its work was with 
petty debt, possessory actions and the enforcement of feudal 
obligations. 
These courts were later supplemented by the Burgh Courts - some of 
which had charters stretching back in time - and the Justice of the 
Peace Court. The Justice of the Peace Courts were modelled on English 
lines and were first introduced with partial success in 1587. Both 
these courts, especially the Burgh Court, were concerned with enforcing 
"guid nichtburheid" and other local issues. 
Royal Justice, centred in Edinburgh, was slow to develop. There 
was no central court as such, excepting the Sovereign's Curia Regis, 
until 1532, when the College of Justice was established, consisting of 
fifteen Lords of Session. In as much as a distinction can be drawn at 
this time, between civil and criminal law, this body was supreme in 
civil matters. It was not until 1672, that a separate High Court of 
Justiciary was founded as the highest court in all criminal matters. 
As was said, this decentralised legal system, in which there 
existed a delicate balance between core and periphery, reflected the 
decentralised social structure of locality and kin. It also, however, 
reflected a theory of "popular sovereignty"; the Scots Sovereign was 
held to be subject to the people. As Buchanan put it, the people have 
"the power to grant Imperium to their King"; "he, <the Sovereign) acts 
like a guardian of the public accounts". But this granting of imperium 
did not amount to wholesale "transmission" of their own original 
sovereignty; rather, the people simply "p•scribed to their King the 
form of his Imperiu~' <Buchanan, 1579 in Skinner, 1978, vol.2 p.340). 
This theory of popular sovereignty did not go unchallenged and was 
countered implicitly, for example, in the Basilikon Doran of James VI. 
But, Buchanan's work was massively influential in Scotland and was well 
known on the Continent. The idea of "popular .sovereignty" captures a 
contemporary view of the proper balance between the power of the centre 
and the power of the people. It can be read as a well worked ideal 
justification of the nature of Scots society. The view it put forward 
meshed with the reality of the legal system. Royal justice was to work 
hand in hand with local justice, as the best way to maintain the peace 
of the realm. But the King's "peace" was only one, albeit a very 
important one among others <cf. Harding, 1973; van Caenegem, 1973 pp. 1-
29). 
This decentralised legal system was mirrored by the un-
differentiated structure of the law. There was no clear-cut distinction 
between civil and criminal law. Rather, there was a generic conception 
of harms as delicts. A distinction was drawn between "private" and 
"public" delicts, and both were called crimes. This was not the sort of 
distinction we now draw between criminal law and civil law. For 
' example, MacKenzie, writing in the early modern period, chose to phrase 
the matter this way. In the section on "The Division of Crimes" in his 
"Collected Works", he says 
"Crimes are divided ... into public crimes and private crimes. 
Public crimes are defined to be those, which any person may 
pursue for public revenge and whereof the punishment is stated 
by an express law. And, a private crime, which none can pursue 
but the party injured and which is not declared to be public 
crime by an express law" <MacKenzie, 1722, vol.2 p.60). 
This is not so much a distinction between two types of law as 
between types of procedure for dealing with types of harm. Of course, 
the modern distinction between civil and criminal law has a similar 
procedural edge to it, but, we must remember that MacKenzie was writing 
in a context where the primary responsibility for prosecution, as we 
saw, was still private. Indeed, later in this section, he tries to 
argue against private prosecution - which anyway was being challenged 
by the rise of the Lord Advocate, CMacKenzie being one) - but his 
case turns out not to be one founded in any deep legal theory. Instead, 
he argues that private prosecution is "inconvenient and unnecessary", 
and he 11 wish[ es] it were otherwise" CMacKenzie, 1722 p. 60-61). l-
Pollock and Maitland, in "The History", appear deliberately to 
have set out to challenge the forcing of modern distinctions onto 
historical material of the early medieval period. They say, 
"we shall ... pass backwards and forwards between civil and 
criminal procedure, just because most modern writers have 
sedulously kept them apart" <Pollock and Maitland, 1898, vol.2 
p. 573). 
Moreover, if we return to Scottish materials, we must recognise 
that when the term civil law was used, it covered a variety of 
meanings. Sometimes it referred to Roman Law, sometimes to the law of a 
particular nation or town. 
Another aspect of the lack of distinction between civil and 
criminal law is evidenced by the lack of emphasis placed on the need to 
prove "intention". In modern criminal law, the doctrine of mens rea, 
the requirement to show that the accused intended to commit the crime, 
is a condition sine qua non Ccf. Hart and Honore, 1986). It is one of 
the core principles by which the criminal law is distinguished from the 
civil law. However, in the medieval system no great emphasis at all was 
placed on proving intentionality. For example, in the scale of 
penal ties set out on the "Leges inter Brettos et Scot .,os", no relevance 
is given to the determining whether a harm intentionally committed 
:3hould result in a larger sum being paid than if the act was 
"a~·~1· dP_ntal". The ,...ca le i· s 1 d it ~~ Q pure y concerne w h describing what 
payment should be made, if an arm as against a leg is damaged or hurt. 
In later med.ie·Jal Scotland, if it is true, however, that if, say, a 
theft was "forethought", then a harsher penalty could be p~scribed. 
But this is still very different from requiring proof of intention 
before guilt can be established. 
The doctrine of "dole", as it was known in Scots jurisprudence did 
not become an essential aspect of the criminal law until the eighteenth 
century. And then, it was not the English form of mens rea. There was 
no need to prove specific intent to commit a particular act, but 
rather, to show that the person was of "corrupt and malignant 
di::;po::;i tion" CHume, 1844 p. 22). 
The jurisprudence of medieval Scotland thus lay little emphasis on 
distinguishing between different branches of the law. It did recognise 
a distinction between public and private harms, but this was not the 
. , 
foundation of two separate branches of law and legal reasoning. It 
merely indicated that the form of action needed to remedy the harm was 
different. 
It was in this administrative and jurisprudential context that what 
I have referred to as "negotiated justice" took place. By "negotiated 
justice", I mean that the process of settling disputes and harms was 
premi:3ed in the assumption that disputants ought to enter into 
negotiation to determine where responsibility lay and what the 
"solution" should be. These negotiations took place both outside the 
formal ccurt structure and also within it. It was considered better to 
settle disputes amicably rather than go to court. Often, the resort to 
a court was a sign of failure; it showed that the two parties had been 
unable to reach agreement. This makes sense of the practice that both 
ld ' , . bl .. cou oe i1a ~e vO pay sums of money to the court. Parties could be 
amerced - that is lay in the mercy of the court - and any penalty that 
resulted could be increased, the "extra" going to the court as if 
indicating its displeasure <MacTaggart, 1968). There were also a number 
of 11 half-way house" type measures. Parties could go to the court after 
they had settled the dispute to get the court to recognise the 
agreement and, in these circumstances, it was not uncommon for a 
"cautionary bond" to be lodged and a third party to stand "surety" for 
it. Those who stood "surety" thereafter took responsibility to see that 
peace was kept (see MacTaggart, 1968; Lenman and Parker, 1980 pp.20-
22). Again, if this involved reappearing at some future date before an 
"ayre" and one or other of the parties failed to turn up, the third 
party could be amerced <see Pitcairn, 1833, vol. 1pp.149ff). 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this process of negotiation 
is the payment of a sum of money in assythment. Assythment worked this 
way. The parties involved in dispute could agree on a sum of money to 
be paid either to the injured party or the surviving relatives. If an 
agreement was struck, then a "letter of slains" was issued. This letter 
indicated acceptance and ended the dispute. Once this point was 
reached, further prosecution was ruled out; the victim or remaining 
kin, in the case of slaughter, in effect sold the "right" to pursue the 
case further. 
Assythment is mentioned for the first time, in existing records, 
in an Act of Parliament passed in 1424, though it is thought to 
preexist[ that date and is probably derived from the Middle English 
word assithe <Black, 1975 p.53; Wormald, 1983p.107), It is defined in 
Balfour's Practick s as "amendis for slau\ch~r or mutilations" 
4 
CBalfour, 1597 p.517). It was relevant only in criminal cases, but all 
homicide in Scotland, however caused, was criminal until the beginning 
of the eighteenth century. The one situation when assythment could not 
be sought after or offered was when the "offender" suffered capital 
puni:::;hment. In these circumstances, however, the estate of the executed 
person were "escheat" to the Crown. For example, in March 1535, one 
John Armestrung, alias "Jany Gutterholis", and Christopher Henderson, 
"convicted of theft, reset of theft, ou~putting and inputting, in 
England and Scotland; And of art and part of treasonably inbringing 
Englishmen: common thieves and traitors within Scotland, and committing 
common Hereship and Stouthief, Murder and Fire-raising" were sentenced 
to be "Drawn to the gallows and hanged as Traitors; And all their 
goods, moveable and immoveable, to be escheated to the King" <Pitcairn, 
1833, vol. 1, p.173). 
In the later medieval period, assythment was directly tied to the 
granting of pardons and remissions. The process worked two ways. First, 
the granting of a pardon did not remove the liability of the offender 
to assythe the kin of a slaughtered person; indeed, the offender 
remained open to further prosecution until a letter of slains was 
issued. Successive sovereigns, in fact, would not grant pardons unless 
the remaining kin joined with the offender. There thus existed a close 
relationship between assythment and the granting of pardons and 
remissions. From the offender's point of view, there was no point in 
offering assythment unless it was tied to a pardon or a remission, and 
from the victim's or remaining kin'~ point of · 1 th t 
~ ' view, un ess assy men 
was agreed to, there was every chance the offender would be executed 
and thus payment of the "damages" lost <see Gane, 1983). 
The practice of assythment illustrates the general features of the 
medieval system extraordinarily well; it shows the balance between the 
centre, the Sovereign, and the locality; it shows the "mix" between 
what we would regard as "civil" and "criminal" law; it shows also how 
the process involved negotiation and compromise at every level. 
Assythment was a popular and general action, and continued to be 
practiced well into the eighteenth century. As it developed, it was 
increasingly recognised by the courts. It settled blood feuds as well 
as "normal" crimes <see Brown, 1986). Its decline was due to the coming 
together of a number of different developments - the emergence of a 
clear distinction bewteen civil and criminal law, the growing 
resistance to the granting of pardons and remissions which by the 
seventeenth century had an extraordinary bad press, and the development 
of public prosecution with the rise of the Lord Advocate. In short, it 
disappeared with the gradual modernisation and rationalisation of the 
system. However, the last, and unsuccessful, attempt to raise an action 
of assythment was in 1970 in McKendrick v Sinclair <see Black, 1975). 
Judging from the commentaries on it, assythment appears to have 
been most used in the later stages of medieval and in early modern 
Scotland. Other 11 compensation11 systems and other monetary penalties 
both predate it and run alongside it. For example, many of the earliest 
published legal records contain detailed lists of the payments to be 
made, often in cows, to an injured party. The "Leges inter Brettos et 
Scot os" included in the "Regiam Maiestatem", are little other than 
'11 
such a list <Book IV, chapters 36-40). The words used to describe the 
sum paid are of mixed Welsh and Irish derivation; enach, era, kelchyn 
.~nd gae..t)e$<Vlelsh, galci.no.s). Other terms were 1•:-ed 1 "'- a so; kinbut was a 
late medieval Scots term referring to a payment to the relatives of the 
kin. A rarer term is cynebot, which appears to have meant a payment ta 
the Sovereign (Wormald, 1983 pp. 105-109). 
The principles upon which these lists or "tarrifs", as they are 
sometimes called, is twofold. The quantum depended both on the degree 
of damage done and upon the status of the two parties. For example, the 
era for a King was usually set so high that it was, for all practical 
purposes, unpayable. The result of non-payment was forfeiture of all 
goods and death (for detail see Davies and Fouracre, 1986 passim). 
The other monetary sanctions commonly used in medieval Scotland 
were, as noted, cautionary bonds, amercements and also, most common of 
all, the fine. 
It is important to note that there was a good deal of interchange 
in the use of all these terms. One can find examples of assythments, 
which in the records are called 11 fines". Black <19-...,-p. 53) claims to 
have discovered such a case. Amercements were also called fines <Fox, 
1927 p.134). This interchangeabilityy can be ascribed to the origin of 
the term, "fine". 
"Fine" is ·derived from the Latin expressions finis, finem fecit or 
finem facere <Fox, 1927 p.137i van Bar, 1916 pp.,0-62~ Originally, it 
simply meant an agreement that brought to an end <finis) a dispute. It 
was not specifically tied to the criminal law. For example, one of the 
most common forms of medieval English conveyancing was also known as 
"the fine". This was a process of alienating land without the expense 
C\ 2... 
of registration and the records of these land transactions are 
contained in those volumes known as the "Fleet of fines". 
The use of fines in cr1'm1'nal ca~es · 1 ~ invo ved an element of 
negotiation analogous to that used in assythment. Pollock and Maitland 
describe the fine as a "bilateral transaction"; fines were "made", "not 
impm5ed" <1898 p.S)r>. One "made fine" with the court or the King. 
Fox argues, at great length, that this process of "making fine" 
underlay its medieval usage. Apparently, one "made fine" in those 
situations in which one's body was held in "ward", as the Scots would 
have put it. Now, being held in 11 ward" did not necessarily mean being 
held in a prison; there existed "free ward" as well. But if one's 
liberty was restricted, one negotiated with the court to pay a sum of 
money which freed the ward and also settled the dispute. It is this 
process of negotiation that Fox calls "making fine" <see also van 
Caenegem, 1959 passim). 
Although Fox describes a necessary connection between 
"imprisonment" and "making fine 11 , he does not see the fine as "second 
best"; as simply a method the rich could use to buy themselves out of 
the prison. Rather, according to him, the reverse was true; the fine 
was the punishment and the prison the potential method of enforcement. 
He says, 
''It might be said that the fine was the punishment, and 
imprisonment was the the means of enforcing payment <1927 
p. i37>. 
A similar picture is painted by Pugh. He provides many examples of 
this type of relationship between the prison and the fine, but also 
argues that the fine could be introduced at a later stage, once 
imprisonment had taken place <Pugh, 1968 pp.28-47 and 14-16). But, 
whatever the exact relationship between the pri~on f - and the ine, Pugh 
still uses the term "to make fine" rather than "to be fined". Hence. he 
too portrays the use of the fine, at this time, to have involved 
negotiation. 
The expression "~o make fine" seems not to have been used in 
Scotland. Nevertheless, there are many examples of a similar 
relationship between warding or coming into the King's will, 
amercement, assythment and standing surety. And, given the 
interchangeability in the uses of terms, one can conclude that the same 
broad process was at work. Take these examples: 
Alexander Baxter and George Bell were convicted of blooding and 
wounding and were sentenced to be "amerciat" in 100 merks, and were 
also ordered tc "find caution for the fine or also be imprisoned until 
they paid it" <Records of the Proceedings of the Justiciary Court, 
p.52), or one Duncan MacKenzie was fined £100 for striking Donald 
Mc Vicar and was "ordained to continue in prison until he paid" <Stair 
Society, vol.12p.140). 
The records are full also of many cases of "compounding" - that is 
offering a sum of money as payment for the crime committed. The courts 
clearly recognised this as a standard procedure. For instance, 
"Thomas Fresale, allowed to compound for the forethought felony 
done to <John) Mcke, merchant in Wigtoune and Hurting him" 
CPitcairn, 1833, vol.1 p.91, date 1513), or 
"Patrick Mure, permitted to compound for art and part of the 
B t M K · f Gilbert Mcke" ·, and oppression done to e oun c ev1n, spouse o 
also "for the oppression done to Mr Richard Akinhede, Vicar of 
Wigtoune, breaking the doors of his chambers, and keeping him 
furth thereof" <Pitcairn, 1833 vol. 1 p. 91, date 1513). 
In both these above cases "Sir Alexander McCulloch of Mytoune, 
11 became surety to satisfy the parties". 
At the same court <Wigtoune), Patrick Agnew, the Sheriff of 
Wigtoune, with others, was "convicted of art and part of Convocation of 
the lieges with warlike arms, ... contrary to the Acts of Parliament, 
and of the oppression done to Sir David Kennydy, Knight, coming to 
Leswalt, and hindering him from holding his court - each of them fined 
ten merks and the Sheriff became surety for himself and the others" 
(Pitcairn, 1883, vol.l p.91>. 
Compounding was often tied to remission. For example, at Selkirk, 
on November 28th 1502, Walter Scot was "permitted to compound, under a 
remission, for art and part of the Theft of four score sheep, priced 
each 5/-". The same Walter Scot, was "permitted to compound under 
another remission, ... for the Theft of three score sheep from the Abbot 
of Kelso". One James Scot stood surety as well <Pitcairn, 1833, vol. 1 
p.38). Amercement was allowed also in more serious cases; for example, 
at Jedworthe on November 17th 1493, William Tayt and Robert Burne, "his 
cousin-german" came in the King's will for art and part of the 
forethought felony done to Thomas Young, by way of murder ... And also, 
for Stouth~ef of a horse, a saddle, a bow, with a satchel and purse and 
£20 being in the said purse". Each was "amerciated in £40, and Sir 
Robert Ker, "became surety" <Pitcairn, 1833, vol. l p.17). Similarly, in 
Lauder in the same year, "John Spottiswode, junior, and Robert Steill 
came in the King's will for the forethought felony done to James 
Weddale of Blyth". They were "amerciated t3 for ~ch". The Laird of 
Spottiswood became "cautioner to :-at1·,.....-f 1•• .i..h · - - " e parties" <Pitcairn, ibid. 
p. 16>. 
Many more examples of such cases could be extracted from the 
re 1:ords of this period (vol. 1-1488-1564). Compounding involved making 
an offer, especially, presumably, when it wa~ ti'ed to · · - rem1ss1on. 
Amercement, if it followed the English pattern, described in detail by 
Fox, al·50 involved some elements of negotiation. The process worked 
this way. The offender was amerced by the court - that is lay in its 
mercy - and a hypothetical sum of money was levied. The sum was 
hypothetical because the next stage in the procedure was. for a group of 
the offender's peers to meet at the end ~f each ayre and they decided 
the actual sum to be paid. The individuals who made up the group were 
known as "afferrors" and they, supposedly, made their judgement on the 
basis of their knowledge of the offender, the victim, the circumstances 
of the case and so on. Hence, the term amercement referred to the 
"laying in mercy" rather than the actual sum paid. 
As noted, Fox argues that by the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries the distinction he sees to have existed between 
amercement and fining had become blurred and, thus, one term was 
substituted for the other. The Scots evidence on the matter is 
equivocal. When the term amercement is used, it does not seem to refer 
to the process of "affering" that Fox describes. The process seems 
rather simpler and much more direct. But as most of the evidence I have 
used is extracted from fifteenth and sixteenth century documents, the 
interchangeability of the various terms ought anyway to be expected, if 
we accept what Fox says. 
The money raised by these penalties normally went both to the 
Sovereign and to the victim. It also commonly went to the local burgh 
for particular purposes. Craig <1732> includes the f f' ' revenue ram ines 
amongst the King's inter-regalia. He argues, the money was part of the 
King's "fisc" or personal purse. But the prevalent practice seems to 
have been that the money was split several ways; certainly part did go 
to the King, but also part went to the victim or surviving relatives, 
and part also went via the fiscal to the local court. Also informers 
could be given a "fee" for providing information. As time went on, the 
pattern of distributing payments appears to have changed. Certainly, as 
the granting of remissions came under fire, less could be put to this 
purpose. And as compounding and assythment were tied to remission, the 
less the latter could be given, the less was the interest in pursuing 
crime by these methods. However, Hume, several hundred years later, 
still saw it as proper that part of the money should go to the victim 
as solatium <Hume, 1844 p.21>. Thus, the idea that the complete sum of 
money ought to go to the exchequer, appears not to have been finalised 
until, at the earliest, the nineteenth century. 
The details of the Scottish situation are important and 
interesting and warrant much more attention than can be paid to them 
within the confines of this chapter. But enough has been said, it is 
submitted, to bear out the main points of my argument. Various monetary 
penalties were used extensively in the medieval system, and their use 
took place in a broad context of compromise and negotiation. These 
penalties were not restricted to the lesser offences and crimes, but 
also regularly used for slaughter, theft and rape (see case of Mary 
Clerk and John Sterling; Argyll Justiciar~ Records p.503). In this 
sense, they were a general sanction. And if we add to them the use made 
of assythment as a way of avoiding prosecution - even in the case of 
murder - and the lodging of cautionary bonds to achieve the same, it 
can be ·:;een that money played a central role in th ., H - - e sys~em. owever, it 
::;hould be remembered that the court records are only the tip of the 
i::eberg. Priority was given to keeping disagreements out of the court 
as fa~ as possible, not least, because both parties could face 
amercements and fines. This practice was not restricted to Scotland. 
Nicole Castan provides detailed and convincing evidence that the same 
process was at work in the Languedoc during the Ancien Regime. The 
emphasis was on arbitration at each and every stage <Castan, 1983 
pp.219-260; see also Sharpe, 1983p .. 167-187). 
These general conclusions are supported by MacTaggart in his study 
of the decisions of Scots criminal courts between 1400-1747. He 
examines records for all types of court from the Justiciary Court to 
the Burgh Court, and thereby builds up a detailed picture of actual 
"sentencing" practice during the period. His conclusions are worth 
quoting. 
11 Taken overall, fining was the most frequent sentence of al 1, 
although it was relatively infrequent in the justiciary courts . 
. . . the lower courts all show that fining was their basic 
sentence and the amounts seldom exceeded £100, the usual amounts 
being between £10 and £50" <MacTaggart, 1968 p. 581). 
Several comments need to be made. First, we must place this 
conclusion in its proper context. MacTaggart is describing just the 
results of those cases that came to court. He thus excludes from his 
ana:ysis the use of pr.e-court settlement; also, he fails to consider 
the full significance of assythment. H owever, and second, there is a 
re.markable resemblance between the medieval and early modern 
"sanctioning structure" and the + 
presen~ day one, schematically outlined 
in the last chapter and given a much fuller description in the next. In 
the lower courts the fine was the most common sanction then and is now; 
in the higher courts, bodily punishments prevail. MacTaggart, however, 
does also point out that it is easy to "over-emphasise" the frequency 
of death sentences in the justiciary courts, demonstrating that there 
were many "non-capital sanctions including fines" <MacTaggart, 1968 
p.580). The other non-capital sanctions used were banishment from the 
realm, putting to the horn <outlawing) a~1 a limited use of 
imprisonment. In each of these, the goods of the offender were also 
escheat to the Crown. 
The resemblances between the medieval sanctioning structure and 
the contemporary one, however, hide much that is different. To use 
terms discused earlier, whereas the structure of the modern system is 
organised partly around the estrangement of punishment from money, 
there was no such clear estrangement in the medieval system. As has 
been shown, money was regularly used to deal with the most serious of 
crimes; the practice of assythment is evidence of this, as is the use 
of compounding and bonds of caution. Further evidence of the use of 
money to deal with those crimes where now the fine would be seen as 
inappropriate, is provided in the treatise by Lord Pitmedden entitled, 
"Of Mu ti lat ion and Demembration and their Punishments" (16q'i), first 
published as an appendix to one of the editions of MacKenzie. 
Pitmedden describes in great, and sometimes very gory, detail the 
use of "pecunial" punishments in response to bodily injuries criminally 
committed. The treatise considers ~h · 
v e principles upon which a judge may 
award such 11 pecu nia1" 1 t · o - pena ,1es. f particular interest is his 
discussion of what he calls the arbitrary powers of the judge. By this 
he refers to those situations in which the judge had discretion to 
adjust the penalty both to the seriousness of the crime and to the 
particular features of each case. For example, he argues that, if a 
tradesman with a family loses an arm, eye or leg essential to trade, 
then the penalty awarded must be increased. According to Pitmedden, 
this indicates the operation of the principle of "natural equity" in 
assessing punishment. 
The treatise is a long, involved work, and full of examples of the 
use of money in this type of case. By modern criteria, many of the 
actual cases he discusses would be judged as delictual rather than 
criminal. However, Pitmedden is describing a well-entrenched Scots 
practice, and tries to justify it according to "ancient principle". It 
is a description of practice in the criminal law of medieval and early 
modern Scotland. It is evidence of the degree to which punishment and 
money were brought together in circumstances, where today, in criminal 
law, they would be kept apart. 
All of this does suggest that the estrangement we argue exists in 
the modern system, did not occur in the medieval one. It would be easy 
to conclude from this, that medieval people placed much less value on 
human life and upon the individual than we do now. Scholars, such as 
Lawrence Stone, have implicitly suggested this, in claiming that early 
modern England was five times more violent than it is today <Stone, 
1983 pp.22-23; see also Stone, 1977 passim). The same theme runs 
explicitly though Norbet Elias's magnificent "The Civilising Process" 
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and Spierenberg's analysis, using El' • 
ias s framework, understandably 
draws the same broad conclusion CElias, 1982; Spierenberg, 1985). 
Simmel put:5 the same argument rather differently. In the section on 
Wergild <compounding for murder). Simmel contends that a monetary 
settlement was acceptable to the kin, because there existed what he 
calls, a "utilitarian valuation of the human being". In other words, 
the value of a person was judged according to the "function" -
economic, military etc. - that he or she served for the group. He 
acknowledges, of course, that this was influenced also by notions of 
status and honour, but he sees this as qualifying rather. than 
destroying his argument CSimmel, 1978 pp.355-357). 
These are strong and convincing arguments, though it should be 
noted that they have not gone unchallenged <see, for example, 
Macfarlane, 1981 for challenge to Stone). However, they need to be put 
in the broader context of a countervailing belief system that 
underpinned medieval conceptions of the proper place of law and 
punishment. This countervailing set of beliefs were those associated 
with the Catholic Church. Not only did the Church, for example, prevail 
against violence and feuds and offer sanctuary to offenders <benefit of 
clergy included), but its theology was disseminated more widely through 
a complex nation that historians now refer ta as "love before law". The 
core of this doctrine can be summed up in this proposition from the 
"Leges Henrici Frimi": "Pactum legem viscit et a.:mor iudicium" 
<Agreement prevails aver law and love over judgement) <see Clanchy, 
1983 pp. 47-67>. 
This doctrine .all important. Its essential message was that 
man's chri::5tian duty is to settle all arguments amicably and peacefully 
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without recourse ta law. The Christian 
person expresses Christian love 
by forgiveness, not by endeavouring to th see ano er punished. In this 
scheme, recourse ta law marks a failure. As Clanchy puts it, quoting 
the "Leges", 
"Agree:::nent Cpactum) or peace Cpax) is good and even better is 
"to proceed by love < .. Der amor""_m), ~ if the parties wish ta have 
the .. oerfect freedom of friend~ to d 11 <C, h ~ come an go ~anc y, 1983 
p. 47>. 
The idea of love here is not the romantic notion tied to sexuality 
or its voluntary denial. Rather, it is , "a bond of affe.ction, 
established by public undertakings before witnesses" <Clanchy, ibid. 
p.47); "we offer love only to those whom we cannot do without" 
<Clanchy, ibid. p. 48, quoting "Leges"). Clanchy argues, medieval, 
feudal relationships were founded on this idea of love. In the Scottish 
context, the most explicit manifestation of it was the bonds of manrent 
CWormald, 1986>. These were pacts voluntary entered into, and they 
entailed an exchange of duties and obligations. The feudal superior was 
to came to the defence of his people and, in return, they were to offer 
services, including military ones. 
One duty awed by the feudal superior to his people was to help 
them when in trouble with the law. Hence, in many of the examples 
quoted earlier, it is probable, that it was the feudal lord who "stood 
tf 
surety". But there was a much deeper way that Catholic theology 
influenced law. As Bossy notes, the medieval theory of salvation was 
premised upon the idea of what he calls "retributive compensations" 
<Bossy, 1985 p.4). That is, the relationship between Man and God was 
analogised to a state of debt. Man entered in God's debt by offending 
l 02... 
Him <Adam and Eve disobeyed God in the Garden of Eden). This debt could 
only be paid back by Man offering to God a "retributive compensation" 
equal in worth. Once paid, this removed the offence and restored the 
original relationship. Man, thus, could be saved by offering to those, 
whom he had offended, a valued object. 
If we put together the doctrine of "love before la~' with this 
idea of christian salvation, it can be seen that they offered a 
justification of monetary settlements. In making an offer of money, in 
giving up something valued, an individual was acting in a Christian 
way. Christian duty obliged the making of these "retributive 
compensations". 
This, of course, is a very idealised view of the matter. However, 
my point is, that as well as the material factors - such as the 
decentralised legal system, the importance of kin, the balance of power 
between Sovereign and locality - which encouraged negotiation and 
compensation, they were also justified in the highest of terms. They 
were acts of Christian conscience and duty. 
There are some points that need to be made in qualification. 
First, the whole process, of course, was made easier, if you were rich 
rather than poor. But, the "pur" could make their compensations by 
payment in labour or by the performance of other services <see 
Johnston, 1974 pp.92-94 and 100-107). Second, if the above account 
seems to play down the use of violence, the physical bodily 
punishments, this is partly deliberate and partly justified. It is 
deliberate in as much as other accounts of the medieval legal system do 
the opposite; they exaggerate or misunderstand the nature of medieval 
law and punishment. The conceptualisation of punishment in terms of 
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Power, we looked at in the first chapter, s t h d - eems o ave iverted 
attention from this other view of the system. The accounts of 
punishment we studied in chapter I have concentrated on the vertical, 
hierarchical power relationship. My description has endeavoured to 
explore the horizontal and lateral ones as well. It is justified, 
because it seems that in the Scottish system the harsher bodily 
punishments were quite rare. This is a theme picked up by Hume in his 
11 Commentaries". He observes that 11 our judges" have never "been in the 
use of dooming to imprisonment for these long terms of four to five 
years, of which instances sometimes happen in the practice of England" 
<P.471). 
MacTaggart makes the same point. The Scots system seems not to 
have been as harsh as the English one. Further evidence for this view 
is prcvided by the letters of Edward Topham, an English army officer, 
who came to Edinburgh after the Jacobite risings. He wrote, for 
example, "The penal Laws of Scotland are highly remarkable for their 
lenity" <1776 p.286>. He continues, "They have no 'Black Act' as in 
England" Cp. 288). Or again, 
"It is an honour, in my opinion, to the Laws of Scotland, that 
in judging on this crime [robbery], they are so lenient; and the 
equitable consequences that flow from it, are a convincing 
proof, that is as good in fact as in theory" <p.292>. 
So, how can we conceive of the medieval Scottish system? Simply to 
call it a system of "compensation" is too simple, if by that one has in 
mind the legal notion of compensation as being distinct from 
punishment. The term Bossy uses of "retributive compensation" is more 
helpful, because it makes the point that in compensating one also did 
1 O'f-
penance. In her book on wit~hcraft, Christina Larner uses the term 
"restorative justice" to descri....._A_ "'"h "'" ... 
u ~ e sys~em <Larner, 1981 pp.53-59>. 
This is a useful concept, becau~e i·+ mak~ "'"h · + t.h 0 ~ ~s ~ e pain~ . at the punitive 
-.:tnd the •:omp'?n:::;atory were not opposed conceptually and were not opposed 
in practice. Punishment and money were not estranged. 
IV 
In Scotland, elements of this system of "restorative justice" 
stayed in place until the middle of the eighteenth century. Perhaps the 
date which symbolises its passing is 1747. In that year was enacted an 
Act abolishing all heritable jurisdictions; as these were intimately 
tied to the earlier system we have de!5cri bed, their passing marks the 
end of the old practices. The 1747 Act wa::; imposed by the English 
colonia.l power using the .Jacobite r-isings as the immediate excuse. 
David Hume, the philosopher, <and uncle of the criminal lawyer), saw 
the demise of the franchise courts as an indication that traditional 
Scottish social structure was changing. The abolition of these 
jurisdictions disturbed the harmonious structure of Scots society by 
removing from power the "middling orders"; the gentry who, according to 
Hume, were essential to a balanced polity <see Forbes, 1975 pl14). 
However, the system had been under attack for at least one hundred and 
fifty years already. The reign of James VI and I marks a transition 
point between the old and the new. 
In the seventeenth century much had started to change. Feuding - a 
traditional way of settling disputes - was under attack. A new force 
w.3s present with the us.a of public prosecution. Established in 1587, 
1 O)° 
the King's, later the Lord;, Advocate first proceeded with, then 
gradually without, the permission of the pursuer. Private prosecutions 
became rarer as a consequence. A:3 has been mentioned, the granting of 
rerni:3::;ions was increasingly frowned upon, indeed it was considered as a 
scandal. In 1649 an Act was passed, which declared all remissions null 
nformald, 1983 pp.138-140). By that time, assythment - an action whkh, 
as we have argued, tells one so much about the older system and its 
::;upporting legal and social structure - was almost entirely a matter 
for the courts. Also, the Sovereign had now gone; henceforth, it was to 
be a period of absentee Kingship and this decisively shifted power to 
London and to English ways. 
The eighteenth century saw equally far reaching change::;. As well 
as the abolition of the franchi::;e courts, whole new di visions of law 
were opened up and developed. An increasingly distinct law of delict 
::;eparated it::;elf from the older notions of harm. No longer was all 
killing necessarily criminal <see Black, 1975 passim). As was 
11 . 
.mentioned, within the criminal law, "dole" or the "subjective element" 
entered in, and new forms of reasoning about the nature of crime 
emerged. One indication of this is the increasingly complex 
classificatory schemes that were applied to criminal law. The early 
practice of classifying criminal law had been simple. Crimes were 
classified according to the punishment they received. Hence, in 
MacKenzie crimes are either capital, pecuniary or arbitrary. However, 
in the eighteenth century new, more ambitious, wider-ranging schemes 
emerged. One line of development is tied to the natural jurisprudence 
of Smith and Millar, another, to the much more concrete and practical 
t:i:1inking of David Hume (the nephew and ·:riminal lawyer). 'While M:Elar 
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endeavoured to elaborate a classification consistent with the 
philosophy of his master, Adam Smith, Hume, interestingly, breaks the 
pattern. Although he was a pupil of Millar's, he evolved a 
clo.ssificatory scheme, which, he claimed, reflected the practical 
workings of the criminal court. His classification, he argued, was 
based on. those crimes a working lawyer was most likely to meet in 
practice (Hume, 1844 intro). It places crimes against the person at the 
top of the list, followed by property crimes; the scheme is very 
"modern" <much of the above is based on an unpublished paper by 
J. Cairns, 1987). 
More narrowly, in the area of monetary sanctions, the situation is 
transf armed. 11 Compounding" had disappeared; assythment sti 11 existed 
but, as was said, was now the business of the criminal court alone. 
And, if we follow Fox (1927), one no longer "made fine", but "was 
fined''. Fox argues, that in England, during the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth ;:entury, a "quiet revolution" took place. In the High 
Court, Coke dropped the older expression of "making fine" and 
substituted a new expression, "to be fined". According to Fox, Coke was 
copying "Star Chamber type" tactics; he was abrogating a right to make 
fine and imposing a new measure, that allowed no negotiation. The 
expression "to be fined" is the result of this. Thereafter, Fox argues, 
the change went unnoticed. Blackstone, for example, repeats Coke's new 
expression without comment; the idea of being fined was absorbed into 
legal knowledge <Fox, 1927pp.197-201). 
lOT 
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It is beyond the scope of this chapter, indeed of this thesis. to 
give a detailed description, let alone explanation, of why these 
changes happened. As was said in the introduction to this chapter, it 
is not intended to be a "hi::;tory of puni::;hment through the ages". Yet, 
what h.~s been said above, indicates the dimensions of such a task. One 
has to contend with fundamental changes in the law and legal system and 
in the organisation of the "state". To these have to be added another 
major social upheaval. Earlier we argued that the system of restorative 
justice was underwritten by medieval catholic theology; the emerging 
modern one, however, was underwritten by the theology of the 
reformation. As Bossy argues, the reformation put forward a new 
theology, containing a new theory of salvation, which challenged the 
older idea::;. It claimed that knowledge of salvation on earth was not 
possible; it delayed the certainty of salvation until after death. This 
caused a great "moralisation" of behaviour to take place. Crimes became 
seen as sins, and sins were now to be punished rather than forgiven. A 
new image of God as a wrathful judge emerges. From now on, 
"compensation", as an expression of 11 love", was inadequate. It could no 
longer serve the dual purpose of restoring relationships and being a 
penance. Wrong doings must be met by pain; those who cause suffering, 
r3 
must suffer in return <Bossy, 1985 pp.91-94). 
In Scotland, this message was transmitted through the system of 
kirk sessions, at the parish level, and in the general assembly, at the 
national level. This disturbed the traditional social hierarchy, as it 
was lairds and burgesses, not the nobles, who sat on the church courts 
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<~ormald, 1983 p. 141). The church courts were concerned with morals. 
They rooted cut the intimate details of :5exual life, and exposed the 
"fallen" to public condemn.ation - a· true form of Foui:auldian 
.-11' ::;.: ·_: ~, ·J.i A.~· :-_:1;::._ .-:n1J rt:=. dA_a,.L t w1' th - ~ ~ ~ -- - - - . issues such as fornication, adultery, 
drunkenness, breaches of the Sabbath, and slander. For sexual offences. 
the g~ilty had to appear for a number of Sundays before the 
congreg.;.tion to be rebuked on the "stool of repentance". Also fines 
could oe imposed; for example, t5 for a single fornication, tlO for a 
repeat, up to a maximum of £40. Fines were also imposed for breaches of 
the Sabbath, drunkenness, and slander <Davies, 1980 pp.127-129>. 
J'f. 
The great ~cralising of the reformed church thus affected 
traditional values in both theory and practice. In theory, it placed 
individuals directly before God, with no intermediary to forgive them 
for their sins; personal conscience, the acceptance of responsibility 
for actions, guilt at wrong doing, replaced the older ideas of "love". 
While the doctrine of "love before law" may have seen "agreement to 
prevail over law. and love over judgement", the new moral order saw it 
differently. Now, reconciliation was not the point, but obedience to 
authority was Csee Bossy, 1985 p.94 and Brown, 1986 chapter 7). 
Judgement was the new order of the day. 
The rise of protestantism had a dual effect on conceptions of 
moral behaviour and, thus, on the role law and pu·nishment played in 
society. It made the individual more free; as Mauss notes, the 
protestant dissenting sects of the seventeenth century were importantly 
related to the emergence of the idea of individuals as being 
inalienably free, subject only to God <Mauss, 1985 p.ll). But 
protestantism also tied the individual into a new web of guilt and 
consciousness of self. This dual relationship underlies what Simmel 
refers to as the growing "spiritualisation" of the individual. 
Increasingly, the individual becomes the point of reference. No price 
could be put on the uniqueness of each soul; so, to offer payment in 
money wa::; no longer adequate. Because it became thus impossible to make 
amends for harm done, the offender had to be punished. Punishment and 
money become estranged. 
The relationship between these changes in morality, conception of 
individualilty and the law and legal institutions, is an issue of 
immense complexity, and I do not pretend my description is anywhere 
near full enough. This is an area that warrants much further research. 
Nevertheless, what I have tried to show, is that law now existed in a 
very different "moral world" than it once did. This new moral world set 
a new context for the operation of legal institutions. Indeed, legal 
institutions, including punishment, became part of the process, by 
which these new ideas became influential and legitimate. The 
increasingly public quality of law - following the demise of the 
"private", heritable jurisdictions and of negotiated justice - was 
central to the legitimation of the emerging social order. To use 
Elias's concept, the "civilising process"stressed the need for the 
individual to practi~e self-control and restraint; to be more "private" 
and not to depend on "public" relationships for moral sustenance. The 




The changes that occured in the Scottish legal system after 1747 
can be described in Weberian terms. It became more rationalised and 
more bureaucratic. The abolition of the heritable jurisdictions 
effectively separated the ownership and control of the means of 
administration of justice. Those who once "owned" the court, were no 
longer able to control its business. Rather, justice was now controlled 
from Edinburgh. Legally qualified personnel were sent into the 
localities, and this further disturbed traditional patterns of 
authority. Now the Sheriff was a stranger; a qualified lawyer, whose 
co.m.rnitment to local issues could not be assumed. The 1747 Act required 
the Sheriff and the Sheriff depute to be advocates of at least three 
years standing. Also the Sheriff was now to be paid a salary. "Justice" 
was becoming more distant from established local relationships. 
The 1747 Act laid the foundation to the modern court structure. 
The new system was streamlined and consisted essentially of the Burgh 
and J.P. 's court, at the bottom of the hierarchy, the Sheriff court, in 
the middle, handling the vast majority of criminal work, and the High 
Court, at the top. The values of an increasingly rationalistic law thus 
were applied to crime by fully qualified lawyers; the system on the 
whole became increasingly legalistic. 
The growing bureaucratic nature of the criminal justice system was 
evident also in the reorganisation of other court officials. The fiscal 
changed from being an agent of the Sheriff, originally responsible for 
collecting fines and fees, into an independent prosecution service. 
Although these changes began earlier, it was not until 1876 that all 
\I I 
fiscals were placed on a salary, and in 1907 the right to appoint them 
was vested in the Lord Advocate. The final centralisation of the 
prosecution service took place in 1975, when the District Court 
!Scotlandj Act abolished the power of district courts, as they are now 
known, to appoint their own prosecutors. 
Similar strea::Llining took place in procedure. In particular, a 
system of summary procedure emerged to be consolidated in the 1908 
Summary Jurisdiction <Scotland) Act. The clas::;ificatory schemes used to 
record criminal stati:;tics also became rationalised. In 1337, the 
11 miscellaneous" class of offences <then Class VD inclu9-es Hamesucken, 
smuggling, assembly armed and to aid smugglers, conspiracy to raise the 
rate of wage::;, deerstaaling, indecent exposure. Being out armed at 
night to take game, taking and destroying fish in enclosed ward, and so 
on. The only recognisably "modern" offence is "Riot and Breach of 
Peace". 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century a series of acts were 
passed directly aimed :3.t regulating the administration of the fine. For 
example, 1881 Summary .Jurisdiction <Scotland> Act introduced for the 
first time a "default table", that set out in detail, how long a 
defaulter was to be imprisoned. Before this, the relationship between 
time spent in the prison and non-payment of a fine seems to have been 
determined by the seriousness of the crime committed. Although, of 
course, the "default table" reflects this too, it does so indirectly. 
The new scheme was supposed to be comprehensive and applicable without 
.assessment being made of the seriousness of the original offence. 
The effect of all these changes on the use of monetary sanctions 
was profound. The 11 moral universe" which justified their use had been 
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challenged, if not shattered; the associated legal and social structure 
had disappeared. As a result, it could no longer be used in these 
Gircu:mstances where a serious harm had been done. Individuals could no 
longer hope to restore relationships and do penance as well. The 
growing bureaucratic nature of the increasingly formally legal system 
did not recognise negotiation in criminal matters. Monetary sanctions, 
thus, were downgraded as a result. It would be wrong to conclude that 
the prison simply arose to take the place of these older practices. As 
we saw, commentators saw Scotland as having a very lenient penal system 
in the eighteenth century. Indeed, at least one famous visitor saw 
Scotland as a very moral society . .John Howard, after visiting Scotland 
between 1779 and 1783, he wrote, 
"There are in Scotland but few prisons; this is partly owing to 
the shame and disgrace annexed to imprisonment; partly to the 
solemn manner in which oaths are administered, and trials and 
executions conducted; and partly to the general sobriety of 
manners produced by the care which parents and ministers take to 
instruct the rising generation" <Howard, 1929 p. 148). 
The great "moralisation" of the reformed church apparently met 
with success. Perhaps, part of the explanation for why there was no 
"great incarceration" lies in the fact that Scotland did not develop 
industry until later. But, importantly, the society which sustained the 
use of money to deal with the full range of crimes had disappeared. 
Punishment now had a very different moral basis. Thus, we learn from 
Hume that the fine is now too "mild a corrective" to apply to "so base 
a character" as a thief <Hume, 1844 p. 475). The 1864 Summary Procedure 
<Scotland) Act distinguished between civil law and criminal law in 
113 
terms of those acts which are imprisonable. All this suggests that by 
the middle decades of the nineteenth century the prison had come to be 
closely associated with the idea of the "truly" criminal and thus also 
'~, +.' • ..J +: II 11 • h -"" • w1.,,n .,ne J..c..A.ea o .... proper pun1s men1,,, Vl1th the exception of assaults, 
especially if they were mitigated by drink, crimes against the person 
would now result in imprisonment or in transportation. The fine was 
associated with the lesser crimes and the burgeoning minor offences. As 
we shall see, in the next chapter, this pattern of sanctioning began to 
change quite quickly. From the end of the nineteenth century the fine 
again creeps up the scale to be used in the property crimes once more. 
But, the important change had taken place; the relationship between the 
fine and the idea of "true" punishment had been broken. 
VII 
My point in relating the above details is to give some idea of the 
transformations that have taken place in the Scottish criminal justice 
system. The account is neither full nor complete and, as said, I make 
no such claims for it. Much of the story I have told will be familiar 
enough to scholars in the area, although, hopefully, some may find the 
specifically Scottish information new and useful. Moreover, scholars 
will probably evince no surprise at the "broad categories" of cause I 
have identified; but again, I would claim some credit for endeavouring 
to point to the importance of generalised religious beliefs. As Larner 
(1981) argues, organised religion was the first "political ideology". 
It provided a comprehensive belief system, which governed the totality 
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of life and thus was the backdrop to changes in law and conceptions of 
punishment. 
But there are ways, in which the story told is a new one. Most 
importantly, it shows that money has played a significant part in penal 
relations, and I have advanced reasons for why this is so. The medieval 
Scots :3ystem allowed. the use of money for all kinds of crimes and 
of fences in a way that is not true of the present system. Some of the 
ways money was used, seem not to be very closely related to our modern 
conception of punishment, but it would be quite wrong to exclude them 
from the analysis. Processes like assythment, compounding, the lodging 
of bonds etc, were recognised as legitimate ways of dealing with crime. 
They may not be punishments from our point of view, but perhaps we 
should pause and question, whether we should use our modern ideas as 
criteria by which to describe the past. Of course, to some extent we 
must, but this does not mean that we are incapable of seeing their 
limitations. If the story I have told is accepted, it does have 
implications for the sociology of punishment. As we saw in chapter 1, 
the modern discipline makes little room for deprivation of money in its 
theories. It excludes them conceptually and empirically or, if notice 
is taken, then they are pushed to the sidelines, so that the "proper" 
story of punishment can be told. The subject matter of this "proper 
story" is the bodily punishments. If the general picture I have painted 
of the medieval system has any accuracy, then perhaps it is time for 
sociologists to think again. 
In broad historical terms, the pattern of change I see as 
occuring, is this. We have moved from one system, in which money was 
the most common sanction, to another system, in which the same is true. 
On the surface, this is not a very interesting story, but if we dig 
below this layer, then we find the systems work on very different 
• • 1 I +h ct· 1 pr1nc1p ... es. n •, e me leva system there appears to have been no 
estrangement of punishment and money; in the contemporary system this 
estrangement is central. This, of course, means that money enters into 
, , t. . d. +f t h pena ... re~a ions in i ... eren ways; t at a new relationship has been 
drawn between punishment, money and legal order. 
I propose, in the light of my analysis, that we must revise both 
the view of earlier systems of punishment implicit in the literature 
and its portrayal of penal change. The medieval system was not based 
only or even primarily on the use of the blood sanctions. At least in 
Scotland, it appears to have been a rather lenient system, in which 
prople negotiated settlements. Corporal punishments were used, but not 
to the extent that the literature implies. Also, it appears much more 
difficult to tie particular sanctions just to a particular mode of 
production. Rusche and Kirchheimer, for example, claim that the fine 
was not a general penal sanction in the pre-modern system. My analysis 
questions this - especially, if we broaden our sight and look at other 
monetary sanctions as well as the fine. Rusche and Kirchheimer further 
suggest that it is only in capitalism, that the fine ~become a 
general sanction, because it is only capitalist society that is fully 
monetised. Again, my analysis questions how far this view can be 
maintained; there appears to be no inevitable or unique relationship 
between capitalism and the use of the fine. Perhaps, what we earlier 
described as the "rupture" view of penal history, needs to be looked at 
again. Perhaps, enough has been said to make sociologists think again 
about the assumption of discontinuity with which they work. \Jhy ::;hou:d 
it be accepted that history is best described as a series of leaps and 
bounds? Is it not time to start exploring "continuity" in change, 
rather than assuming the opposite? 
Clearly, the picture I have painted describes a legal system that 
has undergone far reaching changes. But the process of change portrayed 
was slow. The Weberian thesis of gradual rationalisation has much to 
recommend it. That this characterises patterns of change rather than 
explaining them, is accepted. This may, however, be all that we can do 
at this stage. My analysis of the changing relationship between 





In the next four chapters, we explore the place of the fine in 
the modern criminal justice system in Scotland. The empirical focus 
of the inquiry turns from the broad themes considered in the previous 
chapters and centres on the use made of the fine by the criminal 
courts, particularly the sheriff criminal court, which has been and 
arguably still is, the busiest and thus the main criminal court in 
Scotland. Although our inquiry thereby becomes more specific and 
concrete, the more general questionS'of the nature of rationality, and 
of the rationalism which we claim to be an emergent feature of the 
criminal justice system, are not dropped or put to one side. Rather, 
the following chapters can be seen as a continuation of the story by 
different empirical means. Our aim is to build up what Geertz (1973) 
has called a "thick description" of the system, albeit by using a 
wider range of methods than the ethnographic ones on which he rests 
his particular inquiries. 
The next chapter analyses official statistical data recording the 
use of sanctions from 1897 to 1978. As is explained, these dates mark 
the introduction of a comprehensive recording system and a major 
change in classificatory schemes. Broadly speaking, between these two 
dates the same classification for recording statistics was used. 
Thereafter a new scheme has been introduced which makes strict 
comparison difficult; also, the publication of data in Scotland since 
1978 has been, to say the least, fraught with difficulties. The only 
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figures which can be used with safety since 1978 which compare to the 
system of recording prior to that date are those for 'all crimes and 
offences' and for the 'miscellaneous' and 'motor vehicle offences'. 
If we briefly examine the figures for all crimes and offences it can 
be seen that the same general pattern of sanctioning continues. In 
1983, the fine was used in 81% of cases, all forms of detention in 
6.03%, admonitions in 9.8%, probation orders in 1.22%. If we add to 
the figure for fines, those for compensation orders (1,050), 
introduced by the 1980 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, the total 
figure for monetary sanction in 1983 was 81.6%. The corresponding 
figure just for fines in 1978 was 83.1%. Given the time span over 
which we examine figures, it is still too early to say whether the 
slight decrease in the use of monetary sanctions indicates a 
substantial new development. 
We have focused on the use made of fines by the criminal court 
for a number of reasons. First, as we argued in chapter one, the fine 
has been and is a: relatively "invisible" sanction and thus there 
exists little primary material on it other than the actual use courts 
have made of it. There have been very few general inquiries, 
governmental or otherwise, concerning the fine. We do not have the 
rich source of primary material on the fine that exists, for example, 
on the prison or methods of treatment. There are a few inquiries such 
as the Wootton CoDDDittee (1970), the Report of the Scottish Council on 
Crime (1975), the Dunpark Report (1977) and the Report of the Stewart 
Committee (1983), but not much else. These documents form an assumed 
backcloth to the following chapters. 
There is another reason we have focused on the use made of the 
fine by the criminal courts. We reason that the "proof" of the thesis 
so far argued ought anyway to be borne out in the day- to-day 
activities of the criminal justice system. Of all the sanctions 
available, it is the fine, this mundane, routine, non-dramatic 
sanction, that warrants study at this concrete level. It is data on 
the day-to-day use of the fine that constitutes the "hard-end" of our 
argument and inquiry. This strategy has meant paying focal attention 
to the issue of sentencing and sentencing practice; have there been 
changes in sentencing practice during the period of study? What 
factors explain the use made of the fine by sentencers? What 
relevance does the administrative framework of the system have to the 
use of the fine? These are the sort of questions that constitute the 
topic of this part of the thesis. 
We begin by looking generally at the use of sanctions by the 
criminal courts in the period 1897-1978. The following chapter 
provides information on the use of sanctions and also continues the 
narrative. One issue explored is whether changes in the volume of 
different types of crime appearing before the criminal court can help 
explain changes in the use of sanctions. The next chapter certainly 
describes such changes in the former but it is argued also that we 
should be cautious in describing the relationship these have with the 
latter. We then turn to the issue of how and why sentencers use the 
fine today. The point is to try and understand and describe the 
process which underlies sheriffs' use of the fine. This is an 
important question because before any sanction can be used a decision 
has to be made by a sentencer. Together these decisions build up into 
the sanctioning structure, they constitute its shape and profile. 
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Hence understanding how and why sentencing decisions are made has an 
obvious importance and relevance. This part of the argument uses data 
generated by interviews conducted with sheriffs in three cities. As 
is said, the interviews were normally tape recorded; twenty-two 
interviews took place. Although no attempt was made to draw up a 
sample of sheriffs, it is useful to know that approximately 10% of 
sheriffs were thereby .contacted. In the two chapters on the sheriff 
interviews, the concern with rationality, the complex interplay 
between substantive and formal rational reasoning, is examined. The 
fourth chapter looks at the issue of default both as a matter of 
policy and in the context of a discussion about coercion and 
voluntariness. This takes up our earlier argument concerning the fine 
as a "voluntary" sanction. 
This part of our inquiry thus endeavours to explore the 
relationship between punishment, money and legal order by focused, 
concrete empirical inquiry and uses a variety of techniques to that 
end. That this displays an eclectic, even catholic, attitude towards 
the problem of methodology is true, but that this catholicism is a 
weakness is debatable and to be decided, at least in part, by the 
plausibility of the argument that follows. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Structure of Sanctions and the 
Use of the Fine 1897-1978 
My objective in this chapter is to provide a broad statistical 
description of changes in the use of the fine in the last 85 years 
from 1897-1978. The earlier date is the first occasion on which 
comprehensive figures for all crimes and ofences and for all 
procedures were given and the latter date marks the end of the general 
classificatory scheme used; from 1978, a new classification has been 
in use. Also, we will present figures which record developments in 
the patterns of other sanctions, especially the use of detention and 
admonitions. Our purpose in reviewing these statistics is threefold. 
First, in the broadest sense, it allows one to perceive the fine in 
the context of the other sanctions available to sentencers. This is 
important because, without comparative knowledge, one lacks any clear 
idea of how and in what ways the fine has become the most common of 
penal sanctions. Secondly, as the figures we use are based upon 
official data, they can be taken to represent the outcomes of judicial 
decisions. The figures are a record of the actual use made of 
different sanctions by sentencers, and can be seen as a first stage in 
the explanation of sentencing patterns: they are a point at which to 
begin to understand how and why sentencers make decisions. If this is 
so, it follows that this data indicates the absence or presence of 
general sentencing policies. Thirdly, these figures may be taken as 
a reasonable basis upon which to assess likely future policy 
directions in the use of sanctions. The figures record 85 years of 
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sentencing practice and hence are invaluable as a source upon which 
the rational appraisal of developments can be based. 
I am conscious that this exercise is no more than the first 
stage in the process of explaining sentencers' decision-making. The 
figures can be used only as a basis upon which to raise certain 
questions and issues that may be important in an explanatory account. 
In this context, they provide the background to the next chapter in 
which we describe the legal reasoning of the group of sheriffs we 
interviewed. 
The methodological limitations of the statistics we use are the 
same as apply to any official data. Official statistics, it is said, 
measure more the means of their own production than they record 
accurately the state of the objects they purport to represent (see, 
'1" for example, Kitsuse and Cicourel). While this may be an issue of 
" considerable importance in the official statistics on crime - and here 
we think in particular of the debate about the dark figure of crime -
that such problems do not affect the data we use. These data, 
extracted from the annually published volumes, entitled first the 
'judicial' and then the 'criminal' statistics, amongst other things 
record the activities and workings of the various courts in the 
jurisdiction. They provide figures on the number of people against 
whom a charge is made, against whom a charge is proved, and they also 
describe the outcome in terms of disposal. Hence, unlike the official 
statistics on registered crime, these figures can record nothing other 
than that which happens in the criminal judicial process. Unlike the 
statistics on crime, there exists no other possible "reality" against 
which to measure their accuracy. The statistics can only represent a 
limited range of actions and decisions; therefore they are a 
reasonable and solid foundation upon which to proceed. 
There are, however, some methodological choices to be made about 
how to use these statistics. It is important to distinguish between 
figures recording the number of offenders against whom a charge was 
brought (the commitment figure) and those which record the number 
against whom a charge was proved. The first can be viewed as a pre-
trial measurement, the latter as a post-trial one, even if the vast 
number of pleas, especially in class VII (miscellaneous) offences, are 
guilty pleas. It is fairly obvious also that the latter measures a 
smaller population than the former for a number of reasons - verdicts 
of not guilty or not proven, the prosecution or police withdrawing the 
charge on evidential grounds, etc. Given that we wish to examine the 
relationship between disposals and judicial decision-making, it seems 
logical to use, as our parameter, the total number of offenders 
against whom a charge has been proved. In each of the tables and 
graphs given, it is this figure that is used. 
There are, of course, a number of other technical matters that 
affect the way in which data may be interpreted. In particular, the 
classificatory schemes under which data were originally collated, any 
shifts or changes in classif~catory procedures, or movement of an item 
from one crime class to another are important. 
We indicate in the text where such issues arise. Of special 
significance for the interpretation of data is the introduction or 
abandonment of sanctions, as this has an obvious bearing on sentencing 
practice. Fortunately, this is not a major problem for the period we 
cover. Statistics recording proceedings in both solemn and sununary 
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procedure were not available until 1897. Before that, data is patchy 
and tends to under-represent swmnary proceedings. As the three 
principle sanctions - fines, imprisonment (and other forms of 
detention) and admonitions - were already in use at this time, the 
possible changes resulting from the introduction of new major 
sanctions has not arisen. Probation was introduced first in the 1881 
Probation of First Offenders Act, and consolidated into a national 
scheme by the 1908 Probation (Scotland) Act. However, probation has 
not been, and certainly is not today, a major sanction if we judge by 
its frequency of use. The introduction of Young Offenders 
Institutions by the 1963 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act has made some 
difference to the use of imprisonment. Arguably, in some classes of 
crime - for example Class III (crimes against property without 
violence) - it has led to a slight increase in the use of 
imprisonment, but its effect on the system overall appears to have 
been limited. 
In the tables that follow, descriptions are given of the use of 
sanctions, first in the case of all crimes and offences, and then 
individually for a selected number of classes of crimes and offences. 
The classes studied were selected in two ways: first, we chose those 
which are numerically the most important; secondly, we selected 
comparatively - working upon the hypothesis that the fine will be used 
less in the case of more serious crimes. As a result, Classes I 
(crimes against the person), II (crimes against property with 
violence), III (crimes against property without violence), and VII 
(miscellaneous offences) were chosen for analysis. 
Before we begin detailed analysis, there is one other important 
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methodological consideration. This is whether one should work with 
figures describing absolute changes in the use of sanctions, or with 
figures describing proportionate changes in the use of sanctions. 
This is important because it can significantly alter the general 
picture which one builds. 
Figures recording absolute changes in the use of sanctions record 
changes in the volume of cases proved and in the volume of sanctions. 
Now, although there is no simple relationship between these two 
measures, it would be reasonable to assume that if everything else 
remains constant, then a volume increase in cases should be matched by 
a volume increase in sanctions. An obvious difficulty can arise in 
that the pattern of distribution in the use of sanctions for a 
particular class of crime or for a particular crime may change over 
time due to some intervening factor. This could be a reclassification 
of the basic category over time, or the inclusion of a new item in a 
crime class, or it could be due to a change in sentencing policy, 
either promoted by legislative changes, or by judicial discretion. 
Statistics recording the proportionate use of a sanction express 
the frequency of its use as a percentage of the "total of charges 
proved" figure. This is a measure of the relative use of a disposal. 
Unlike absolute figures, it is not directly responsive to any change 
in the total increase in the number of cases proved. What the 
proportionate figures measure is the relative balance in the use of 
differing sanctions. Absolute figures thus can hide relative ones. 
Absolute figures do not directly record the frequency of use of one 
sanction compared to another. This has important implications. As 
Bottoms (1983) has argued, it is a mistake to presume that absolute 
figures can be used to support a thesis which contends that the volume 
increase in the use of a sanction is direct evidence of a change in 
penal policy. Yet this is precisely what many arguments about the 
penal system do (for example, claiming an increase in the size of the 
prison population indicates an increased use of the prison as compared 
to the use made of other sanctions). 
Our predeliction thus is to perceive relative figures as a more 
generally usable measure of the use of sanctions. Proportionate 
figures record the response of the system to "input", irrespective of 
absolute increases. However, it is important to appreciate the nature 
of the volume increase in cases proved, as this is an important 
indication of "the workload" the penal system has to handle. 
In what follows we present both absolute and proportionate 
figures, the objective being to give a rounded portrait of the use of 
sanctions. In both cases the figures are described over time. 
Our scheme in presenting the data is, first, to construct a 
general picture of the broad changes that have characterised the penal 
system during the period, second, to look at changes in the use of the 
fine and other sanctions within each of the selected classes, and 
thirdly, to look at changes in the use of sanctions for particular 
crimes and offences. Finally, we will consider the general 
implications of the analysis, concentrating in particular on whether 
we can say there has been a change in sentencing practice. 
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Volume changes in the classes of crimes and of fences 
The table below (Table 1) describes the relative contributions of 
the different classes of crimes and offences made to the overall total 
of all crimes and offences. We provide figures both for 1897 and 
1978. 
Table 1 
Volume chan~es in classes of crime: 1897 as compared to 1978 
-
Class 
1897 (total against 
1978 % increase whom charges proved) or decrease 
I 4,830 (4.3%) 3,062 ( 1 . 5%) -36.6% 
II 879 (0.78%) 9,362 (4.4%) +965. 1 % 
III 9,073 (8.0%) 23,569 ( 1 1 . 0%) +159.8% 
VII 93,996 (84.0%) 171 ,478 (81 .0%) +82. 4% 
Total 108,778 (96.5%) 207,471 (98.3%) +90.7% 
For all crimes 112,714 ( 100%) 211,113 ( 100%) +87.3% 
and offences 
A number of interesting observations may be made. First, it can 
be seen that, as the selected classes of crimes and offences together 
account for 98% of all the crimes and offences for which a charge was 
proved, they do provide a very full picture of this part of the penal 
system. Second, the class of crimes, in which there has been a 
decrease in the number of cases proved, is Class I - crimes against 
the person - with a 36% decrease. 
It is important to realise that it cannot be concluded from this that 
there has been a significant decline in the volume of serious violent 
crime with which the courts have to deal. Rather, it can, in part, be 
explained by the removal of petty assaults (including technical police 
assaults) from Class I to Class VII in 1901. Given petty assaults 
normally constitute the greatest proportion of assaults brought before 
the court, then considerable importance must be attached to this. All 
other classes have witnessed a major increase in business over the 
period, especially Class II with a 965% increase. From constituting 
0.78% of the total in 1897, it had increased to 4.4% by 1978. 
Although, of course, one must be cautious, it does appear reasonable 
to assume that such a major change is related to volume increases in 
the amount of violent crime against property during the period. 
Third, it is important to note that the contribution of Class VII 
offences to the overall distribution has decreased during the period. 
This is a somewhat surprising figure, as it is generally assumed that 
the significant increase in statutory legislation during this period 
has had a major effect upon the type of business with which the court 
has had to deal. 
The general picture that emerges from the above table can be thus 
summarised: 
(a) that, in terms of the volume of cases in which a charge is 
proved, there has been a decrease in crimes against the 
person. In 1978 the courts were dealing with less disposals 
for serious violent crime than in 1897. 
(b) that, in the two property classes - II and III - there have 
been significant increases in the number of cases. These 
two classes now constitute a greater part of the volume of 
business with which the criminal court deals. 
(c) that, while there has been an increase (of 81%) in the total 
number of Class VII offences in which a charge was proved, 
this has not increased the contribution of this class to the 
overall distribution. Thus, while the majority of cases 
with which the criminal court deals are now, and were in 
1897, Class VII, the relative significance of this class has 
not increased. 
(d) finally, as there has been an overall volume increase of 
87%, it is reasonable to relate this to a general increase 
in the volume of crimes and offences with which the criminal 
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The use of sanctions 
Table 2 describes changes in the use of certain sanctions based 
upon absolute figures, i.e., those recording total usage of each 
sanction at each date. The first two columns of each section simply 
note these totals and the third expresses the difference between them 
as a percentage of the 1897 figure. Although this is a somewhat 
general and crude comparison, it does allow us to observe broad 
changes in the volume of proved cases for each of the selected classes 
and for all crimes and offences. To further aid comparison, the 
figures in brackets express the use of the disposal as a percentage of 
the total number against whom a charge has been proved (the relative 
figure). 
As can be seen from the figures for all crimes and offences, 
there has been a very significant change in the use of the fine, 
whereas the change in the use of all forms of detention, as measured 
by percentage change in the total for all crimes and offences in 
comparison, has been slight. While the number of sentences of 
detention have increased by 7.8%, the use of the fine has increased by 
118.9%. If this is put in the context of the percentage increase in 
the total against whom a charge has been proved (in 1897, 112,714; in 
1978, 211,113 - percentage increase +87.3%), then it is clear that in 
general the increase in the fine is disproportionate. If we further 
observe changes in the use of probation and admonition (15.8 and 1.1 
respectively), the pattern of change is highlighted. In general, 
there has been a major increase in the volume of fines given by the 
criminal court which, not only exceeds the comparative volume increase 
in the other recorded sanctions, but also that of the overall increase 
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in the volume of cases in which it is possible to give any disposal. 
In short, the fine has picked up the major increase in court business 
during this period. 
This is an important and significant finding in its own right, 
and later in this chapter we will consider its general implications. 
At this stage we wish to describe more fully the detailed nature of 
the changes that have taken place and to draw some provisional 
conclusions. 
The use of detention: volume changes in the different classes 
It is clear from Table 2 that there has been uneven developments 
in the use of detention in the different classes. Whereas, there has 
been a volume decrease in its use of 31.6%, 24.9% and 5.5% 
respectively for Classes I, III and VII, there has been, in 
comparison, a major volume increase in its use in Class II - crimes 
against property with violence - of 36.6%. This increase is 
undoubtedly related to the overall increase in the number of cases of 
Class II crimes that pass through the court. Whereas in 1897 there 
were 879 cases of a charge proved, in 1978 this had risen to 9,362 - a 
965% increase in volume. If these two figures are compared, then it 
is clear that the increase in the use of detention in Class II has 
been less than the overall increase in volume for Class II. Thus, if 
these figures are converted to changes in the relative use of 
detention, we can, in fact, observe that, relatively speaking, the use 
of detention has decreased, i.e., the relative use of all forms of 
detention in Class II has substantially decreased over the period (by 
-56. 2%). 
Indeed, this general pattern can be discerned if we look at the 
use of detention for all classes of crimes and offences. While there 
has been a slight volume increase in the use of detention of 7.8% in 
proportional terms, there has been a marked decline of 42.5% over the 
period. As we argued above, the use of detention has, by our first 
measure, remained relatively constant, whereas, by our second measure, 
it has tailed off. Generally, therefore one can con1.lude that there 
is a significantly srraller chance today of any case in which a charge 
has been proved being dealt with by the use of a sentence of detention 
than there was in 1897. As can be seen from Table 2, this holds true 
for Classes II (-56.2), III (-71.1) and VII (-48.1) and for all crimes 
and offences (-42.5), but not for Class I, where there is now a 
slightly greater chance (+7.9) of detention being used. 
The use of the fine: volume changes in the different classes 
There have been major changes in the volume use of the fine by 
the criminal courts during this period. With the exception of Class I 
crimes, it can be seen from Table 2 that there has been major 
increases in its use in all other classes. For example, in Class II 
in 1897, 30 fines were given, compared to 4,627 in 1978, a percentage 
increase of 15323%. If we compare this rate of increase to that for 
the total against whom a charge has been proved (from 879 to 9,362, or 
a percentage increase of 965%), then it is clear that there has been a 
major shift into fines in this class. Indeed, this picture is 
confirmed if we look at the relative use of fines for Class II crimes. 
The percentage figures for 1897 and 1978 are 3.41% and 49.42% 
respectively, an increase in the proportional use of the fine of 
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1349.3%. While the dramatic nature of these increases is somewhat 
highlighted by the small size of figures involved, it is nevertheless 
clear that there has been a significant increase in the use of the 
fine for crimes against property with violence. 
A similar, though less dramatic, increase has occurred in the 
other class of property crimes, Class III (crimes against property 
without violence). The relevant figures for volume changes are for 
1897, 2,127, and for 1978, 16,852, a percentage increase of 692.8%; 
and for proportionate use 23.44% to 71.5%, an increase of 205%. 
A shift into the fine is clear also in Class VII - miscellaneous 
offences. This group of offences is normally seen to have a special 
significance for the use of the fine. Because it is composed of 
"regulatory" or "trivial" offences, it is often argued, or more 
normally tacitly assumed, that it is to this class that one ought 
primarily to look in order to explain the "rise" in the popularity of 
the fine. There are, of course, good grounds to this argument: not 
only is this the class in which the fine is used most (87.34% in 
1978), but also this class, as was shown in Table 1, contributes by 
far the greatest number of cases that appear before the courts. 
Moreover, as is well known, the majority of offences in Class VII are 
related to the Road Traffic Acts (80% plus), and the majority of such 
offenders receive monetary sanctions either as fines or as fixed 
penalties (90% plus). Indeed, very often it seems to be assumed that 
the rise in the popularity of the fine parallels the rise of the 
automobile and to a lesser extent the rise of radio and television. 
It is re~dily admitted that, in crude global terms, this thesis 
has much to it. However, there are a number of important 
qualifications and caveats that must be made. First, as can be seen 
from Table 2, while the volume increase in business in this class is 
considerable, there being a rise of 105% over the period, this has had 
little effect on the proportionate use of the fine; proportionately, 
the use of the fine has increased by only 12.4%, from 77.7% in 1897 to 
87.34% in 1978. It appears reasonable to conclude from this that 
there has been no m~jor change in sentencing practice in this class in 
the sense that there has been no major shift or switch from the use of 
another sanction into the fine. However, there has been a significant 
change in the type of of fence which is predominant in the class and is 
fined. In the earlier period, from 1897 until the 1920s, the 
predominant offences fined in order of magnitude were breach of the 
peace, those falling under police regulations, and drunkenness; from 
the mid-1920s onwards, there has been a significant increase in 
offences against the Road Traffic Acts, these reaching a position of 
dominance, with other statutory offences falling under the Wireless 
Acts, only after the second world war. 
As breach of the peace is a common law crime, and was in this 
earlier period the most common of all "miscellaneous offences" 
appearing before the court, it follows that the relationship to be 
analysed is not just one between the creation of statutory offences 
and the use of the fine. Rather, there is an underlying issue of why 
certain "harms" are construed as trivial, or less serious, and so can 
be put into this class, while others are deemed to be serious and 
classed elsewhere. 
Various e~planations have been put forward to account for this 
process. It is often claimed, for example, that the offences which 
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are categorised in Class VII have one feature in connnon. Rather than 
being aimed at responding to "serious" harm caused to the individual, 
such as attacks on the person or upon property, these offences are 
aimed at controlling or managing aspects of daily life. The contrast 
drawn here, it is important to note, is not one just between 
seriousness and triviality, but also one between harms that directly 
impinge upon the individual and those that impinge on routine 
procedures which lend order to a complex society. (Matters such as 
the control of traffic, or the need to keep a reasonable level of 
"peace", or the need to "licence" certain public services (drink), or 
forms of shared technological communication, or public sex.) As 
Gusfield (1983) has recently pointed out, there is an important 
conceptual difference in the way these offences are legally 
categorised. Whereas, in the case of crimes, a doctrine of mens rea, 
centred upon the legal subject as a right-bearing, responsible 
individual, is the principle of classification, in the case of 
offences, the relevant legal category is one more akin to a form of 
strict liability. The legal subject is no longer the centre of 
attention (either as victim or offender); now the central calculation 
is focused upon the harm caused by the act in abstracto. 
There is an important point here. The implication of Gusfield's 
argument is the construction of an action as an "offence" rather than 
a "crime" is related to broader legal categories as much as it is to a 
calculation about harm. It is because the classic criminal law 
relationship between intentionality, proportionality and assessment of 
harm is absent,. or at least marginal, that certain actions become 
construed as offences. But it would be wrong to conclude from this, 
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as Gusf ield points out, that offences are classed as trivial or less 
serious only because the classic criminal law relationship is absent. 
This is relevant and is part of the process, but we ought not to 
reduce the argument to one of simple cause and effect. Other broader, 
sociological considerations have to be brought into focus as well, 
particularly those, as Bottoms (1983) has argued, connected with 
bureaucracy and changes in technology. 
As we contended earlier, the change in the nature of the type of 
offence which predominates in Class VII is tied in with developments 
in technology. The emergence of the motor vehicle - which President 
Woodrow-Wilson feared would lead to universal socialism - and 
increasingly technologically based forms of communication, like the 
wireless, telephone and television (and, we may add today, the 
computer), have had major implications for criminal law and the penal 
system. These forms of technology are, in an important sense, 
indifferent to traditional social relationships, particularly to 
values associated with individualism, such as, for example, the 
private ownership of property. These new forms of technology push 
property and also communication away from the individual into the 
abstraction of mass society. It is not meant by this that individuals 
do not "own" cars, wirelesses or computers, but that this relationship 
now takes place in a distinctly and qualitatively different public 
sphere. (In the case of cars this is further complicated by the need 
for a third party risk insurance.) Ownership of a car or a telephone 
is not an end in itself, but rather a means to wider, more general 
ends in which ac;tors have a relatively "low" emotional (or in Weber's 
terms, substantive) commitment. This contrasts with the core or 
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standard type of relationship envisaged by modern criminal law in 
which a harm against private property or against the individual's body 
is seen as one committed against the whole person and therefore as 
warranting serious moral evaluation and condemnation. 
It is in this context that we can better understand the 
functional-type argument sometimes advanced, that to fully criminalise 
the common means of transport or communication would be an over-
extension of the law and result in an "overloading" of the criminal 
justice system. It is not simply for "practical reasons", such as the 
use of law inhibiting the free flow of traffic or of communication, 
that the criminal justice system classes statutory offences as less 
serious. Rather, these practical reasons tie in with, and overlay, 
the important conceptual changes outlined above. 
So the relationship between Class VII offences and the fine is a 
complex one which cannot be understood only in terms of the growth of 
statutory legislation. The other factors briefly discussed enter in 
the picture and must be given full explanatory weight. Also, it is 
important to keep in mind the long term nature of the process. The 
statistics presented in Table 2 allow us to view the process only from 
1897 onwards, when, as the table makes clear, the fine is already the 
most regularly used of sanctions. This is further support for the 
argument advanced; statutory offences, and the growth in them during 
this century, are not the "cause" of the growth in the popularity of 
the fine, rather they have altered the nature of the offences most 
regularly dealt with by this sanction in Class VII. 
There is also a broader issue not yet broached to which these 
considerations naturally gives rise. Why is it that the fine is seen 
as the appropriate sanction to use for offences or harms considered to 
be less serious? Why not some other sanction? Why not imprisonment? 
We leave consideration of this to the final sections of this chapter. 
At this stage of the argument, however, it should be clear that, far 
from being a backwater of little interest - as the lack of attention 
paid to summary offences by the literature may lead one to believe -
these offences in fact stimulate questions of great sociological 
import. And, in particular, they return us to one of the central 
themes of this study, the social basis of the evaluation of harm as it 
is expressed in the criminal law and in punishment. 
We turn, from consideration of Class VII, to an overall view of 
the use of the fine by comparing its "take up" in the classes selected 
for study. Table 3 below compares volume changes in the number of 
cases in which a charge has been proved to volume changes in the use 
of the fine over the period. 
Table 3 
Volume chang;es in number a~ainst 
whom charge proved compared to volume 
Chanises in use of' f i.nes 
% change in % change in 
Class volume of volume of 
cases proved fines 
I -36.6 -49.7 
II +965.0 +15323.0 
111 +159.8 +692.8 
VII +82.4 +105.0 
All 
crimes and ·+87. 3 +118.9 
offences 
J~O 
As can be seen, there are considerable differences between the 
classes, but one clear trend is discernable. The use of the fine has 
expanded most rapidly in the two classes dealing with property crime -
Classes II and III. In both, the take up of the fine clearly 
outstrips the rate of change in volume increase; in Class III the 
proportional comparison is 1:4, while in Class II it is 1:16 
(approximately). T~e magnitude of these rates of change does suggest 
major alterations either in the type of crime which composes this 
class, or in sentencing practice, or a combination of these. As a 
provisional and cautious conclusion, we may say it is improbable that 
major changes of the type we have observed will be explicable in 
technical terms - that is only by reference to changes in 
classificatory practice. Such alterations can have innnediate and 
sometimes dramatic effects on the statistics, but this can be 
counterbalanced by time. What we see in the case of Classes II and 
III are long term developments, and this suggests we must seek for 
their explanation by other broader criteria as well. 
While these internal developments in Classes II and III are of 
interest and importance, it would be wrong to exaggerate their 
significance for the criminal justice system as a whole. In 
comparison to Class VII, the total numbers involved in Classes II and 
III are small. As we saw from Table 1, Class VII accounts for 84% of 
all the cases proved, while together Classes II and III account for 
only 15.4% (1978). Although this is a notable increase over 1897 
(8.78%), it is not a basis from which to try and explain trends in the 
larger criminal justice system. As was pointed out earlier in the 
case of Class II, the nature of the dramatic changes must be offset 
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against the very small number of fines (30) given in 1897. With this 
as the baseline more or less any developmental increase will appear 
extraordinary. 
The one class which differs in many ways from the others is 
Class I. As can be seen from all three tables presented, this is the 
only one in which there has been a decrease in overall business and in 
the use of all sanctions except probation. If we return to Table 1, 
then it can be seen that there has been a decline in the total number 
of all other disposals compared to an increase in the total use of 
probation orders (an increase of 451.4 in volume usage). Although the 
number given in 1978 is still small in absolute terms (193 as compared 
to 35 in 1897), probation is the only penal measure in which there has 
been an increase at all. If, however, we convert these figures into a 
measure of proportional usage, it will be seen that admonitions were 
used relatively more frequently in 1978 than they were in 1897, even 
though there has been a decrease in the absolute number given. 
The general pattern of development in Class I thus is of a 
decline in usage of the two main disposals - detention and fines - but 
an increase either in absolute or relative terms of ad.monitions and 
probation orders. A significant factor accounting for this decline in 
business and for the use of the fine especially at the beginning of 
the period, is the removal of petty assaults from Class I to Class 
VII, where they become included under breach of the peace. Although 
this was later reversed in 1951, when a substantial number were 
reclassified as criminal assaults, it is still nevertheless relevant. 
Similarly, husband and wife assaults, the most common crime against 
the person at the beginning of the period, have been continually 
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"downgraded" and are now mostly (except for serious assault) recorded 
as breach of the peace. 
To summarise: 
(a) with the exception of Class I, there has been a significant 
and important increase in the use of the fine over this 
century. 
(b) the increase in the use of the fine in Classes II, III and 
VII, and in all crimes and offences together, is greater 
than the increase in business in each class. 
(c) the most dramatic increase in fining is in the two classes 
recording crimes against property. 
(d) the significance of Class VII must not be under-estimated 
due to the total number of cases that fall within it. 
However, there appears not to have been a change in 
sentencing practice following the growth of statutory 
legislation such as that related to cars and moving traffic 
offences. Rather, this has changed the nature of the 
offences fined within the class, rather than expanded the 
significance of the class to the rest of the criminal 
justice system. 
So far we have discussed changes in the use of sanctions by a 
broad comparison of absolute figures over the period, and have reached 
provisional conclusions. While this does enable a very general 
picture to be drawn, it does not take us very far in understanding 
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either how, why or when the observed changes took place. From the 
discussion of developments in the use of the fine in Class II, for 
example, we can glean that changes have occurred but not why or when. 
For instance, is the growth in the use of the fine in this class a 
recent phenomen01confined to the period after the second world war, or 
is it the result of longer term changes? 
To answer this sort of question we need to present the statistics 
in a different way. The graphs presented in the following argument 
are designed to show, first, the relative use of the different 
sanctions in the selected classes, and second, how the use of these 
sanctions has changed and varied over time. We present the figures 
expressed as proportions, as we have yet to establish in any detail or 
with precision, the proportionate use of the main disposals available 
to the court. Also, as was said earlier, the use of relative or 
proportionate figures allows one to identify and describe more clearly 
general trends in the use of sanctions. To put this a little 
differently, proportionate figures enable one to see how the increase 
(and decrease) in business, outlined earlier, has been distributed 
among the main sanctions available. The result is a more complete and 
rounded account of the pattern of sentencing in the Scottish criminal 
justice system. 
It is necessary to introduce two further qualifications before 
proceeding to the substance of analysis. First, the objective is not 
to explain every detailed fluctuation in the use of sanctions; rather, 
it is to identify and account, where possible, for the broad direction 
of change. Second, it is important to realise the effect of the two 
world wars on the figures. As Shields and Duncan (1964) and the 
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preface to the relevant volume of the statistics make clear, these can 
dramatically change the nature of the business dealt with by the 
courts. For example, the commentator in the prefaces to both the 1914 
and 1919 volumes of statistics point out that the drop in certain 
crimes - drunkenness and husband and wife assaults - was caused by men 
going to war, and the consequent rise in the same offences by their 
return. Indeed, Shields and Duncan (1964 ) argue that war "upsets" 
the statistics for a period of ten years or so. This suggests, first, 
no special significance is to be attached to the war years in terms of 
the overall pattern of development, and, second, to gain a general 
picture, we must look carefully at the years immediately before the 
warS and compare them to the period several years on from the end of 
the wars. We introduce these qualifications not to deny the 
importance of wars as sociological phenomena, but rather to indicate 
caution in the interpretation of the statistics. 
The proportional use of sanctions for all crimes and offences and for 
the selected classes 
The following graphs describe the proportionate use of sanctions 
for all crimes and offences and for each of the selected classes 
separately. Also, the graphs epitomise the use of the main sanctions 
individually for all classes of crime and offence. 
The graphs reinforce the main conclusions of the previous 
section. The most dramatic increase in the use of the fine takes 
place in the two property crime classes (see Graphs 3 and 4); in Class 
VII there appears to be some increase in the use of the fine but this 
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as is the change in the use of the fine in Classes II and III (see 
Graph 5). Further, from Graph 2, which describes developments in 
Class I, it is clear that there is no consistent pattern of change in 
the use of all the four main sanctions within this class. Rather, the 
use of each fluctuates significantly over time. There appears to be 
"trade offs" between, on the one hand, uses of detention and the fine, 
and, on the other hand, uses of probation and admonitions. 
These graphs considerably expand the broad picture previously 
painted. In particular, they illustrate the rate of change and 
direction of change over time. From them we are better able to see 
the date from which a change in use takes place. For example, if we 
examine Graphs 3 and 4, it can be seen that the expansion in the use 
of the fine in Classes II and III is a long-term process, beginning at 
least from the 1890s and, save for the 1930s, continuing uninterrupted 
to the present day. This is an important observation, not least 
because it suggests that there may well be differences in development 
between Scotland and England and Wales. For example, Bottoms (1983) 
has suggested that the expansion in the use of the fine in England and 
Wales took place first at the end of the nineteenth century 
(presumably as part of the general European policy of substituting the 
fine for short periods of imprisonment (see Gerbling (1981)) and 
remained fairly static until the second world war, and since has 
rapidly expanded, particularly in the indictable crimes. While the 
picture described by Graphs 1, 3 and 4 is not entirely different, it 
does appear to be the case that in Scotland the process has been more 
gradual and consistently expansionist throughout the period. 
Moreover, with regard to Class I crimes in Scotland (see Graph 2), it 
appears in many ways to be very different indeed. For example, as can 
be seen from the graph, fines were used more at the beginning of this 
century than they are today. While this may be due to "technical 
reclassification" (first petty assaults, then husband and wife 
assaults - most of which were fined - were removed to breach of the 
peace in Class VII), this simply raises the wider issue of why these 
"crimes" were downgraded to "offences". Why these changes in 
evaluation? 
For the moment, we leave these wider issues and proceed to 
describe more fully the changes described by the graphs. From Graph 1 
we can observe the broad lines of development in the use of the four 
main sanctions for all crimes and offences. Three principal features 
are immediately apparent. 
First, the graph clearly illustrates the predominance of the fine 
over all the other sanctions. This is perhaps the most important 
observation. While, proportionately, the use of the fine falls only 
once, in the early 1930s, below 70%, the use of the other sanctions 
never rises (except again for a few years in the 1930s) above 20%. 
The simple explanation for this, as was said before, is the size of 
Class VII. Since during the period this group constituted over 80% of 
all the business with which the criminal courts dealt; it follows 
that the overall pattern of sentencing must be significantly 
influenced by movements within it. 
Secondly, from Graph 1, we can see that the fine has gained in 
frequency of use compared to all other sanctions. Whereas, the 
general direction of development in the case of admonitions, detention 
and probation is downward, there is a general rise in the use of the 
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fine over the period. To be more precise, the general patterns of 
development can be split into two periods, 1897 to 1932, and 1932 to 
1978. During the first, the pattern in the use of the fine is 
somewhat irregular. In the early years of the century its use rapidly 
increases but then tails off, save for a slight rise throughout the 
1920s, until 1932. From then on it increases quite steadily except 
for the plateau of the war years. Certainly from 1952 its use 
increases without interruption. It should be noted also that the 
decrease in the use of the fine between 1897 and 1932 appears to be 
accounted for by a rise in admonitions and not by an increase in the 
use of detention. Indeed, the same broad pattern, but .in reverse, 
appears to occur from 1932 onwards. As the use of admonitions falls 
off, the use of the fine increases. Thus, we may conclude that the 
main line of development over time can be accounted for by "trade-
off s" in the use of what are generally seen as the less punitive 
sanctions. 
With regard to the use of detention, it can be seen that there is 
a fall in its use of about 50% over the period (from just below 10% to 
approximately 5%). This is a notable development but, generally 
speaking, more significance ought to be attached to its relative lack 
of importance (as measured by use) throughout the period. As we enter 
the period in 1897, detention is a little used disposal and its use 
declines fairly consistently thereafter. 
There is a third general observation to make of Graph 1. Even if 
we accept the changes described, these have to be put in a broader 
context. If we conceive Graph 1 as describing a sanctioning structure 
then it is clear that little has really altered during the period. By 
this is meant that the features of the structure are similar at the 
end of the period to what they were at the beginning. From Graph 1, 
it is impossible to argue that there has been any "revolution" in 
sentencing patterns in the system as a whole. There has been a shift 
to using the fine more, but this is a minor change compared to the 
basic stability in sentencing patterns. It is manifestly the case 
that this stability rests upon the central position occupied by the 
fine. 
Several implications follow from this. First, if we are to seek 
for the "origins" of this sanctioning structure, then we must do so 
prior at least to 1897. However, if we rely on the existing 
penological literature to guide us in our search then we would, it is 
contended, find it of restricted use. The overwhelming impression 
created by this literature - and this is a theme as clear in the 
traditional penological literature as it is in the more modern, 
radical, sociological type - is that in the nineteenth century the 
prison was the normal and indeed the most connnon punishment. Our 
analysis questions this. As was pointed out before, we enter the 
picture only in 1897 when the fine is already the most connnon sanction 
in use. Unless one believes that such patterns, like Topsy, grow up 
overnight, or that there exist clear radical ruptures in historical 
processes (and although some, for example Foucault, claim for just 
such a history, there is not supposed to be one at the end of the 
nineteenth century), then one has to explain a pattern that has been 
in existence for a considerable period of time. 
In my view, it would be mistaken to try to resolve this issue by 
reducing it to one about which sanctions were used most and when. 
This is an important question made considerably more complex by the 
way in which statistics are reported in the nineteenth century. (In 
Scotland there was no comprehensive reporting in the general returns 
of a class of offences equivalent to Class VII; rather, these are only 
presented for separate counties and burghs with the result that, as 
far as the general returns are concerned, the offences for which the 
fine is most likely to be used are seriously under-recorded. This 
changed in 1897 when the new comprehensive list of crimes and offences 
we use was drawn up. We have not examined the English figures in 
enough detail to see if the same is true there also. However, as the 
pre-1897 list was compiled earlier in the century (as was the 1897) to 
"assimilate" it to the English one, a similar story cannot be ruled 
out.) This line of argument is to be resisted, because underlying 
this empirical question is a more fundamental one about how we 
conceive of "punishment". The problem with most literature on the 
penal system is, as we noted in the first chapter, that it proceeds 
upon the assumption that punishment is essentially about deprivation 
of liberty as symbolised by the prison. As a limited account of how 
the major crimes were dealt with this does have some substance, 
although it must be pointed out that it ignores the significance of 
transportation and banishment. However, this account becomes 
problematic as it becomes overextended. The presumption is that one 
can understand the system as a whole from the vantage point of how 
crimes were dealt with; this leaves out of analysis offences and also 
ignores those occasions on which the fine was used for crimes anyway 
(for example, for 1838, of 673 offenders charged with assault, 130 
(19.3%) were acquitted or discharged, 9 (1.3%) were transported, 399 
(62.6%) sentenced to imprisonment, and 123 (18.83%) were fined. Thus, 
in terms of those convicted, the figures read - death: 1.6%, 
imprisonment: 73.5%, fine: 22.7%). 
Another implication follows from our analysis. This concerns the 
explanatory weight given to Class VII offences. At the risk of 
prolixity, it must be reiterated, both that it appears impossible to 
understand the structure and pattern of sentencing as regards the 
whole system, unless this class is fully taken into account, and thus 
one must repeat warnings against ignoring it. There appears almost to 
be a conspiracy of silence in the literature. Sociologists and 
policy-makers (see, for example, Shields and Duncan (1964), and 
McClintock and Avison (1968)), perhaps for what are seen as good 
reasons, have traditionally ignored the impact of the group of harms 
called offences. Indeed, part of the problem with the accounts 
briefly alluded to above is that they do just this. To do so, 
however, is to necessarily limit the scope of inquiry even before 
investigation has begun. 
The proportionate use of the fine in the selected classes of crime 
So far we have emphasised the stability of sentencing patterns as 
a whole throughout the period. We turn now to a more detailed 
examination of the classes of crime in which there have been 
significant alterations and, in particular to Classes II and III, 
where, as it has been shown, there is a considerable increase in the 
use of the fine and a decrease in the use of detention. (In the 
course of this discussion it should be kept in mind that Classes I, II 
and III correspond to indictable crimes in the English context. They 
constitute the most serious of crimes prosecuted in Scotland.) The 
increase in the use of the fine for them is thus a matter of 
considerable sociological and pragmatic import. 
Graphs 2, 3, 6 and 7 describe these changes. As can be seen from 
Graphs 2, 3 and 6 there is a similarity in the shape of the curves 
recording the increase in the use of the fine for Classes II and III. 
From the beginning of the period there is a rapid increase in the use 
of the fine followed by a decline throughout the 1920s and 1930s, but 
from 1937 onwards a continuation in upward movement. There appears to 
be a check on this in the 1950s in Class III, but from 1957 onwards 
the rate of increase in both classes is rapid and consistent. It 
should be noted first, that in these periods of decline, the lowest 
point reached each time is always above that at which the previous 
increase began, and second, that in these periods of decline, there 
appears to be more movement into admonitions than into detention. 
This can be established by comparing Graph 6 to Graph 7 and also Graph 
3 to Graph 4. At the very end of the period, from 1967 onwards, the 
fine significantly increases compared to the other sanctions which all 
tail off dramatically. In the case of probation, this is probably due 
to the effects of the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act, which 
established the children's hearings system, and thus removed a high 
offending group from the purview of the criminal court and abolished a 
separate probation service in Scotland. (For more details on the 
decline in probation see the report by N. Passas, 1985.) 
The graphs thus confirm the provisional conclusions reached 
earlier in this chapter, i.e., there appears to be a change in 
sentencing practice in these two property crime classes. Broadly 
speaking, the fine increases in use very significantly whereas there 
is a proportional decline in the use of detention, probation and 
admonitions. 
It is, of course, one thing to describe changes in the use of a 
sanction for a whole class of crimes and quite another to do the same 
for particular crimes which fall within the class. Yet, this latter 
task must be undertaken as it is quite possible for the overall 
picture for a class to be distorted by the preponderance of one 
particular crime within it which is being "disproportionately" fined. 
In order to "test" for this, we intend to examine two crimes within 
Class II in more detail where the increase in the use of the fine has 
been greatest - robbery and housebreaking. Of these, housebreaking 
is, and has been, numerically the more common crime. Indeed, from 
1897 onwards, the commentaries which preface the annually published 
statistics point out the rapid rise in its commission. For example, 
in the 1903 report, it is commented that cases of "housebreaking have 
been considerably more numerous in recent years, and, as a 
consequence, the balance of real criminality in comparing the 
statistics of 1898 and 1903 is against the year under report" (Cmnd. 
2317, p.8). That this trend has continued, can be seen from comparing 
the following tables. Table 4 records the total number of persons 
convicted of crimes of housebreaking and robbery and also the use of 
detention and fines in randomly selected years from 1839 to· 1912. 
Table 5 similarly shows the total number of cases in which a charge is 












The use of detention and fines in housebreaking and r6bbery 
in randomly selected years : 
Source relevant volumes of judicial statistics 
Total Convicted Detention Fines 
House- House-Robbery House-breaking breaking Robbery breaking 
281 32 280 31 -
360 51 359 51 -
166 40 160 39 2 
235 1 41 218 136 9 
586 - 398 - 39 
924 - 570 - 49 
1 ,088 - 521 - 88 










The use of Detention and fines in housebreakinc; and robbery 1965-1978: 
Adapted from Criminal Statistics 
Total against whom Detention Fines charges proved 
Year House- House- House-
breaking Robbery breaking Robbery breaking Robbery 
1965 10'1 93 246 29.8 63.4 30.5 14.2 
1966 10,832 268 31 . 1 65.6 31 . 2 14.2 
1967 11 '348 324 30.3 61.4 32.5 16.4 
1968 10' 977 404 31.4 62.7 33.7 15.8 
1969 11,781 398 30.7 64.0 31.8 20. 1 
1970 1 3' 1 40 480 30.7 60.4 32. 1 19.2 
1971 10,445 465 37.4 67.8 32.8 15.7 
1972 7,831 370 41.1 67.0 39.8 21 . 6 
1973 6' 351 293 35.5 67.6 42.5 16.7 
1974 7,019 348 34.0 60.3 45.8 22.7 
1975 7,533 392 35 .1 66.3 46.7 20.2 
1976 7,856 475 32.9 62.3 48. 1 24.2 
1977 8,716 476 30 .1 65. 1 51.3 23.3 
1978 8,856 490 31.0 58.9 50.5 28.6 
I '11 
These tables show that there has been a continual expansion in 
the number of cases of each crime the court deals with and that there 
has been a significant development in both of the use of the fine. 
Housebreaking has expanded more than robbery. If we compare the total 
number of cases of housebreaking in 1839 to that in 1978, there has 
been a 3151% increase; the figure for robbery is 1531%. Numerically, 
housebreaking contin~es to be the most common of crimes in Class II. 
It follows from this that the expansion in the use of the fine in 
Class II crimes is closely associated with its use in housebreaking. 
Further evidence for this argument can be gathered if we examine 
the differential expansion in the use of the fine in the two crimes 
since 1946. In the crime of robbery, the fine was used only in 1.61% 
of cases in which a charge was proved as compared to 21.4% of cases in 
housebreaking. This pattern is discernable in the 1920s as well. 
Whereas, for example, the fine was used in 24% of cases of 
housebreaking in 1925, it was not used at all for robbery. Clearly 
then, the use of the fine in Class II as a whole is intimately 
connected with the very great expansion in housebreaking. The upward 
moving curve described in Graph 3 thus is to be explained by 
developments in housebreaking. However, since the end of the second 
world war, as can be seen from Table 5, the fine has increased in use 
in robbery also. The rate of increase in its proportionate use is 
1787.Si. - a very notable expansion indeed. How can these changes be 
explained? How can we account for the increase in the use of the fine 
in these two crimes? One way is to examine the very full connnentaries 
given to the statistics at the beginning of the period to try and see 
what sense contemporaries made of the situation. In commenting, both 
on the increase in housebreaking, and the increase in the use of 
"minor" punishment, the writer in 1908 said: 
"The technical crime of housebreaking includes a 
wide variety of offences, varying from ransacking 
a mansion to breaking a shop window in order to 
steal cigarettes or a bottle of whisky. Some of 
the offences, owing to the youth of the offenders, 
may not justify prosecution." 
The commentary continues: 
"The relative importance of housebreaking in which 
the authors were convicted may be judged from some 
of the punishments inflicted. 
102 of the culprits were whipped 
75 of the culprits were fined 
447 of the culprits were imprisoned 
periods of 3 months or under 
255 of the culprits received longer 
sentences of imprisonment 
for 
36 of the culprits were sentenced to penal 
servitude. 
The months of the year during which most of the 
apprehension for housebreaking occurred were June, 
July and August, when we have the longest days and 
also many cases of drunkenness and disorder." 
(Cmnd. 4395, p.11) 
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And in 1905: 
"The punishments inflicted on the housebreaker 
would lead us to believe that the magistrates and 
judges ··· did not take a serious view of many of 
the crimes." (Cmnd 3226 9) • , p. 
The minor nature of many of the particular incidents of 
housebreakings, coupled with the youth of a good proportion of the 
offenders, thus is seen as the reason for the increase in the less 
punitive sanctions. This was not seen to be the only explanation, 
however. In 1904 the commentators in talking about penal servitude 
argue: 
"The reduction in the number of these sentences is 
probably due more to a general tendency which has 
been operating for some years to mitigate the 
severity of criminal sentences, than to any 
reduction in the number of crimes committed." 
(Cmnd. 1830, p.2) 
Hence the decrease in the severity of punishments was seen to be 
important in its own right. But the various factors combine; changes 
in the nature of crime, especially an increase in the number of minor 
cases, together with alterations in broader views on the severity of 
punishment, lead to a new emergent pattern of sentencing concentrated 
on the minor penalties. And, as whipping - which was seen as a 
milder, less stigmatising punishment for young offenders than 
imprisonment - falls from favour, there is a shift into fining. 
It is within this context that we can explain the increase in the 
use of fines in robbery as well as housebreaking. As the crime grows 
in size, there appear more minor incidents of it, and this, in 
conjunction with already existing "more lenient" attitudes towards 
punishment, facilitates the growth in the use of the fine. Moreover, 
as a general background to this, legislation was passed in the 1881 
Summary Procedure (Scotland) Act and the 1908 Summary Jurisdiction 
(Scotland) Act which enabled a fine, not exceeding £25, to be 
substituted for crimes for which certain specified periods of 
imprisonment could be given. The 1908 Act extended this power for 
crimes taken on indictment and this power was further consolidated by 
the 1954 and 1963 Criminal Justice Acts. 
The rise of the fine in Class II crimes thus can be seen to be 
the result of a complex series of changes. While its increased use 
was due to the rapid expansion of one particular crime, housebreaking, 
our analysis ·does suggest the processes that underpin it have become 
generalised and applicable to the other main crime in the class, 
robbery. An interesting pattern of development thus is suggested: 
fines are used first against property crimes only and then for crimes 
which involve an element of violence directed against the person. 
(The greater usage of fines in Class III crimes at an earlier date 
than in Class II, confirms this. As can be seen from Graph 4, the 
fine was used more in Class III where the predominant crime was theft 
(followed by reset) in 1897.) 
The use of the fine in Class I crimes - those against the person 
- remains to be explained. As we established earlier, the pattern of 
sentencing in this class is more irregular than in the other classes 
of crime. Graph 2 demonstrates this irregularity, which is especially 
pronounced with regard to the fine. Indeed, this is the only class of 
crime which, in terms of its size and in terms of the use of the fine, 
is smaller at the end of the period than at the beginning. 
The irregularity in the use of the fine can be related to a 
continual process of redefinition of the crime which predominates -
assault. At the beginning of the period the most common type of 
assault prosecuted was husband and wife assault. Indeed, so common 
was this crime that it was given a separate status as a crime in its 
own right. Examination of the statistics shows that the majority of 
husband and wife assaults were taken on sununary procedure and were 
fined. The explanation given for this practice was the perceived 
connection of the crime with drunkenness. The commentators to the 
statistics point out the numbers prosecuted for drunkenness and 
husband and wife assaults rise and fall in similar ways. As 
prosecutions for drunkenness (an offence) increase, so too do those 
for husband and wife assaults (a crime). The connection between these 
assaults and drink appears to have been seen as the reason why they 
were dealt with by fines. Drunkenness, it seems, was a mitigating or 
extenuating circumstance. This ties in with a general practice 
already established. Generally, the Scots judiciary seem to have 
tolerated violence, especially if it was connected with drink. In the 
early decades of the nineteenth century, for example, practically the 
only crime in which the fine was used at all was assault (which was 
seen as connected with drink). 
The rapid decline in the use of the fine i~ Class I at the 
beginning of the century can be accounted for in part by the shifting 
of an increasing number of petty assaults to Class VII where they 
became included in breach of the peace. Also it can be explained by 
the general fall in the amount of crime in this class. As the early 
volumes of the statistics make clear, the number of crimes against the 
person fell from the 1850s onwards until about 1913 when there was a 
slight upward movement, which was counteracted by the effect of the 
first world war. As has been pointed out, the number of husband and 
wife assaults and drunkenness prosecutions fell in 1914 and did not 
start to rise again ?ntil 1919. 
The general picture that emerges therefore is that the type of 
crime in Class I at the time most likely to be fined (a) fluctuated 
and (b) was increasingly defined out of the class altogether. Another 
important factor was the age distribution of offenders in the various 
classes of crimes. This is shown in the following table. 
Table 6 
Convictions per 100,000 of population: 
Source Judicial statistics 1898 
Class Age 
of 
Crime 12 12-16 16-21 21-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60+ 
I 
I 
10 67 - 214 327 257 121 34 
II 4 32 51 43 10 10 5 2 
III 77 450 370 328 229 229 120 63 
As can be seen, there are important differences in distribution 
In of juveniles and adults between Class I and Classes II and III. 
Class I, the majority are technically adults (21+) while, as in the 
I~ 
other classes, there are more juveniles and young offenders. The 
effect of this on sanctions is that the prison would be used 
proportionately more in Class I, than in Classes II and III. 
Generally, as can be seen from Graph 2, the use of detention in 
Class I over the period has remained relatively constant, save for the 
important fluctuation immediately before and during the second world 
war. In this period, there was a straightforward exchange between the 
fine and detention which ceased more or less at the very end of the 
war. Thereafter, the use of the fine does fluctuate, but steadily 
rises. For example, in cases of sexual assault (rape, assault with 
intent to ravish and indecent assault), the figures for the fine in 
1946 and in 1978 are 26.4% and 33.3% respectively; for assault are 33% 
and 29.5% respectively; and for cruel and unusual treatment of 
children are 22.8% and 32.4% respectively. 
Summary 
We are now in a position to swnmarise the mean findings of this 
empirical survey. 
(1) There appears to have been a significant increase in the 
amount of registered crime and offences with which the 
criminal courts deal, but 
(2) this does not seem to have caused far reaching or 
fundamental changes in the pattern of sanctioning as 
measured by their proportionate use; 
(3) this can be explained by the importance of Class VII 
I~ 
of fences in the overall distribution; 
(4) however, there have been significant changes in sentencing 
practice in Classes II and III - the property crime classes. 
(5) These can be accounted for in terms of change in (a) the 
nature of the types of crime, (b) the age structure of the 
criminal population, and (c) the emergence of what was 
described as a less severe attitude as regards punishment. 
There are a number of broader conclusions that can· also be made. 
First, it appears that there is no mechanical relationship to be found 
between volume increases in crimes and the pattern of developments in 
the use of sanctions. Rather, and this may seem a rather obvious but 
nonetheless important conclusion, there always exists an intervening 
stage composed of the evaluations sentencers make; the actual 
distribution of sanction rests upon assessments made by the judiciary. 
Both the regularities and changes we have been able to demonstrate are 
to be accounted for by judicial reassessments of the nature of the 
harm involved. In a way it thus makes sense to interpret the general 
trends, say in Classes II and III, as indicating changed perceptions 
of the nature and significance of harms done to property with and 
without violence. The judiciary appear to assess these less severely 
at the end of the period of study than they did at the beginning. Why 
these changes have taken place, even given our SUilllilary conclusions 
above, remains in part a matter of conjecture. More importantly, what 
we have not shown, and could not demonstrate on the basis of the 
evidence before us, is why these changes point in the direction of the 
fine. Why, for example, should the development of a more "lenient" 
attitude result in an increased use of fines rather than the other 
"minor" sanctions available to the court? 
These changes in the use of sanctions must be placed in the 
context of the broader societal developments discussed in the first 
part of our inquiry. As we argued in the last chapter, the Scottish 
criminal justice and penal system has been subject to a process of 
rationalisation since at least the abolition of the heritable 
jurisdictions in 174~. By this is meant it has become increasingly 
bureaucratic and centralised. As Weber argues, rationalised systems 
develop a particular type of rationality, the formal legal, 
characterised by adherence to means ends related rules - in general, 
they develop an administrative type. Decision-making becomes governed 
by rules which limit discretion in the name of calculability and 
routine. These changes, we suggest, have made the system increasingly 
receptive to fines. As Weber pointed out in his wider discussion of 
rationalisation, there exists a close, three-fold relationship between 
it as a general social process, money and bureaucracy. He saw money 
(in the form of taxation) as both a precondition for bureaucratic 
growth and its abstract form as meshing with the formal, rule-governed 
nature of the bureaucratic decision-making process. For Weber (and 
Simmel), bureaucracy and money epitomise modern society; they are the 
"universal" context for contemporary social relationships. However, 
there are limits and qualifications to this process of 
rationalisation. These arise from the necessarily wider functions 
that law, crime and punishment serve. As Durkheim argued, one of the 
functions of punishment is to reinforce the collective consciousness, 
the morals and norms of society. As a result, punishment, and more 
generally law, conceived sociologically are represented as sacred 
symbols rather than as being profane. In Fuller's terms (1969), law 
and punishment possess an "inner morality" which must be socially 
recognised if they are to be seen as legitimate. The content of this 
"inner morality" is expressed in the other emergent characteristic of 
modern western society, liberalism, or more precisely, as it has come 
to be understood, the idea of negative liberty (freedom defined in 
terms of lack of intervention by the state; the law setting the limits 
to intervention). These liberal principles have set the limits within 
which the process of rationalisation has taken place. Consequently, 
the modern, rationalised criminal justice system is composed of - to 
return to Weberian language - substantive and formal rationalities 
which exist in tension one with the other. The fine can appeal to 
both; it can be seen as consistent with modern "classical" ideas of 
punishment, such as retribution, and also as being consistent with the 
administrative logic of the bureaucracy. In the Chapters which 
follow, we intend to explore these themes by examining how sheriffs 
use the fine, how the broader social forces referred to bear upon the 
decision-making of sheriffs, and in doing this we will be able to 
understand more fully the place of the fine in the Scottish criminal 
justice system. 
The matter cannot, however, be left here. As well as this 
convergence between forms of rationality, the inner morality of law 
punishment and bureaucracy, the penal system has been influenced by 
other social forces. In particular, there have been general 
developments in penal policy that are important to note. As Garland 
(1985) and others have demonstrated in some detail, since the turn of 
this century and possibly before, penal policy has been shaped by the 
growth of rehabilitation. While it remains a matter of controversy as 
to the precise effect of this ideology on actual penal practice, what 
is certain is that rehabilitation has formed one of the aims that 
sentencers must con~ider even if it is only to reject it. There is a 
tension between the liberal notion of legality, the morality 
consistent with it and the "science" of rehabilitation. ColIUllentators 
as distinct as Francis Allen (: fq~) and Pashukanis ( 1978) have 
explored this tension. Rehabilitation is seen as illiberal in both 
the sense that it challenges the liberal concept of the actor as 
rational and also in that it can lead to administrative excess. The 
important point in this context, is the substitution of determinism 
for the idea of rationality. Although rehabilitation has never been 
the main or sole aim of penal policy - indeed it has always had to 
work in Great Britain within a larger context set by liberal notions 
of legality and we are now said to be in a post-rehabilitative era -
its influence remains. Perhaps most importantly, it has compromised 
and qualified the use of imprisonment. It is difficult for sentencers 
to use the prison and justify it in a purely punitive fashion, except 
in the most serious of circumstances. The effect of this has been to 
leave the fine as the only "punishment" sheriffs feel they have left. 
As we show in chapter 6, this is a complex process and depends on the 
circumstance of the particular case, but, this represents a general 
trend. Hence for reasons other than just the convergence noted above, 
the fine has emerged as a key sanction able to fulfil a multiplicity 
of purposes. 
To this must be added the general move away from the use of 
imprisonment as the primary, first option sentencers use. We have 
noted this above. The growth of a more "lenient" attitude toward 
punishment has worked against the prison. For example, in the 
commentary to the 1925 volume of criminal statistics, it is said, 
"The present day tendency to avoid committing 
of fenders to prison whenever possible is 
strikingly exemplified by the figures in respect 
of fines." 
or, in 1936, 
"This is very satisfactory if only because it 
shows that imprisonment is being resorted to less 
and less as a first punishment." 
All this suggests that the "rise of the fine" is due to the 
coming together of general, broad historical trends and more specific 
policy developments. However, what remains true is that those trends 
require sentencers to make sentencing decisions in favour of the fine. 
Hence we must now turn to the analysis of these decisions before we 
can fully understand the place of the fine in the modern, criminal 
justice system in Scotland. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Legal Rules, Rationality and the Normative 
Practice of Sentencing 
I have two objectives in the next two chapters. The primary one 
is to report on a series of interviews with sheriffs on the reasons 
they give for how and why they use the fine. These interviews were of 
a semi-structured but informal kind and were normally tape-recorded. 
We interviewed sheriffs in three cities - Glasgow, Edinburgh and 
Dundee. The questions asked were aimed at ascertaining views on a 
broad range of issues from their general perceptions of the fine as a 
punishment to more detailed matters, for example, default procedure. 
By casting our net thus widely we sought to gain knowledge of how 
sheriffs view the fining process as a whole. 
My second objective which will be the main topic of this 
chapter - is more general; we offer this analysis as a contribution to 
the growing, but still relatively underdeveloped, literature on the 
sentencing process; we will argue that sentencing, as a variety of 
legal decision-making, is to be understood and explained as a 
rational, rule governed activity. Although this is far from being an 
original thesis about legal decision-making in the context of 
litigation or adjudication, it is not a case that is elaborated in the 
literature on sentencing. We develop our argument by considering two 
'themes'. First, we examine the methods that have been used to 
analyse legal decision-making and we propose what we claim to be a 
more adequate explanatory framework; secondly, we explore different 
ways of describing legal rules. Finally, these themes are pulled 
together in a description of what is called the "normative practice of 
sentencing". 
We characterise a "normative practice" as a system of rules which 
establish off ices - like that of being a judge - and govern the way in 
which incumbents are able to act, for example, to make decisions. We 
argue that two sorts of rules are used in sentencing decisions, formal 
legal rules and substantive ones. The first are stated rules of law 
enshrined in statute, in common law practice or precedent; substantive 
rules express desired policy aims and objectives. In comparison to 
formal rules they are more diffuse, open textured and are grounded in 
general legal culture. As we show, particular sentences are 
constructed out of the relationship between these two sorts of rules 
established by sentencers in the court. We portray the relationship 
as dynamic, fluid and contingent. 
A Methodological Excursus 
Before proceeding to the description and analysis of the 
interview material, it is both worthwhile and necessary to say more 
about the structure of this and the next Chapter and to outline their 
contribution to our general argument. 
As has been stated, the "test" of the broader, more general 
themes developed earlier is whether it is possible to discern evidence 
h II II h • • 1 of them in the day to day practices of those w o run t e cr1m1na 
justice system. Description at this level is the "hard-end" of the 
thesis. While sentencers are not the only ones charged with running 
the system they do occupy a pivotal position. They are, for example, 
"gate keepers"; decisions they make determine what happens to 
ll->" 
offenders and these decisions, in combination, constitute one of the 
profiles of the system. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that 
analysis of sentencing decisions and of the basis upon which they are 
made can tell us a lot about the system in general. 
Posing matters in this way immediately gives rise to a number of 
theoretical, methodological and empirical problems. Research into 
decision-making generally and into legal decisions in particular is 
notoriously difficult (see Paterson, 1982). Not only are there 
practical problems of gaining entry into an elite group - like Scots 
sheriffs - but there is the more important issue of how to make sense 
of the data once it is collected. The latter issue, of course, is 
common to studies, but is heightened in this area as the subjects of 
the research themselves hold already established views and theories as 
to the nature of their enterprise. Legal decisions are "second order" 
constructs, in the sense that the actors involved work within an 
already theorised set of relationships and contexts, parts of which 
are elaborate views as to the nature of legal knowledge itself 
(Simmonds, 1984; MacCormick, 1978). 
The empirical researcher thus enters into a complex field of 
inquiry. The researcher has to come to terms with both the 
significance of the already theorised knowledge of the legal actor and 
with how this is applied to the particular case or cases, hypothetical 
or real, the actor is asked to comment on or is dealing with as a 
matter of immediate reality. There is a complex interplay between 
knowledge held and decisions taken. The researcher must untangle this 
relationship as well as being aware, phenomenologically, that the 
process of inquiry itself can transmute that which is being studied. 
The "double hermeneutic" is quadrupled in this area (see Giddens, 
1979). 
One common way of dealing with this complexity is for the 
researcher to place more than ordinary reliance on existing accounts 
a 
and explanations. This simplifies the task, as the existing 
literature can be taken to represent a view of the established, 
abstract knowledge ~he legal actor possesses. In the area of civil 
law a particularly useful source of knowledge that can be used to this 
end is the published decisions of the court. These decisions often 
contain detailed and well worked out commentaries by judges on the 
nature of legal knowledge and legal reasoning. These decisions thus 
constitute a source of evidence and a valuable conunentary at the same 
time. In the area of criminal law the position is significantly 
different for two reasons. First, there are nowhere near as many 
published decisions on issues of sentencing. Appeal case decisions 
may be published but their content is unlikely to contain the 
elaborate views of a general sort that published decisions in civil 
cases do. In particular, the content of an appeal case in criminal 
law is more likely to be made up of a discussion of a particular set 
of factual questions concerning the various grounds of the appeal 
than of a commentary on the nature of the legal reasoning process. 
Also, precedent does not bind in criminal law with the force it does 
in civil law. Sentencing decisions, it is said, are made case-by-case 
because sentencers have always to deal with the particulars of the 
circumstance before them (Finnis, 1972; Ashworth, 1983). In studying 
legal reasoning at the point of sentence in criminal law the 
researcher thus does not have the range of evidence and the guidance 
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it can give that is available in civil cases. As a result, attention 
is thrown onto empirical methods such as the interview as this -
combined with observation - becomes the most practicable way of 
gaining the evidence needed. 
There is a second problem faced by research into criminal 
sentencing decisions. The secondary literature most commonly 
associated with the topic is couched in a conceptual vocabulary that 
seems at odds with that which the subjects use to describe their own 
actions and processes of reasoning. If we look at existing research 
on sentencing we find a common characteristic. It uses a variety of 
quantitative social science methods, conventionally associated with 
behaviourism, to pursue its objectives. As one of its practitioners 
and critics puts it, the research utilises a "black box" model of the 
court to study sentencing (Hogarth, 1971). The court is seen as 
analogous to Skinner's famous black box - an experimental device 
designed to control the subject's behaviour (usually a pigeon) in 
order to allow the researcher to isolate the stimuli that go in and to 
correlate them with the responses that come out (the S-R paradigm as 
it is known). In the context of sentencing, the decisions are the 
responses, and the stimuli are the various "factors" seen to impinge 
on the sentencer, such as offence and offender criteria, other legal 
factors (the law), time, place and circumstance. Although the 
behavioural or empirical tradition can be extremely sophisticated (see 
Hood, 1969 and 1972; Hood and Sparks, 1970; Green, 1961), it is this 
relatively simple method which lies at its base. 
There are a number of well known problems with this method. For 
example, like other forms of multi-factorialism it is weak as a form 
of explanation. It generates a good deal of information, but has 
severe limitations in putting this together to form a coherent picture 
of what it purports to explain. But its most severe limitation for 
our purposes is that its explanatory vocabulary seems entirely alien 
to the one sentencers themselves use to describe and justify their 
actions. Sentencers do see themselves making decisions by 
mechanically taking into account various factors but for them this is 
. 1 I. a rat1ona process. They do not see themselves as merely reacting in 
a reflex, conditionM. manner to a range of stimuli. They view 
themselves as rational actors seeking after certain valued ends - the 
advancement of justice and the upholding of the law by the imposition 
of punishments on guilty offenders. These valued ends inform their 
work; they are its basis and the decisions they take can be seen as 
the means by which they work toward them. 
The language of rationality, value and meaning is not entirely 
absent from the empirical literature on sentencing. At one level, 
much of the work implicitly feeds off such a vocabulary. Many of the 
studies in this tradition were undertaken to account for the problem 
of disparity in sentencing and in as much as this assumes the ideal of 
formal equality, one can see the basic problem as being founded upon 
an assumption of rationality. Indeed, this may explain why some of 
these researchers explain disparity by invoking notions of 
irrationality (Gaudet, 1933 for example). 
Also, there is a strain towards a vocabulary of rationalism in 
Hogarth's description of his work as "phenomenological". He claims to 
examine sentencing from the actors point of view in terms of their 
individual penal philosophies. However, it is doubtful if Hogarth 
understands the meaning of the term; certainly his actual methods of 
inquiry - elaborate, statistical techniques - have little to do with 
those commonly seen as being phenomenological. 
Hence the work within this empirical/behavioural tradition fails 
in a very important sense to convince. As Matza (1963) once pointed 
out, theories and explanations appeal and convince not just on the 
basis of their empirical range or logical coherence. Just as 
important is the credibility and plausibility of their exemplar - the 
general image of the phenomena they purport to describe and explain. 
To use these terms, the empirical/behaviourist tradition of sentencing 
studies fail to convince because its exemplar of the sentencer fails 
to convince. The sentencer is portrayed in an excessively passive 
fashion. Decisions are explained as the product of a range of 
material conditions all of which are external to the sentencer. In a 
sense, the sentencer is an instrument of forces beyond rational 
control. 
While this is not the place to go into an extended discussion of 
3, 
the merits of behaviourism versus phenomenology, its relevance can be 
seen. In arguing that the conceptual vocabulary of the empirical/ 
behavioural tradition lacks plausibility one moves forward advocating 
phenomenology. A phenomenologicJ1 framework becomes the point of 
departure. 
Once this shift takes place another body of literature comes into 
focus. This is the more jurisprudentially inclined literature known 
as legal reasoning. While in the empirical tradition the concept of 
rationality is notable more by its absence than its presence, the 
reverse is true with this other approach. In this analysis of legal 
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reasoning rationality is the keyword: the legal process, law in 
general, are perceived as exemplifications of the practical use of 
rationality in human affairs (see MacCormick, 1978 Introduction). 
Legal reasoning is seen as a species of "practical reason", that is 
rational action aimed at achieving desired ends. The Kantian 
overtones of this perspective are clear. As human activity is 
presumed to be rational and purposive, actors' intentions become 
crucial to the explanation of human affairs. 
In modern, Anglo-American jurisprudence this Kantianism has been 
kept within limits, most noticeably so within legal positivism (though 
clearly there in continental jurisprudence, for example, Kelsen 1964). 
Indeed, some now argue that legal positivism is all the more limited 
and restricted in consequence (see Simmonds, 1984). Nevertheless, 
this has not meant that the explanatory need to describe action in 
terms of purpose and intention has disappeared. On the contrary, the 
very possibility of describing legal systems is seen to rest on the 
"internal point of view" (Hart, 1961). Ironically, the situation is 
thus created that, while in the social sciences in general, advocacy 
of a positivist method has meant the rejection of a purposive 
vocabulary, the opposite is true in jurisprudence. In legal 
~ 
positivism, phenomenology and positivist methods come together.· 
The stress on rationality and purpose giveSlegal reasoning an 
obvious methodological relevance to our inquiry. It has an initial 
plausibility because it meshes with the vocabulary sentencers use to 
describe their process of reasoning. It captures the rational seeking 
after valued ends that characterises the way in which sheriffs 
described their use of penal sanctions. There are, however, limits to 
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its plausibility. If we look more closely at the literature on legal 
reasoning the exemplar of the reasoning legal actor that emerges lacks 
credibility as a description of what goes on in a middle level, busy 
criminal court like the Sheriff Court. For example, we are told that 
' the standard or core case of legal reasoning is that of pure deduction 
(MacCormick, 1978 Ch.2). The judge deals with cases by applying 
general rules to particular circumstances by a process of deduction. 
Or, to vary the picture slightly, the judge is seen to make decisions 
in circumstances where there are no clear general rules or where rules 
conflict, by the application of general principles, these being 
suggested lines of reasoning rather than precisely formulated rules 
(Dworkin, 1977). Even if we make some allowance for these being 
ideal-typical constructs, there remain doubts as to their application 
to the busy criminal court. It is difficult to see how the sheriff 
could find time to work the syllogistic exercise or, in those 
circumstances where no rules exist or they conflict, seek out deep 
principles of the sort of which Dworkin speaks. Both these positions 
share much in common; they portray the judge as a sort of super-
rational being apparently unconfined by time, place and circumstance. 
The above account does not do justice to the great subtlety of 
either MacCormick's or Dworkin's work, but I suspect they will be able 
to withstand this. My point has not been to offer the sort of account 
in which such justice has to be done. Rather what emerges from this 
commentary is that despite its methodological advantages the 
literature on legal reasoning is limited by its overrationalisation. 
There are good reasons why it does portray judges as super-rational 
actors. First, the examples used in the literature on which this view 
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of the judge is based, tend to be carefully selected to illustrate the 
general perspective. The careful selection of examples is a virtue 
but, at the risk of being judged a crude empiricist, there remain 
doubts as to their representativeness. Second, most (not all) of the 
examples used are confined to the area of civil law. As was argued 
earlier, there are good reasons to discriminate between the civil and 
criminal area in that decisions in the former do manifest a more 
elaborated and more generally abstract form of thinking. These points 
come together; a possible selectivity of evidence, and evidence of a 
particular sort, deliver a picture that shores up a more pervasive 
ideological view of law as a rational activity. 
The idea that the legal reasoning literature overstresses the 
rational nature of law and legal reasoning has recently been supported 
by Professor Atiyah (1987). Although Atiyah is at pains to avoid the 
English tendency of characterising law as atheoretical and pragmatic, 
he is equally wary of what he sees as the danger of seeing it as a 
tight knit logical system. As he puts it in commenting on 
MacCormick's work, judges "apply" logic they do not "use" it; 
deductive argument does not lead them to a conclusion they otherwise 
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would not have made (Atiyah, 1987 pp.14-16). Atiyah's point is not 
that judgements are illogical, but that it is a mistake to inflate and 
exaggerate the extent to which the judge is explicitly concerned with 
abiding by the laws of logic when reasoning. 
The view of law and legal reasoning that emerges from Atiyah's 
account is more open-ended that the one created by, for example, 
MacCormick. It describes legal reasoning as being more fluid and more 
concerned with the substance of the issue involved. The form of the 
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reasoning process takes second place to the content of the judgement. 
The notion of a "normative practic~'' outlined earlier bears 
strong similarities to Atiyah's view of law and legal reasoning. It 
was evolved, in part, as a compromise between the two perspectives or 
traditions reviewed. On the one hand, it is intended to capture the 
general methodological position implicit within the legal reasoning 
literature, and in particular its stress on understanding law from the 
"internal point of view", but, on the other hand, also to offset 
somewhat its view of legal reasoning and law as tightly-knit and super 
rational. This brings back into the picture elements of the 
instrurnentalism that forms the core of the empirical/behavioural 
tradition. The view of a normative practice has affinities also with 
the idea of sentencing put forward by Nigel Walker; formal legal rules 
can be seen as equivalent to his notion of "first order" rules: and 
"substantive rules" to his "second order" ones (Walker, 1985 pp.18-
21). 
The idea of a normative practice also tries to come to terms with 
certain specific characteristics of Scots criminal law. With the 
important exception of moving traffic and wireless offences, Scots 
criminal law is mostly common law. This means that the potential for 
discretion in the use of penal measures is considerable. It would be 
wrong to draw too sharp a distinction between a statute based system 
and a connnon law system in this regard. With the exception of life 
sentences and certain mandatory disqualifications, sentences in the 
former are not prescribed by statute; statutes permit rather than 
prescribe sentences (cf. Walker, 1985 p.111). Nevertheless, in a 
conunon law system sentencers do not have the guidance provided by 
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statute when sentencing in common law crimes. Any regularity in 
sentencing must therefore be explained by reference to a shared set of 
norms and rules - or as we have called it a "practice". This raises 
the issue of how to characterise a practice and how to demonstrate the 
effect of it on individual sentencers. 
The answer to these questions given here turn on the issue of 
explaining rule-governed or rule-following behaviour. Again, this is 
a very broad issue, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of 
this inquiry. Nevertheless some answer has to be given and the one 
developed utilises Rawl's famous analysis of the practice conception 
of rules. 
There are a number of other broader themes the notion of a 
normative practice is designed to carry further. In our discussion of 
estrangement in the earlier chapters, we contended that it operates 
most noticeably at the discursive legitimatory level of the criminal 
justice system. Beneath this, we argued, the system relies on the 
fine. This raises the issue of the relationship between these various 
levels or strata. How is this relationship maintained so that they do 
not clearly contradict one another? The answers we have developed so 
far refer to broad, general historical changes and processes, such as 
the emergence of the modern distinction between civil and criminal 
law, the development of strict liability, regulatory offences and 
changes in the notion of what constitutes serious crime. In the last 
chapter we showed the effects of these changes by analysing sentencing 
trends. We now shift the type of analysis to investigate how this 
potential conflict is resolved at the most concrete of levels - in the 
criminal court. We argue that the conflict is resolved by sentencers 
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perceiving the purposes of sentencing and the fine in particular as 
being essentially about punishment. As we show in more empirical 
detail in the next chapter, sheriffs perceive the purpose of the penal 
system to be about achieving justice through the implementation of 
punishment. They understand punishment in classical terms; the 
infliction of pain on guilty offenders whom they regard - unless it is 
otherwise demonstrated - to be rational and responsible agents. 
Retribution and deterrence are the concepts they commonly refer to in 
justification of their activities. This brings the fine into focus. 
For them, the fine is the sanction that is most easily described in 
these terms. Other sanctions are "marred" either because they are 
explicitly treatment oriented or can only be realistically used in 
rare circumstances or after "social work" ideas have been considered. 
Their use of imprisonment is compromised in part because it is in 
practice difficult to sentence the type of offender that appears 
before them for the type of offence they have conunitted to the prison 
and also because, before they can do so, they have anyway to resort to 
social enquiry reports which carry with them a social work ethos. 
Hence, relative to the other available sanctions, the fine appeals 
most easily to their general view of the nature of the penal system. 
There are a number of other factors which come into operation. 
For example, the sheriffs placed considerable emphasis on the 
"voluntary" nature of the fine. They see offenders as having a choice 
whether to pay. Voluntary payment indicates an acceptance of the 
"obligations" that committing crimes and offences places on the 
citizen. This ties in with the sheriffs' view of criminals as 
rational and responsible actors who have chosen their course of 
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action. The fine is seen also as a "flexible" sanction that can be 
adjusted to meet most circusmtances. It thus has the dual advantages 
of being the sanction most consistent with their general views about 
the penal system and also being practically useful and adaptable. 
The interviews show, however, that sheriffs perceive there to be 
a number of problems with the fine. Because statute requires 
sentencers to take into account the means of the of fender when levying 
the fine, there arises a tension. The classical views of the sheriffs 
lead them to place priority on offence related criteria as the most 
important determinant of punishment. This they see as most likely to 
maintain "justice". However, the need to adjust fines to offenders' 
incomes shifts the balance dramatically in favour of of fender related 
criteria (see Black, 1987). As shall be explained, there is a 
potential for this to corrode the wider views of justice the sheriffs 
hold. The danger is increased by the facility to pay fines by 
instalment. Although these two requirements are also rooted in a view 
of how justice ought to be achieved - the rich should not "escape" 
punishment nor the poor suffer unduly - and the sheriffs recognise 
this, they nevertheless perceive there to be a conflict. The idea of 
proportionality according to offence related criteria can conflict 
with the idea of proportionality according to offender related 
criteria. We demonstrate how sheriffs endeavour to resolve this 
conflict in their use of the fine. 
The potential for conflict between these competing ideas of 
proportionality, and the views sheriffs have of the constraints that 
arise from the administrative requirements of a modern penal system 
are examples of another wider theme of this study. This concerns the 
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role of rationality and different types of rationality in the 
evolution of the modern notion of criminal law and punishment. In 
what follows, we endeavour to show both the social context and roots 
of rationality and the continual tension that exists between its 
varying expressions. This takes us back to the notion of the 
normative practice of sentencing because it is within it that one can 
discern different rationalities at work. The place to begin our 
argument thus is in a discussion of how we can sociologically 
characterise a practice. 
Rules, Regulations and Outcomes 
So far we have argued a general methodologicaJ. case and for a 
particular, but as yet an unexplicated, view of the nature of legal 
rules. What we have yet to do is to describe how rules relate to what 
we have called the "normative practice of sentencing". This is a 
crucial issue, as upon it rests our explanation of the way in which 
sheriffs' decisions to use the fine are rule-governed. There is, 
however, a problem of logical order involved here. Before we can 
describe how rules are related to this normative practice, we must 
first examine the nature of rules themselves; we must examine ways of 
conceiving of and describing rules. 
In his famous paper on the subject, Rawls distinguishes between 
two conceptions of rules which he calls the summary conception and the 
practice conception (Rawls, 1967 ~ We will explore the relevance of 
this distinction to our subject matter. 
According to Rawls, the summary conception of rules involves 
conceiving of them as summaries of past experience: a rule summarises 
what it is we have learnt from making decisions in the past. Each 
decision is made by the application of a utilitarian principle to the 
matter in hand. We decide what to do in a case by considering each 
time the utility of the various alternatives we face. Rules emerge, 
according to Rawls, in those circumstances where there is a regularity 
of cases and decisions. As he puts it, "rules are pictured as 
summaries of past decisions arrived at by the direct application of 
the utilitarian principle to particular cases" (Rawls, 1967 p.158). 
In this conception, the point of having rules is that similar 
cases tend to recur and that one can save time if one's past decisions 
are captured in the form of a rule. If there was no regularity of 
cases then the utilitarian calculus will have to applied on a case by 
case basis. But, as Rawls points out, it is part of this conception 
of rules that the particular case is always logically prior to the 
rule. This is so, because we will make a decision on utilitarian 
grounds regardless of whether the rule exists or not. Furthermore, 
each person is entitled to consider the correctness of a rule and to 
decide whether it is proper to apply it in a particular case. 
Rawls distinguishes this summary conception of rule from the 
practice conception, which involves seeing rules, not as 
generalisations from past experience, but as themselves defining a 
practice. A practice is a form of activity composed of a set of 
rules. According to the practice conception of rules, the freedom to 
apply a new principle of utility to each case does not exist; rather 
already existing rules define how one is to act. 
It is a requirement of the practice conception that practices are 
publicly known and that individuals can be taught how to recognise the 
practice, As Rawls puts it, 
"Those engaged in a practice recognise the rules 
as defining it", and "it is the mark of a practice 
that being taught how to engage in it involves 
being instructed in the rules which define it, and 
that appeal is made to those rules to correct the 
behaviour of those engaged in it." (Rawls, 1917 
p.163) 
In this conception, rules exist prior to individual cases, and 
one decides on the basis of applying practice rules to particular 
circumstances. It does not really make sense to ask if an individual 
is applying a practice rule to a particular case; to pose this 
question is to move outside the practice. Practices have an immense 
authority; they define competences, establish offices and hierarchies. 
One decides in terms of the practice, one does not decide whether the 
practice is to be applied. To question the rules of a practice is to 
move outside it and to take up the position of a reformer. When one 
accepts an off ice established by a practice, all that one can do is to 
describe one's action by referring to the rules which define the 
practice. 
The description Rawls gives of these two ways of conceiving of 
rules is tied in with another important distinction. He argues that 
it is always possible to distinguish between justifying a practice and 
justifying a particular action falling under it. His point is that 
unless we make this distinction, it becomes impossible to conceive of 
promising or punishment as institutions. Unless we can separate out 
the institution of promising or punishing from the particular acts 
which fall under them, then we have no conception of them as 
institutions. Rather, we simply justify each action as it occurs. 
Promising and punishing are social institutions, as are judging and 
sentencing. We have a conception of these independent of each act of 
promising, punishing, judging or sentencing. Rawls' argument is that 
the summary conception of rules does not allow this distinction to be 
made. Rather, as its point is to stress the contingent nature of 
rules, the case by case basis of them, the summary conception 
suppresses this distinction. 
Rawls' argument is of direct relevance to our concerns. Each 
conception of rules yields a substantially different framework for 
describing the normative practice of sentencing. If we were to adopt 
the summary conception of rules, we could not talk of sentencing as an 
institution; of it as a regular, rule-governed form of behaviour. 
Rather, we would have to describe sentencing by pointing, for example, 
to the dispositions of individual judges and their possibly 
idiosyncratic application of rules on each case that appears before 
them. Although some members of the judiciary are at times prone to 
this description, not least because it embellishes their individual 
powers and competences, it is not one that we claim on the basis of 
the evidence provided by the sheriff interviews fits the process of 
judicial decision-making. The implications of the summary conception 
of rules is that the application of rules is always indeterminate, it 
can change from case to case. It thus throws the weight of analysis 
on to particular decisions taken by individual sentencers and leads to 
the view that legal rules can be overthrown by the sentencer simply by 
the application of the utility principle; of what the sentencer sees 
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best to do in the circumstance. Ultimately, this challenges the 
conception of law as a system of rules existing independently of the 
particular decision to be taken. 
The practice and summary conceptions of rules also deliver very 
different descriptions of what it is to be a judge. According to the 
practice conception, judging is an office. It is a position involving 
the acceptance of ce~tain duties and obligations defined by 
constitutional law and convention: pre-existing legal rules define the 
area of competence and define what is regarded as legitimate action. 
According to the summary conception, these pre-existing rules would 
have no particular force or priority. Rather, they would be just one 
set of rules among many which the decision-maker could shrug off if 
greater weight were to be given to some other set. In this view being 
a judge is rather like playing a role, a bit part in a play, that can 
be interpreted with poetic licence. The practice conception of rules 
is analytically superior precisely because it does give weight to the 
pre-existing. It allows one to comprehend the institutional nature of 
the exercise, yet keep a focus on the idea of actors rationally 
calculating within this institutional nexus. 
Rawls' practice conception of rules is very similar to the 
analysis of law which legal realists such as Llewellyn (1960) or 
sociologists like Durkheim (1893) outline. Although at points 
Llewellyn does seem to veer towards an act utilitarian description of 
legal decision-making this is offset by a naive sociological account 
of the factors that lead to what he calls "reckonability" in legal 
decisions. Llewellyn lists fourteen clusters of factors that make for 
"stability" in legal decisions. Many of these fit well with Rawls' 
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conception. Factors such as law conditioned officials, known 
doctrinal techniques, opinion of the court, responsibility for 
justice, and above all, professional judicial office, are concrete 
descriptions of the rules which define both the notion of judicial 
office and the constraints that accompany it. 
Similarly, in his discussion of the law of contract, Durkheim 
(1893) distinguishes between the laws of contract that are applied in 
a particular case, and the law of contract as a sociological and 
social institution. Durkheim maintained that as such the law of 
contrac:t exists independent of its application in individual cases, 
it is sui generis. Legal rules are as Searle (1967) and MacCormick 
(1974) maintain "institutional facts". They are social entities which 
govern the behaviour of those who work within them. 
Conceiving of sentencing as a normative practice has certain 
implications. It shifts analysis away from investigating the 
"attitudes" and "characteristics" of individual sentencers towards the 
system of rules that exist independent of them. It requires we 
conceive of sentencers as actors who work with rules and who, by a 
process of interpretation, apply them to the business at hand. 
Furthermore, it requires we conceive of this process of interpretation 
as itself rule governed. 
While this approach moves us away from the type of analysis 
associated with the empirical/behavioural tradition outlined earlier, 
some may argue it does so only at the expense of reifying the notion 
of rules, by turning them into abstract, and innnutable "forces" that 
bear absolutely on the sentencer. Thus, it may be said, the 
instrumental materialism we objected to in the empirical approach has 
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simply been replaced by a sort of "rule determininsm". Moreover, a 
further objection could be made. It could be argued that we seem to 
be moving towards just that portrayal of the legal system as a close 
knit, hermetically sealed system that we objected to in our commentary 
on the legal reasoning literature. This seems particularly 
inappropriate in the area of criminal law because, as has been 
acknowledged, sentencers always have to come to terms with the 
particular features of the case before them. 
Another way of putting these objections is to say we have to 
ignore the contribution of a whole body of quite recent sociological 
literature on the criminal court. There is a tradition which stems 
from the work of Blumberg (1967) through that of Carlen (1976), 
Bottoms and MacLean (1976) to that of McBarnet (1981). Although these 
studies are not directly concerned with sentencing, their general 
conclusions are relevant and, most important, different in significant 
ways. The important difference is this. While our argument appears 
to be moving in the direction of formalism, theirs - which is based 
also upon observation of the court in practice - with the possible 
exception of McBarnet, stresses the opposite. This stress is perhaps 
best summarised in the idea of "negotiated justice". By this is meant 
that the criminal courts as a whole, and by implication sentencing as 
well, do work on the basis of rules, but rules which are informal and 
situational rather than abstract and formal. McBarnet, it is true, 
endeavours to counterbalance this stress by laying emphasis also on 
the formal rules of law, but still nevertheless she does portray the 
court in terms of the relationship between the two. Furthermore, it 
may be argued, their picture has a ring of truth in relation to the 
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criminal law as it operates in the lower and middle level courts. 
Here the need to keep the "conveyor belt" (Blumberg) going, means the 
formal rules must be short-circuited if order is to be maintained. A 
related line of objection can be found in the recent study by 
Bankowski, Hutton and McManus (1987) of the district court in 
Scotland, where it is argued that sentencing does not involve using 
strictly legal rules at all. Sentencing, it is claimed, works in a 
legal context and has legal implications, but the decisions themselves 
do not. Rather, the simple pragmatic facts of each case are 
important. Sentencing is an eclectic exercise of no special relevance 
to legal reasoning (cf. Walker, 1985 p.117). 
It ·is not necessary for us to reject this type of argument for 
our case to stand. The analysis of the court in this literature may 
well be accurate. The court may well work on informal or situational 
rules. Our point is a different one. We contend that at the point of 
sentencing, situational informal rules do not form the resource from 
which decisions are made. At the point of sentencing the sheriff is 
making a legal decision. That this can involve interaction with the 
accused is true, what is not true is that this interaction can be the 
foundation or context of the decision. In making decisions on 
sentence, the sheriff must have regard to legal rules and principles, 
as the sentence is justified on these criteria alone. Now among the 
criteria used in reaching decisions, there may well be those concerned 
with special characteristics of the offender - "character" or in the 
case of the fine, income - but this does not mean that the formal 
rules of law are elided. It is the task of the sentencer to 
accommodate these characteristics in the decision precisely because 
the law requires it. 
There is another problem with this line of argument. For 
example, one of the contrasts Carlen draws between abstract and 
situational rules is that, whereas situational rules are plastic, 
abstract ones are not. This is a doubtful contrast to draw. Certain 
rules may be abstract but this does not stop them being interpreted. 
Indeed, the application of any rule requires a process of 
interpretation. In deciding on sentence the sentencer always has to 
determine if a general rule applies to a particular case and then how 
to apply it. This is a quintessentially interpretative process; in a 
sense there are no "easy cases". The point is that abstract rules are 
not inflexible or inactive in the way Carlen implies. Abstract rules 
are not a fixed feast in the sense that they are simply "laws or rules 
in the book". Rather, all rules are open to interpretation - they do 
not have the all or nothing quality ascribed to them by theorists such 
as Carlen and Dworkin. But, it may be retorted, how exactly are these 
rules to be interpreted? Can it not be argued that it is at this 
stage that the informal and the situational are interposed and taken 
over? Sentencing in criminal cases does, after all, involve an 
extended process of individuation, it is inherently open-ended. The 
sentencer has to come to terms with the particulars of a great number 
of cases and in doing this the pre-existing general rules may well 
simply fade into insignificance. Moreover, a proponent may argue, as 
has already been admitted, there are very few formal rules of law as 
defined here relevant to sentencing. With the exception of life 
sentences for murder and a few mandatory disqualifications, there do 
not appear to be the pre-existing general laws that this argument 
implies exist. Thus, if the process of interpretation is open-ended 
and there are very few formal rules of law, how can there be talk of a 
practice of sentencing in which general rules are applied to 
particular cases? Is it not, as the literature just reviewed claims, 
a process better described as a continual informal negotiation rather 
than as a practice, as you define it? Moreover, the opponent may 
further point out, c.laiming the process to be informal does not mean 
it is irrational or non-rational. Informal negotiations can be seen 
to be the epitome of rationality even when the parties involved are in 
very different power positions. This is a powerful argument which 
meets the one developed here at every point. It is premised in an 
assumption that actors are rational agents, it picks up on aspects of 
our characterisation of law and sentencing, but interprets the process 
very differently. 
The argument derived from Carlen et. al. can be seen as a form of 
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core contention is that rules and rule application are indeterminate. 
By indeterminate I do not mean random; randomness means left to chance 
or lacking in premeditation. Rather, indeterminacy means that there 
is nothing fixed or certain about what rules will be applied or about 
the process of application. This stress on indeterminacy links the 
literature with the sununary conception of rules outlined above in that 
it appears to suggest that sentencers make decisions on the basis of 
contingent factors which can change from case to case. Of course in 
one sense this must be true in as much as each case is different. But 
the argument goes further than this to suggest that any rules that are 
built up grow out of the contingencies of the situation. They do not 
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exist independent of it. This is what allows abstract rules to be 
elided and put to one side. They remain but only as a gloss on what 
is really happening. 
The major weakness of this position is that, as has been said, it 
puts in doubt the possibility of describing practices as institutions. 
It leads to a conception of sentencing and other practices as an 
endless series of isolated acts by individuals who manipulate rules 
according to the particular context they are in. The problem with 
this is, like all arguments premised on indeterminacy, it has great 
difficulty in accounting for broad regularity in human affairs. 
The problem is this. If rules and their application are 
indeterminate in the sense defined, we would expect to see over time a 
great variation in outcomes. If rules can always be overthrown, if 
their creation and their application is contingent and variable, then 
any pattern becomes a problem to be explained. Why out of variability 
should regularity arise? 
This suggests that a demonstration of regularity over time would 
lead one to question the presumption of indeterminacy on which this 
literature is based. At this point the analysis of sentencing trends 
conducted in the last chapter becomes relevant. With the exception of 
Class I crimes, and then for reasons explained, the overwhelming 
impression created by our analysis is one of broad regularity even in 
those Classes where there has been a change in the use of sanctions -
for example, the notable increase in the use of the fine in Classes II 
and III. As was shown, this is a regular, constant pattern - it 
suggests a change in policy, but one which sheriffs accepted and 
abided by. 
Further evidence of broad regularity is provided by the table 
below. 
Scotland Pounds sterling (£) 
Crimes and Offences 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Total Crimes and Offences 48 49 47 45 .is .i9 )3 53 50 47 47 
Total Crimes 83 87 85 n 73 n 88 91 94 73 68 
Non-sexual crimes of violence 140 146 152 142 144 142 178 190 202 172 141 
· Homicide 472 450 517 474 547 524 355 765 663 913 766 
Serious assault etc 166 211 250 218 228 269 289 389 239 193 169 
Handling offensive weapons 110 113 113 100 98 93 109 112 101 94 84 
Robbery 172 155 178 178 130 101 188 212 182 191 167 
Other 86 71 53 49 54 51 103 70 75 70 70 
Crimes of indecency 75 85 83 72 69 65 94 117 90 62 ·H 
Sexual assault 133 132 174 110 222 !28 151 185 196 201 125 
Lewd and libidinous practices 96 105 91 91 81 101 113 108 101 94 
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Other 59 65 58 54 45 41 62 106 
70 39 32 
Crimes of dishonesty 81 85 84 76 71 ·n 86 89 94 71 67 
Housebreaking 120 123 117 110 106 103 122 141 137 116 109 
Theft by opening ~ places 75 85 88 85 74 n 94 106 101 82 76 
Theft of motor vehicle 107 120 111 106 96 94 111 115 117 105 94 
Shoplifting } 59 64 64 55 51 53 66 64 { .it 34 30 Other theft 73 54 52 
Fraud 87 93 84 84 n 126 81 87 137 74 71 
Other 124 111 120 108 101 102 112 134 
123 106 100 
Damage 55 60 59 57 51 52 63 
63 62 54 46 
Fire-raising 79 132 Z21 166 174 97 179 
272 175 181 143 
Malicious and reckless conduct 55 60 58 56 50 51 61 
59 60 52 45 
Other Crimes 102 103 93 88 80 85 91 
96 87 76 n 
Total Offences 43 44 42 40 39 43 
45 45 42 42 42 
Miscellaneous offences 40 41 40 38 36 44 44 
43 40 36 36 
Petty assault 73 r 77 74 69 71 92 94 90 76 69 
Breach of the peace 48 49 46 44 40 40 46 
43 40 34 33 
Drunkenness 14 13 12 10 9 9 
8 8 7 11 14 
Other 31 30 29 27 26 58 
35 38 36 32 33 
Motor vehicle offences 45 45 43 42 42 42 46 
47 44 45 46 
Reckless and careless driving 62 60 54 52 49 48 53 
55 53 53 54 
Drunk driving 129 130 122 118 116 118 
127 134 133 131 126 
Speeding 26 24 23 22 21 
20 22 24 23 22 22 
Unlawful use of vehicle 48 51 50 50 48 
45 49 47 46 48 45 
Vehicle defect offences 33 29 28 27 27 
30 32 32 30 28 29 
Other ~() 21 19 18 23 22 
23 23 23 23 24 
(I) Adjusted using Retail Price Index. 
Extracted from the Criminal Statistics for 1985, this table records 
the average fine imposed for all crimes and offences and for each 
Class over a period of ten years. The remarkable finding is one of 
broad similarity, with the exception of homicide, over the period. 
For example, the average fine for all crimes and offences remains 
almost exactly the same (£48 in 1972 and £47 in 1982). This is to be 
explained by the statistical predominance of the miscellaneous and 
motor vehicle offences in the overall distribution, where the average 
fine is approximately £45, but this adds weight to our general 
argument. Sentencers appear to be fining according to general rules 
which pre-exist their application to particular circumstances. 
Examination of the average fine in the main common crimes, such 
as house-breaking, theft by opening lockfast places, theft of motor 
vehicles, robbery and serious assault all show the similar broad 
consistency over the period. Again this can be taken as evidence of 
the existence of a practice - a set of rules - governing the use of 
fines. 
Other evidence which supports this viewpoint is that provided by 
the sheriffs interviewed. Quite clearly, they saw themselves as being 
bound by rules which both defined the off ice they occupied and 
governed the way they sentenced. They did not see the process of 
sentencing as indeterminate, which is not to say they did not tailor 
sentences to the individual offender. Rather, as was said before, 
they described the "trick" of sentencing as incorporating such factors 
into the general rules they saw as existing. 
It appears to be difficult to square this evidence with the 
stress on indeterminacy that one finds in the realist literature. The 
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evidence supports the strength of the practice conception of rules and 
thus the existence of what we have called the normative practice of 
sentencing. 
One of the difficulties with the realist literature is its level 
of analysis. For example, Carlen's work is focused on the micro level 
of interaction. This is perfectly reasonable, but the finer the 
analytical lens is, the more the general picture goes out of focus. 
Details can become over-emphasised at the expense of losing sight of 
the broader canvas. Moreover, on closer examination, this literature 
can be seen to converge with the practice conceptions of sentencing 
outlined here. For example, Blumberg describes the court and the 
criminal justice system as a "conveyor belt" aimed at maximising the 
speedy dispatch of cases. This encourages the growth of guilty pleas 
and plea bargaining which short circuit, so he says, the due process 
or adversary model of justice. For Blumberg this short circuiting 
indicates a failure in the system. Similarly, although, as we have 
noted, with greater emphasis on the formal rules of law, McBarnet 
paints a similar picture - the preponderance of guilty pleas means the 
system works against the defendant. 
There are two comments to make here. First, it is quite wrong to 
see the use of guilty pleas as evidence that the system is necessarily 
unfair and elides rules of law. The right to plead guilty is part of 
the due process model of law. Second, and more important in our 
context, both Blumberg's and McBarnet's analyses can be transposed 
into our framework and vocabulary. What both do is to describe a 
practice at work. The "conveyor belt" is a system or rules. The 
rules are not the ones which Blumberg presumes ought to be in use, but 
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this does not mean that the system cannot be described in these terms. 
This last point brings into focus, however, an important issue. 
This concerns the nature of the rules which make up a practice. One 
valuable lesson that can be gleaned from the realist literature is 
that rules and rule following behaviour are more plastic and fluid 
than is suggested by the discussion of them out of their social 
contexts. We must be careful here neither to give unwarranted praise 
to the realist literature nor by implication to damn any discussion of 
rules that does not use their type of methods. In the most abstract 
and "philosophical" discussion of legal rules, there is allowance made 
for their interpretable nature. Hart (1961), for instance, 
distinguishes between two aspects of any rule; the "core" and the 
"penumbra", in order to show the open-endedness of rules and the 
language in which we talk of them. Also MacCormick clearly states, 
in a slightly different vein and with Humean overtones that "reason 
alone cannot wholly determine what we ought to do" (MacCormick, 1978 
p.264). On the other side, there is a tendency for realists to assume 
that abstract rules - the law in the books - are beyond interpretation 
and that is why informal ones grow up in practice to take their place. 
One problematic consequence of this is the suggestion, sometimes 
explicit, other times made by implication, that there is a "gap" 
between the theory by which the system ought to work and its day to 
day practical nature. As Skolnick has suggested, this idea is often 
argued for by misinterpreting Packer's famous distinction between the 
"due process" and "crime control" models of the criminal justice 
system. The realists use these models in support of the idea that a 
gap exists - that the criminal justice system is oriented only to 
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crime control. However, Packer never argued that the models were 
dichotomous, rather he was trying to point to a possible tension 
between the substantive aims or purposes of the system and its 
bureaucratic/administrative constraints. 
Nevertheless, the realist literature is valuable in making us 
more aware and sensitive to the fact that rules exist in social 
contexts and that this cannot be ignored if we are to understand the 
nature of the criminal justice system. 
It is partly in consequence of this and also because of the 
already noted openness that inheres in the process of sentencing, that 
we distinguish between two sorts of rules, the formal legal and the 
substantive. As was explained in the introduction to this chapter by 
formal legal rules we mean those rules of law enshrined in statute or 
in an accepted conunon law practice that gives direction to sentencers. 
Substantive rules are more diffuse and elusive; they can be seen as 
policy directives; they encapsulate the ends sentencers perceive the 
system ought to achieve. The existence of a "tariff" in Scots 
criminal courts (see Nicholson, 1981) is a good example of substantive 
rules in operation. Equally, the presence of "sentencing guidelines" 
in England, laid down by ~Lord Chief Justice, is another example of 
how substantive rules directly effect sentencing. The tariff and the 
guidelines are expressions of values held to be the foundation of 
policy; they are built up over time and reflect the "collective 
experience" of the judiciary, but they are not in the sense defined 
here, for real legal rules. There thus exist few formal legal rules 
explicitly about sentencing that "tell" sentencers what to do. More 
normally, the formal legal rules are concerned with procedure, 
evidence and jurisdiction. One formal legal rule that does have 
considerable consequences for the system is the statutory requirement 
that, in setting the level of the fine, the sentencer must take into 
account the means of the offender. In the next chapter we consider 
these consequences and discuss their implications. 
In passing sentence, sentencers bring these rules into 
relationship with one another. The calculation usually proceeds on 
substantive grounds - this is how the sentence is individuated to take 
into account the specific features of the case. However, this process 
is bounded by formal legal considerations. To use a Dworkinean 
concept, formal legal rules "trump" substantive ones. The degree to 
which substantive grounds are considered varies by the type of case. 
For example, in motor vehicle offences, the extent to which offender 
related criteria are considered differs greatly from that in a common 
law crime like theft or robbery. Again, procedure can have a direct 
influence. The formalities that accompany cases taken on indictment 
mean the two types of rule are brought into a different relationship 
than they are in the more relaxed circumstances of summary procedure. 
In the next chapter we discuss these matters in greater detail. 
There are, however, a number of more general issues that warrant 
discussion here. First, as our brief discussion of substantive rules 
shows, it is clear that they are not precisely legally formulated 
ones. They would not meet the sort of test for being a rule that, for 
example, Dworkin lays down. Rather, they seem more akin to his notion 
of principles and policies. Why therefore should we not use these 
terms? Does it help or add light to insist that they be called rules? 
While not wishing to deny that there are differences between 
principles and rules, it must be pointed out that the adoption of 
Dworkin's terminology is inappropriate. It ought to be remembered 
that Dworkin develops his distinction between rules and principles in 
the larger context of his debate with legal positivists and in 
particular with Hart. Dworkin attempts to subvert Hart's rule based 
characterisation of law by arguing that principles do not exhibit the 
formal requirements of rules as Dworkin himself defines them - that 
is, a rule must specify all the exceptions to which it is subject 
(Dworkin, 1977 p.24ff). In claiming to show that in hard cases 
recourse is made to principles rather than rules, Dworkin purports to 
have demonstrated that law cannot be described only as a system of 
rules. 
Even if we put to one side the assessment of Dworkin's argument -
and here MacCormick is surely correct in claiming that it exaggerates 
its case (MacCormick, 1978 pp.153-155) - there is no reason for us to ... 
take on board Dworkin's terminology. It has not been our concern to 
argue the case for or against the adequacy of legal positivism as a 
description of law. Not only is this better left to others more 
skilled and knowledgeable in the area (see Simmonds, 1984) for 
example) but our project is more limited. It has been to evolve a way 
of conceptualising sentencing against the backcloth of its inadequate 
conceptualisation in the existing literature. That at points this 
feeds off a more general conception of the nature of rules and law is 
conceded and discussed, but that this means we need to adopt a 
particular vocabulary with all that this entails, is not. Our 
characterisation of substantive rules, however, is comparable to 
Dworkin's notion of principles. Substantive rules do encapsulate 
1,.05 
views on the fundamental nature of the system - in this context, the 
views sheriffs have of the criminal justice system as achieving 
justice by the meting out of classically conceived punishments. But 
this comparability does not mean we have to limit ourselves to a 
vocabulary taken out of the context of a debate between jurisprudes. 
Furthermore, if justification is needed for describing 
substantive rules as rules, then there seems to be no inconsistency 
between say Hart's notion of what a rule is and our claiming 
substantive rules to be rules. Hart develops his notion of rule by 
contrasting rules with habits. Habits he casts in a behavioural 
language - they are patterns of behaviour regularly repeated over a 
period of time. They differ from rules in three ways. First, 
breaking the rule of a group invites criticism whereas this is not the 
case with habits. Second, this criticism is perceived by the group as 
legitimate and justified. Third, and most important, rules have an 
"internal" aspect; following rules as distinct from habits 
necessitates consciousness and deliberation. Rules thus set a 
standard which a particular group recognises and which individuals 
consciously accept as legitimate. 
Our description of substantive rules meets these criteria. 
Substantive rules are generally shared norms which individual sheriffs 
intentionally accept. They rationally use them in making decisions; 
deviation from them ~ be a ground for criticism. (Although the 
sheriffs we interviewed did not "name names", they did occasionally 
allude to the "deviant" behaviour of some of their colleagues). 
This comparison should not be taken to indicate an acceptance of 
legal positivism. There is nothing in Hart's notion of what 
constitutes a rule which restricts it to this particular perspective. 
A Weberian social scientist - or a Durkheimian one for that matter -
would find little to disagree with in it. The comparison simply shows 
that, in principle, there is no reason not to describe substantive 
rules as rules. 
There is another general point that ought to be considered. 
There could be those.who feel able to accept my argument, yet claim 
that it fails to demonstrate that sentencing has any relevance to 
legal reasoning. Such is the case Bankowski et. al. (1987) put 
forward. They argue that sentencing does not rect\.y involve legal 
reasoning; rather it is a matter of sentencers using their commonsense 
to achieve certain ends. Thus it may be rule governed but the rules 
are not legal ones. Moreover, the weight placed on substantive rules 
in our argument is evidence of this. (cf Willock 1987 pp 115-116) 
The question raised here concerns the extent to which one can 
describe rules which are not formulated in specifically legal language 
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as legal rules.· One's answer to this question will depend in turn on 
where one draws the line between legal language and other generally 
available but related vocabularies. There is a danger of drawing this 
line too tightly or too broadly and this issue is not amenable to an 
easy answer. It is a matter of judgement. However, what is clear is 
that sheriffs do see their sentencing as a form of legal reasoning. 
Their actions were premissed on the assumption of them being legal 
actors pursuing justified and justifiable ends of the legal system in 
which they work. Factors like a concern for justice, or of the 
priority given to punishment over other ends, were all seen as being 
part of legal culture as they understand it. They were also aware 
that these values were shared (or not) by members of the community at 
large. But this is hardly a strong ground on which to argue that the 
form of reasoning in which sheriffs encapsulate these values is not an 
example of legal reasoning. These values, crystallised in what we 
have called substantive rules, are active in the criminal justice 
system and thus must be considered an essential part of its operation. 
Perhaps the difference between the account developed here and 
that developed by Bankowski et. al. can be partly explained by the 
fact that their survey was concerned with lay justices while this one 
is with fully trained members of the judiciary. The fact that 
sheriffs are professional judges is important. Sheriffs are a product 
of a long tradition. They learn and are taught the rules, the ethos 
of Scots Law, from the point they enter into legal training, then go 
on to practise as lawyers and this is continued on their appointment 
to the bench. This training is the process by which the rules of the 
normative practice are learnt. What the work of Bankowski et. al. 
shows, however, is that the normative practice we describe has "local 
conditions of existence", in the sense that it most probably does not 
exist, at least in the same form, in other courts with different 
personnel and jurisdiction. 
We claim therefore there exists a normative practice of 
sentencing in the Sheriff Court in Scotland that is amenable to 
investigation and empirical description. The rules that compose the 
practice can be described as can be their effect on the use of 
sanctions. 
It is at this point that the concerns of this chapter clearly 
intersect with the broader themes of our inquiries. It is through the 
rules that make up the normative practice of sentencing that the 
broader and more general social forces discussed earlier in the study 
are transposed into a reality in the everyday workings of the 
contemporary Scottish criminal justice system. It is through these 
rules that different forms of rationality become operative in the 
processing of criminal cases. By studying how sentencers use these 
rules, we can enlarge our vision of the way punishment, money and 
legal order intersect. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has served a number of purposes. First, it is a 
transitional one joining together the statistical analysis of the last 
one with the phenomenological analysis of the next. It has gone about 
this by developing the notion of a normative practice. Second, it has 
sought also to contribute to the more general literature on 
sentencing. Its third purpose has been to prepare the ground for the 
detailed examination of how different forms of rationality co-exist 
within the criminal justice system and how the use of the fine 
reflects and is structured by them. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Working Legal Rules: Money and the Sense of Justice 
In this chapter we will use the interviews with sheriffs to 
analyse empirically the process by which they "construct" fines. As 
was pointed out in the last chapter, the fine is constructed out of 
the relationship between formal legal rules and substantive rules. 
While formal legal rules are the backbone of the normative structure 
of sentencing - they set the parameters within which decisions have to 
be made - substantive rules set broad, general policy objectives. The 
relationship between these rules is complex and, to an ex~ent, 
changeable. Priority is placed on one type as against the other, 
depending on the nature of the problem with which the sheriff is 
faced. If a question of law, procedure or evidence is raised then 
priority will naturally be given to formal legal rules. When no such 
technical matter is at issue, then substantive rules are to the fore. 
Substantive rules, however, can always be trumped by formal, legal 
ones. The decisions made have to be consistent with what the law 
requires. 
In what follows we examine how these types of rules operate and 
their relationship to the fine. We explore, also, the influence that 
money has upon the process. Does the monetary nature of the fine 
introduce a special factor in making decisions on sentence, or is it 
of no special significance at all? 
We begin, however, by looking again at the distinction between 
formal legal and substantive rules. By formal legal rules we mean 
rules that are contained in statutes and in the common law. They 
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describe in varying degrees of specificity, the circumstances in which 
behaviour can be regarded as unlawful. They do not describe the 
behaviour itself but the circumstances. A law which says driving in 
excess of thirty miles an hour is illegal does not describe what it is 
to drive under or over the limit. Rather, it establishes that to 
exceed thirty miles an hour is a circumstance in which you may be 
regarded as engaging in unlawful activity. Formal legal rules also 
set up criteria which describe what sort of knowledge is accepted as 
valid in legal argumentation. Formal legal rules, in this sense, 
describe procedures to be followed as in the case, for example, of 
laws regarding evidence. 
In the area of sentencing there are few of these types of rules. 
As we said in the last chapter, there are few "laws of sentencing". 
Statutes may set upper limits on fines or sentences of imprisonment, 
but in common law crimes and offences there exist only conventions as 
to what sanction is appropriate. The court may make reference to its 
past practice but precedent is not binding. 
Substantive rules differ from formal legal rules in that they 
state broader, policy objectives. They are also themselves policy 
statements. Substantive rules can be more or less general in nature. 
For example, with regard to the fine, rules range from general 
statements about the purposes and objectives of punishment, of the 
nature of the fine as a punishment, to more specific rules that 
describe what the "going rate" of fine is for particular types of 
crimes and offences. 
These substantive rules express values which the community of 
sheriffs recognise. Most sheriffs, for example, hold to a retributive 
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justification of the fine because they see this as the best way of 
achieving justice. There is a broad consensus that the proper place 
to begin setting the level of a fine is by relating it to the 
seriousness of the offence. In doing this, sheriffs see themselves as 
"pricing harm" and establishing "balance" (Sh.1). This "modern 
retributivism" (see Finnis, 198J) comes through in other rules such as 
"the offender ought not to profit from his crime" (Sh.3). 
These substantive rules are part of legal culture. In 
socio~ ical terms they are an "occupational norm". Sheriffs do not 
consciously learn them on apointment to the bench; rather these rules 
are learnt as part of the process of becoming a lawyer. 
Although these rules are part of legal culture, this does not 
mean that sheriffs are unthinkingly or absolutely committed to the 
values they express. Individual sheriffs may be "lukewarm" about 
certain rules. A few, for example, do not strongly advocate a 
retributivist justification of the fine, preferring to see its use 
more as a type of "social work for the community" (Sh.8). Yet again, 
other sheriffs offer other punishment justifications of the fine, such 
as deterrence; they see it, for example, as "a signal to the 
community" (Sh.9). 
The plurality of values is to be expected in any occupational 
group. The normal situation is for any individual to be oriented to a 
variety of different ends at any one time. Thus, it is common for 
individual sheriffs to give a number of different justifications of 
the fine but the general tenor of the interviews showed that the 
central or standard justification was that which emphasised the fine 
as a punishment. The predominant justification therefore was to see 
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the fine as a retributive measure or as a form of deterrence. The 
occasional "treatment" justification was cast not so much in the terms 
we have come to expect, but far more in a framework which sees the 
fine as a form of financial discipline. 
As part of legal culture, these substantive rules are brought to 
bear on the question of how to sentence. It was said in the last 
chapter that in the realities of the courtroom, on a day-to-day basis 
it is these substantive rules that "operate" the process of 
sentencing. Sheriffs assume the validity of formal legal rules and 
deal with cases by substantive rules. However, no matter how pressing 
the constraints of everyday courtroom life may be, it is formal legal 
rules that set the boundaries. As sentencing decisions are legal 
decisions, they must be legally valid. Ultimately, formal legal rules 
can trump substantive ones. 
It would be wrong to perceive of the relationship between these 
two types of rules as though it were a choice of either using the 
formal legal or the substantive ones. Rather, they are in a constant 
relationship with one another. While substantive rules may be the 
process by which general rules are applied to particular cases, the 
formal legal rules provide both the starting and finishing points. 
The rules thus operate together: they are not mutually exclusive. 
This distinction between formal legal and substantive rules is 
analogous to Max Weber's famous distinction between two types of 
rationality; formal and substantive. For Weber, formal rationality 
was action governed by rules, where the orientation towards rules is 
of a logical type. One accepts the rules because they are rules. In 
formal rationality, the selection of means and ends is rule 
determined. Substantive rationality, on the other hand, is that in 
which some value - which for Weber was absolute - defines the ends of 
action: social action premised not upon following rules but achieving 
some objective that is valued beyond any particular set of rules. 
The similarity between the distinction we have drawn and Weber's 
is readily apparent. Formal legal rules are formally rational in 
Weber's terms. Substantive rules, because they express policy or 
value ends, are substantively rational. There are two points to make 
in qualification however. First, the distinction between formal and 
substantive rationality or between formal legal and substantive rules 
is not an absolute one. As has been argued in many discussions of 
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Weber, the distincitEn is one of stress rather than exclusion. In 
Weber, the distinction appears to depend upon the absoluteness with 
which the ends of substantive rationality are held. The orientation 
to the substantive end will outweigh any calculation of means. This 
compares to formal rationality in which there is a reasoned 
calculation of ends and means. However, the belief in the adequacy of 
reason cannot itself be described as a formally rational belief. 
Formal rationality, in other words, rests on substantively held 
beliefs. If this is so then the distinction cannot be absolute. 
Formal and substantive rationality do not exclude one another. Rather 
they exist in a variety of relationships to one another. 
Similarly, in our analysis, formal legal and substantive rules 
are not mutually exclusive. Substantive rules are not technically 
rules of law, but as they, in part, structure how law operates, they 
are legally relevant. They belong to legal culture and thus share in 
conunon some aspects of the rationality of law. Moreover, some of the 
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values that inhere in substantive rules appear to be so central to the 
practice of sentencing that they have an influence on the system that 
is as determinative as that of a formal rule of law. For example, the 
idea that the fine ought to be proportionate to offence and only 
adjusted to income, or that the fine is best justified as a form of 
retribution, or that offenders ought not to be allowed to prof it from 
crime, are central to the legal culture of sheriff. These substantive 
rules have an immense affect on how the fine is used. 
Our second general qualification concerns the boundaries of 
substantive rationality. In Weber's account, the ends of substantive 
rationality are held with a commitment that outweighs cal~ulation of 
means. Quite clearly, it is not possible for a sheriff to be so 
absolute. Formal legal rules, as we have said, trump substantive 
rules. Thus, if there is a tension between rules, it will be the 
formal legal rule that is ascendant. This does not mean that the 
formal legal rule remains uninfluenced by the substantive rule: the 
substantive rule will set the criteria by which the formal legal rule 
is interpreted - rather it is that the substantive rule must 
ultimately "fit into" a formally legal proposition. This is so 
precisely because the sheriff is a legal actor, holding a public 
office, which requires recognition of the binding force of the rule of 
law. Moreover, we do not deny that the rule of law is an example of 
substantive rationality. What we would deny however is that this 
challenges our analysis. The observation that formal rationality or 
formal rules rest upon a foundation of substantive rationality is an 
example of the complex relationship that holds between them. 
The normative practice of sentencing is composed of these two 
types of rules. Fines are constructed out of the relationship between 
formal legal and substantive rules. These rules are neither 
background expectations, in the sense of Hogarth's penal philosophies, 
or inputs in the sense of Hood's model of sentencing. They are rules 
that exist independent of the sheriffs that use them. These rules are 
the structure within which sentencing decisions are made. 
Our task is to describe empirically how these rules operate in 
the context of fining. We begin our analysis by looking at general 
substantive rules that record the views sheriffs have of the fine as a 
type of punishment. These rules have a profound influence both upon 
sheriffs' views of the general policy objectives of fining and of how 
the fine relates to other sanctions. 
Punishment, Regulation and the Fine 
All sheriffs interviewed held two clear conceptions of the nature 
of the fine; that it is a definite punishment and that it is a 
flexible penalty. 
The first of these conceptions was a dominant theme. Sheriffs 
argued that the penol,jical objectives of fining were clear: the fine 
has to be understood as a punishment. For example as one sheriff put 
it, "the fine is pure punishment" (Sh.3), or again, "the fine is a 
punishment, it involves shouldering the recalcitrant into compliance" 
(Sh.4). 
Sheriffs were concerned to distinguish the fine from other 
available sanctions on these grounds. There was a consensus that, 
whereas with sanctions like imprisonment other penological objectives 
like reformation or rehabilitation have to be considered, this is not 
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the case with the fine. This view of the fine was expressed most 
clearly be one sheriff, who argued that "the fine is punishment, it is 
not rehabilitative" (Sh.5). 
This conception of the fine was used to distinguish it from the 
other monetary penalty, compensation orders. Sheriffs generally did 
not welcome the introduction of compensation orders. Most agreed that 
"compensation is a complication" (Sh.10). It introduces "a civil 
action into a criminal trial" and thus there was an expressed 
"reluctance" to see it "grafted" onto the criminal justice system. 
While sheriffs agreed that the fine is a punishment, there was a 
variety of views on how best to justify it. Generally, in using the 
term punis1:1ment, sheriffs appeared to mean retribution. This is the 
central case. The fine involves "a routine pricing of injury and 
damage" (Sh.4). By paying the fine the offender is both punished and 
the balance of harm restored. Sheriffs were divided on whether the 
fine can be used as a deterrent. For some, as the "fine relates 
primarily to the circumstances of offenders, it is not a general 
deterrent" (Sh. 7), while for others, 
"the first consideration is denunciation - how bad 
is it in the public eye. Other things being 
equal, the fine is determined by this. In so far 
as the fine is deterrent then general deterrence 
is uppermost." (Sh.8) 
Both the retributivist and deterrence justifications were seen to 
connect with the priority given to making the amount fined reflect, in 
principle, the seriousness of the offence. As one sheriff put it, 
"subject to statutory and conventional limitations 
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there is a basic equivalence between the extent of 
damage and the amount of the fine." (Sh.4) 
While not all sheriffs were so clear that offence related 
criteria should come first, this was the prevailing point of view. 
The concept of the fine as a punishment was related by sheriffs 
to two other characteristics. First, all sheriffs saw the fine as a 
flexible sanction. Second, the emphasis on punishment was connected 
with the idea that there is a central, voluntary element in the fine. 
Sheriffs regard the fine as flexible in two senses. First, it is 
seen as capable of fulfilling all the objectives of punishment. The 
fine can be justified as a form of retribution or as a deterrent or as 
a denunciatory punishment. As one sheriff put it, "the fine can 
achieve all the conventional objectives of sentencing" (Sh.2). 
Sheriffs thus were aware that it is possible to justify the fine 
in terms of differing conceptions of punishment, but their main 
concern is to affirm its straightforward, simple punitiveness. One 
sheriff commented, 
"In ninety-five per cent of situations the fine is 
purely punitive, there is no reformative or 
rehabilitative element." (Sh.8) 
The fine slros to be favoured by sheriffs precisely because of 
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this. As for them it is a punishment, it apears to satisfy their 
cultural expectations of what sentencing policy ought to be like. Its 
apparent ideological purity reconnnends it to sheriffs. But as well as 
being ideolgoically "pure", it is also ideologically flexible. 
Sheriffs do not need to justify it just as retribution; deterrence or 
denunciation will do as well. 
The second sense in which sheriffs perceive the fine as flexible 
is that it allows them to deal with a wide range of different 
circumstances. Sheriffs argued that it is possible to adjust the fine 
to most situations. One sheriff captured this by contending that "the 
fine is a form; its content and its effect is random" (Sh.4). This 
was seen to be of particular importance as it allows sheriffs to 
incorporate in the sentence both factors relating to the individual 
offender and yet maintain consistency with wider objectives. The 
fine, in other words, is seen by sheriffs as allowing them to both 
individuate punishment, yet still keep intact their conception of the 
wider purpose of the penal system, that of justice. The actual way in 
which sheriffs do this is to manipulate either the size of the fine or 
conditions of payment or both. Moreover, the fine is seen to retain 
this flexibility after implementation - there is a further possibility 
of adjustment if the problem of default should arise. This appears to 
be the reason why sheriffs, while perceiving default procedure, as one 
sheriff put if., "distasteful" (Sh.2), still nevertheless are reluctant 
to lose.their control over the process. One consequence of this is 
the somewhat ambivalent attitude amongst sheriffs over the advantages 
of fine enforcement officers. As the same sheriff commented, fine 
enforcement officers are "a drift toward social workers control" 
(Sh.2). This sheriff also expressed similar views on the already 
existing practice of fine supervision orders. 
Although this particular sheriff expressed views on "social 
workers" with pronounced vigour, the reasoning that lay behind his 
pronouncements was shared by other sheriffs. The fine is conceived by 
them as having a voluntary element - "the voluntary element in paying 
fines is crucial" (Sh.2). This aspect of the fine is tied in with 
their conception of it as "pure punishment". Sheriffs have a 
"classical" attitude towards crime and punishment. Crime is perceived 
as an intentional act to cause harm, which is best dealt with by 
sanctions which allow offenders to expiate their guilt in a rational 
and responsible way. 
Sheriffs argued that because the fine is paid in money, it 
provides the offender with the opportunity of behaving in a 
responsible, reasoned ma~r. The financial discipline required by the 
typical offender - who will be low paid or unemployed - to pay the 
fine is se'\1 by the sheriffs to have value. In the context of a 
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limited budget, it requires them to give up goods they otherwise would 
have enjoyed. This both makes the fine hurt and is seen to remind the 
offenders of their duties as citizens. Sheriffs are aware there is 
always a choice offenders can make not to pay the fine. The fine 
allows the opportunity of "atonement" (Sh.1). It also allows the 
offender to recognise obligations. 
There is another dimension to the general perceptions sheriffs 
have of the fine. Sheriffs draw a distinction betwEfn regulatoty ,.. 
offences and "real crime". Even those sheriffs who regard this 
distinction as "useless" (Sh.5) still recognise it. The importance of 
this distinction is that for some sheriffs it provides the occasion on 
which their view of the fine as punishment may change. For some 
sheriffs, regulatory offences, moving traffic and other breaches of 
statutory provisions, are not really "fined". The money paid is more 
akin to a post hoc tax or licence fee. 
For sheriffs who adhere to this view, certain consequences 
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follow. Where it is considered more of a licence fee than a 
punishment, sheriffs use a formal, but rule of thumb, tariff to set 
the size of the penalty. So many miles an hour over the speed limit 
will result automatically in a fine of a certain size. 
Characteristics of the offender, including income, are seen as 
relatively unimportant. For example, one sheriff argued that 
"television licence fines are not increased to take account of means, 
because the licence is the same for all" (Sh. 6). 
Sheriffs who advocate this way of looking at things do not see 
the "fine" in these circumstances as punitive. The penalty is not 
intended to hurt, but merely to mark a form of disapproval. 
Other sheriffs recognise the distinction but it does not alter 
their perception of the fine as punishment. As one sheriff put it, 
"even in regulatory offences the fine is purely punitive" (Sh.8), or 
another "there is a division between regulatory offences and real 
crimes but the fine is a punishment for both" (Sh.2). 
Although there is an ambivalence amongst sheriffs on the 
implications of this distinction, there is a general consensus that 
many of the regulatory of fences that appear before the court ought not 
to be there. They constitute "trivial business" and the "should be 
removed" (Sh.1). As an example, this sheriff mentioned television 
licence "dodgers" who were seen as "not suitable candidates for 
fining" (Sh.1). 
Furthermore, sheriffs were opposed to the criminal prosecution of 
social security fraud. They felt that the criminal court was being 
used to provide "free diligence" for the Department of Health and 
Social Security (Sh.9). One argued that the D.H.S.S. ought to 
"collect its own debts" (Sh.6). Although not all sheriffs agreed with 
this, it does represent the generally held view. Those sheriffs who 
were not against such prosecutions per se, supported them only because 
to offload them would place them outwith "the sheriff's humanity" 
(Sh.2). 
The differing views of sheriffs on whether, for regulatory 
offences, the fine is a licence or a punishment is of significance. 
For those sheriffs who see fines as licences it means the whole 
process can be far more automatic than when dealing with "real crime". 
They can place the offender within the tariff without worrying about 
the consequences of their actions. Experience stands them in good 
stead here. The majority of statutory offences they deal with are 
motoring offences. As Bottoms (1973) has argued, there is a good 
chance such offenders will pay. This, in part, is because of their 
class background, in part, because it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that offenders themselves see fines in this area as "licences" rather 
than punishments. Whatever the reasons may be, sheriffs with some 
justification can assume that default is less likely. Reflection on 
consequences thus seems not to be necessitated. 
As of fenders will probably not appear in the court in these 
cases, the automatic nature of the process is reinforced. Most 
offenders of this type plead by letter. Invariably, it is a guilty 
plea, perhaps with some attempt to put forward mitigating factors. 
Sheriffs listen to or read these pleas in mitigation, but this rarely 
appears to alter the size of the fine. 
The organisation of court business is another consideration that 
further reinforces the automatic nature of the process. Pleas by 
letter are taken at the end of business. Typically, the court is 
empty except for the sheriff, the fiscal, the clerk and the court 
attendant. The clerk reads the name of the offender and hands the 
sheriff the complaint, the fiscal briefly indicates the circumstances 
of the offence, the sheriff makes a decision. The speed with which 
this is carried out is interrupted only if some "unusual" claim is 
made in the letter. ~n these circumstances, the fiscal may connnent, 
the sheriff may ask a question, but the whole process is still 
extremely speedy. 
Sheriffs who perceive fines as licences justify their decisions 
in terms of their perceptions of offences. They do not see regulatory 
offences as "real crime". These sheriffs do not consider that these 
offences raise or involve moral issues; real crime does and thus 
merits a punitive stance. Because of this, sheriffs seem to view 
their decisions about this type of statutory offence as being more 
administrative than justiciable in nature. By this is meant they deal 
with such statutory offences by what they see as a straightforward 
application of general rules to a particular case. The circumstances 
of the offence and the offender are not, in principle, important and 
nor is there an issue of law involved. Indeed, it is this which leads 
some of these sheriffs into arguing that some statutory offences do 
not belong in the court at all. However, as these statutory offences 
constitute the major part of court business, they are best dealt with 
in as routine and mechanical a manner as possible. For the sheriff, 
this means considering the offence only and relating it to a penalty 
within the "going rate" or traiff. One consequence of this is that 
these sheriffs are more likely to give fines at the lower end of it. 
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For these sheriffs, cases thus are of two broad types. On the 
one hand, regulatory statutory offences and, on the other, real 
crimes. For the first a tariff is employed, for the second a more 
punitive stance. Decisions in the former are administrative in 
nature, those in the second justiciable. 
For these sheriffs who see the fine as punitive there is no 
necessary conflict between this and processing offences in a routine 
manner. These sheriffs can retain their emphasis on punishment and 
also process statutory offences in the way described above. Their 
difference with the other sheriffs arises in them not seeing decision-
making in this context as administative in nature. Because statutory 
offences are the business of the court, decisions on them are 
justiciable. However, these types of statutory offences are regarded 
as relatively trivial and thus, in a sense, easy cases with which to 
deal. As they are easy they can be processed quickly. Although these 
sheriffs concede that some of the statutory offences should be removed 
from the court, they argue that whilst they remain part of the 
business, they must be dealt with in a punitive manner. These 
sheriffs thus maintain an emphasis on speed and routine with an 
emphasis on using the fine in a punitive manner. They perceive there 
to be no strain or contradiction. 
These sheriffs also use a tariff for statutory offences. Where 
they may differ is that they are more likely to place the fine at the 
upper end of the tariff so as to emphasise punitiveness. 
Whatever view sheriffs take on this question does not challenge 
their general conception of the fine as a punishment. The 
disagreement lies not in how sheriffs perceive the fine, but in how 
they interpret the nature of the court's business. It is this 
commonly shared perception of the fine as punitive which underpins 
their use of it. In as much as this perception is dominant, sets a 
standard or is a maximum, we can talk of it as a rule. In our terms, 
it is a substantive rule. Like other substantive rules it is open-
ended and subject to interpretation. It does not have the apparent 
precision of formal legal rules, but it is a rule nevertheless. The 
conception of the fine as punitive serves both to set policy ends and 
to distinguish the fine from other available sanctions. In the latter 
sense it categorises; it establishes principles which demarcate it 
from other penalties. This general conception of the nature of the 
fine structures how sheriffs use it when faced with particular cases. 
We will examine this in a number of contexts, beginning with how the 
fine is perceived in relation to other sanctions. 
Flexibility and Generality 
We established earlier that sheriffs perceive the fine as a 
flexible sanction that can be used to deal with most circumstances. 
It can be used to accommodate· the particular features of specific 
cases without this contradicting the perception of it as punitive. 
Also, in theory the fine can be used for all crimes and offences with 
the exception only of murder. There exists a group of crimes and 
offences, however, where the sheriff has to choose between 
alternatives; either the fine can be used or recourse can be made to 
the sanction of imprisonment. How do sheriffs deal with these cases? 
How do sheriffs cha°se between the fine and its alternative? 
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Much rests upon the place sheriffs give to the fine in relation 
to other sanctions. Here sheriffs are clear. The sanction which 
first comes to mind is the fine. A selection of sheriffs' comments 
makes this clear, "the fine is the first thing to consider " 
(Sh.3), "the fine is the first and the commonest disposal" (Sh.10) and 
"the fine is the first option" (Sh.8). 
In part this view of the fine rests upon their perception of it 
as being more flexible than other sanctions, especially prison. The 
prison incarcerates and thus removes the possibility of doing anything 
else with the offender. The fine does not. It leaves open the 
opportunity in the future of imprisonment, if default occurs. 
However, this is only part of their argument, for their decision rests 
also on how they perceive the prison and the fine to relate to one 
another. There is an interesting difference here. Again sheriffs 
divide into two groups. ... The first distinguish sharply betw~.n the fine 
and the prison. Those in the second group see the two as shading into 
one another. 
The opinions of those in the first group are concisely summarised 
by one sheriff who argued that "the fine is clearly distinct from 
imprisonment, it is easily demarcated ... marginal cases do not exist" 
(Sh.6). 
Sheriffs who distinguish thus clearly between fines and 
imprisonment maintain their argument even in circumstances where they 
give large fines. "There is no crossover from large fines to 
imprisonment" (Sh.9). The reason given is that, as one sheriff put 
it, "the link between the fine and imprisonment is completely 
unnatural" (Sh.6). 
Sheriffs in this group see the fine and the prison as serving 
different functions. Sheriffs perceive the prison as suitable only 
for the most serious of crimes. It is only the "wicked" who deserve 
imprisonment. The "feckless and women" can be dealt with by a fine 
(Sh.3). There are other factors which make the use of imprisonment 
more likely. One sheriff said that "individual violence or the use of 
a weapon leads to an increased likelihood of imprisonment" (Sh.2). 
Sheriffs regard these as "special circumstances". It is only 
when there is a factor which clearly differentiates an offender or a 
crime from the normal ones, that prison is to be used. This suggests 
that for this group of sheriffs, the prison is a residual category in 
sentencing terms. The normal run of crimes and offences and offenders 
can be fined, whereas the "unusual" and serious are more likely to be 
dealt with by the prison. 
For this first group of sheriffs, the use of the fine and the 
prison rest upon very different criteria. The use of the prison can 
be justified in only very special circusmtances. Consequently the 
fine occupies a central place. Its flexibility, its "universal" 
nature makes it the normal sanction to use for the typical case. 
For the other group of sheriffs there is a much closer 
relationship between the fine and the prison. As a result, they are 
much more likely to impose a sentence of imprisonment. This, of 
course, does not mean that they will inevitably do this, because for 
all sheriffs the fine is the first penalty to be considered. 
These sheriffs see the prison and the fine as closely related on 
practical grounds. The fine and the prison shade into one another 
when, for example, a particularly high fine is seen to be appropriate. 
In this situation, the sheriff is likely to sentence to imprisonment 
1.1.."T 
if it is thought that there is a high risk of default. As one put it, 
"if a fine is unrealistic, then impose a custodial sentence" (Sh.5), 
or again, another sheriff, "if the sheriff suspected in advance that 
the fine will be defaulted and the offender go to prison, then he 
would not have fined in the first place" (Sh.7). 
This is a good example of how sheriffs reason consequentially. 
They sentence by fore9asting the likely consequences of their 
decisions. In this example, they sentence by relating the size of the 
required fine to the means of the particular offender. If they 
conclude that, for all practical purposes, the fine is not likely to 
be paid, it is considered better to use the prison in the first place. 
Other sheriffs in this group see the problem rather diffeiil"-tly. 
For them there do not exist clear cut-off points in the use of 
sanctions. Rather, sanctions are arranged on a scale. As one 
commented, "there is a continuum from absolute discharge through to 
prison" (Sh.4). They place offenders on this continuum by looking at 
the nature of the offence and the record of the offender:-
"It is the situation - record, gravity of offence 
- which determines the fine or imprisonment." 
"Shading of a fine into imprisonment is very 
unusual; therefore, the fine is a limited 
alternative to prison." (Sh.6) 
"The fine and the prison shade into one another; 
more often, however, prison shades into the fine." 
(Sh.5) 
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Sometimes, but rarely, the community service order is used. One 
sheriff saw the community service order as a "buffer" between the fine 
and the prison. However, most sheriffs rejected this because as the 
cormnunity service order can only be used when a sentence of 
imprisonment was competent, it was incorrect to use it for any other 
purpose. 
Although there is this internal variation of opinion on the 
relationship between the fine and the prison, it is clear that for 
sheriffs as a whole, the fine is the preferred sanction whenever it is 
possible to use it which is in the vast majority of cases appearing 
before them. The central position occupied by the fine is the product 
of formal legal and substantive rules. Formal legal rules restrict 
the use of the prison. Prison is a mandatory sentence only for 
murder. At the other end of the scale, the majority of statutes 
conclude for the fine. In the majority of common law crimes a 
discretion exists. Sheriffs interpret their discretion by operating 
substantive rules. These rules describe both general policy 
objectives, and also contain more specific recommendations on 
particular sanctions. The fine, because it is "flexible" and 
"universal" is the comprehensive sanction. As a result, recourse to 
the use of imprisonment is rare; the system works in favour of the 
fine. For sheriffs this is a way of maintaining their belief that the 
penal system ought to be punitive. 
Setting the level of the fine 
In this section we wish to explore the way in which sheriffs 
construct the actual level or size of the fine, how they conclude for 
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a certain sum of money. This question lies at the heart of the fining 
process. Moreover, it is important for our analysis as there exists a 
tension between formal legal and substantive rules at this point. 
It is a statutory requirement that in setting the level of a fine 
the sheriff takes into account the means of the offender. This does 
not mean that the fine ought to reflect just this, but that it is 
necessary for the sheriff to consider information about means in 
making decisions. 
The reasoning behind this requirement is to ensure that the fine 
given has a reasonable likelihood of being paid. To this has been 
added a further purpose - that of achieving an equality of impact of 
the fine on offenders. Whether this second objective was a direct 
intention of the legislature is a debatable point; arguments can run 
either way. But what is clear is that amongst the sheriffs 
interviewed and in wider discussions about the fine, it is seen as a 
desirable objective and one that sentencers ought to take account of 
in their decision-making. 
This statutory requirement can be seen as a legal recognition of 
the sociological fact that wealth and income are unequally distributed 
throughout the population. If the fine is to hurt all offenders 
equally then it must accollllllodate this wider social inequality. The 
rich should not be able to buy their way out of the effects of 
punishment and the poor ought not to suffer unduly simply because they 
are poor. As was argued in the last chapter, this legal requirement 
encourages a radical form of consequentialism. Interpreted literally, 
it would mean that the size of the fine would vary in direct 
proportion to the means of each offender. 
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This conclusion has generally been seen as unacceptable by the 
legislature and the judiciary alike. The objection to it is that it 
compromises one idea of the nature of justice. How can one have a 
fair legal system if different of fenders suffer differently for the 
same offence or crime? The radical adjustment of fines to income, 
appears to challenge the maxim that all are equal in the eyes of the 
law. 
There are two different notions of equality at work here. One 
stresses a formal equality which, in legal terms, is generally taken 
to mean that punishment should reflect the seriousness of the offence. 
The other, which has variously been called equality or equivalence of 
impact requires punishment to reflect the situation of each offender. 
A tension exists between these two notions as they pull in opposite 
directions. Whichever notion is adopted has grave consequences for 
the nature of the legal system. If the notion of formal equality 
before the law is advocated, and sentencing is based on offence 
related criteria, then one can anticipate, as a result, a legal system 
in which there is a high degree of consistency. On the other hand, if 
equality of impact is advocated, then there is no premium on 
consistency of results in sentencing. 
The notion of formal equality is deeply embedded in western legal 
culture. It is one of the main policy objectives we expect the legal 
system to achieve. Yet, equality of impact reflects values of a 
wider, but as estimable, sort. Both notions of equality are 
instantiated in the law but in different ways. The notion of formal 
equality is central to legal culture but is not explicitly stated in 
statutes relating to the fine. It is a general presumption in case 
law, but it must be remembered that precedent is not binding in 
sentencing decisions. In our terms, formal equality is a substantive 
rule. The notion of equality of impact in contrast can be seen to 
have explicit statutory statement. It can be perceived as a formal 
legal rule. Admittedly, the statute does not absolutely require the 
sentencer to adjust the fine to means - it simply requires him to take 
them into account - but this intention can be "read" into. Because 
these two notions of equality pull in different directions, there 
exists a tension between the two types of rule which encapsulate them. 
This tension is acute at the point of decisions on how much to 
fine an offender. Do sheriffs fine on the basis of offence-related or 
means-related criteria? The evidence from the interviews describes a 
complex situation. The general inclination of the sheriffs is to put 
offence-related criteria first. Their first consideration is the 
seriousness of the offence; it is part of their general punitive 
stance. One sheriff put it this way, 
"Strict proportionality of the fine to income 
would contradict proportionality to offence. 
Therefore, there are limits to proportionality; in 
effect the offence comes first." (Sh.7) 
All but a few sheriffs argued this way. Consideration of income, 
for most sheriffs, takes a second or third place. The order in which 
the factors are considered can be described in this way - (1) offence; 
(2) record of offender; and (3) income and family circumstances. 
Different sheriffs may substitute between (2) and (3), but nearly all 
of them placed offence-related criteria first. Those sheriffs who 
differ do not necessarily place income first. Rather, they claim to 
treat all factors simultaneously. Two examples illustrate this point, 
"The offender's means are a factor, alongside the 
offence, record and so on." (Sh.6) 
and 
"It [the fine] is influenced by: income, record, 
ability to pay, nature of offence - in no 
particular order." (Sh.9) 
No sheriff placed income related criteria as the first 
consideration. Seemingly, all sheriffs thus work on a principle of 
formal equality and then try to accommodate for equality of impact. 
However, the position is more complex than this. The actual 
amount of money fined reflects also what sheriffs call the "going 
rate". By this, they mean not only the amount of money it is 
conventional to fine for a particular offence or crime, but also a 
convention on how much the typical offender that appears before them 
can reasonably be expected to afford, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offence. The "going-rate", in this second sense, is not 
established by reference to the income of particular offenders. 
Rather, it is set by the general economic climate. For example, 
" ... the magnitude of the fine is in proportion to 
the economic climate." (Sh.3) 
"The fine is in proportion to generally limited 
means. It is restricted in a non-affluent 
society." (Sh.4) 
The "going-rate" sets a very real limit on how far the fine can 
reflect seriousness of offence. To go beyond the "going-rate" could 
well end up with the offender defaulting and being imprisoned. As we 
pointed out above, sheriffs are extremely reluctant to see this 
happen. This constrains their action considerably. One consequence 
of it is that offence related criteria in fact operate within a wider 
appreciation of criteria related to income. These latter criteria do 
not bear down upon the individual offender but upon the means 
available to the common mass. Formal equality thus operates within a 
wider conception of equality of impact. The substantive rule is 
brought within the ambit of a practical interpretation of the formal 
legal rule. 
In the light of this, do sheriffs adjust the fine to reflect the 
means of the individual offender? Sheriffs do adjust the fine, but 
within very narrow limits. Any movement upwards or downwards is 
limited by the stress on formal equality and by the impact of the 
gneral "going-rate". Sheriffs express a reluctance to lower the size 
of the fine too much as they consider the "going-rate" argues for low 
fines anyway. Also, to lower the fine for offender X as against 
offender Y could well contradict the emphasis on formal equality. 
Hence, adjustment of fines to low income is bounded by substantive and 
formal legal considerations. 
Different sheriffs operate these rules so as to produce different 
outcomes. Some sheriffs claim that they are more likely to increase 
fines in proportion to income because the norm is so low that they 
feel they could go no lower. For example, 
"It is more usual to increase the fine in 
proportion to means than to decrease from the norm 
because the norm is rooted in low income. The 
tariff is based upon unemployment." (Sh.11) 
Another sheriff argued a similar case, 
"The scope for increasing the fine according to 
ability to pay is limited because most offenders 
are poor anyway." (Sh.7) 
Sheriff (11) completed the argument by commenting, 
"Any increase is not strictly proportionate, more 
of a gesture." 
Other sheriffs observed that they adjust all fines for income, 
but recognised, at the same time, the limit described above. 
There were other considerations mentioned which affect whether 
the fine is adjusted for income. For example, it appears to be more 
common to reduce for income in the case of regulatory offences or the 
less serious of the common law crimes, such as breach of the peace. 
For more serious crimes, however, the fine is likely to be increased 
if the sheriff concludes that the offender is able to afford it. By 
doing this, they emphasise the punitive nature of the sanction. 
The actual figure in fine is calculated by a rule of thumb. 
Sheriffs combine a knowledge of the typical fine given for the offence 
or crime, with a figure that represents an adjustment to the average 
net weekly income of the offender. The average net weekly income 
forms the norm which can be adjusted for offence related criteria or 
other relevant criteria such as whether the offender is married and if 
there are children. Information about income is gained by asking the 
offender or the agent in the court. Sheriffs commented upon the lack 
of reliable information available to them. 
In conclusion, it seems that the criteria used to determine the 
size of the fine are centred on income related criteria. Although 
sheriffs place offence related criteria first, the practical realities 
of constructing the fine force sheriffs to resort to income related 
criteria. 
The central role monetary considerations play in setting the 
level of the fine, in conjunction with the prevalence of the fine 
create considerable practical problems for the sheriff. One sheriff 
expressed this succinctly. He argued that a penal system which 
depends upon money will inevitably run into crises when there is less 
money about. Increasing unemployment means that the average income of 
the typical offender is continually falling. Either sheriffs lower 
fines in recognition of this, or they must contemplate sending an 
increasing number of offenders to prison for default. Their only 
other alternative is to use the fine less, but this, for reasons 
explained above, is a limited option. The sheriffs interviewed 
recognised this, but were not sanguine about the possibilities of 
solving it. Indeed, in one sense, solution is not within their 
competence. It is a matter for the legislature. But as one sheriff 
said, the legislature appears not to be interested in fines. 
Setting Instalments: The Realisation of Conseguences 
With the exception of very special circumstances, all offenders 
must be given time to pay their fines. The sheriff also has the 
option of allowing payment of the fine by instalments. Either the 
offender requests this facility or the sheriff can offer it. 
Instalment payments are now a very common way of administering the 
fine, not least because this helps to minimise the possibility of 
default. However, sheriffs are ambivalent about instalments. Some 
argue that instalments change the nature of the fine. Either they 
lower the fine's punitive impact or they transmute the fine into a far 
more serious punishment than it was intended to be by extending it 
over time. There is a further dimension to the problem. All sheriffs 
are conscious that instalments make income related criteria central to 
the fining process. This further threatens the importance of offence 
related criteria. A concern with money appears to displace a proper 
emphasis on punishment. 
The majority of sheriffs accept the idea that payment by 
instalments is a necessary feature of the fine. They appear to resent 
it, however, sensing the passing of a definite "price" paid and they 
also regret the development of, as one sheriff put if, a "sin now pay 
later" society, or "crime on the H.P." (Sh.4). But they invariably 
accept it as the only practical way in which offenders can pay their 
fines. The following comment is illuminating: 
"I have no objection to instalments but their use 
does alter the nature of the fine. For example, 
it used to be the case that one 'paid up or else' 
but now it is seen as an 'extended hire purchase 
penalty'." (Sh.2) 
Sheriffs respond to this perception of the effect instalments 
have on the fine in a number of ways. 
There are those who see it as offering a positive opportunity to 
impress monetary discipline upon offenders. 
"Instalments do have a positive advantage because 
they remind the off ender each week of his 
punishment." (Sh.2) 
The constant reminder and persistent bother of regular payments 
is seen to serve a purpose: it extends the control of the court over 
an offender's lifestyle. 
"Bother is the key to the fine, longevity of 
instalments is the punishment ... two to three 
years is no problem." (Sh.6) 
and 
"Instalments can be a positive advantage, because 
of the reminder element." (Sh.8) 
It consistently limits the standard of living and ensures that a 
sacrifice must be made. This achieves the punitive purposes sheriffs 
hold to and also "disciplines" offenders by influencing how they 
manage their budget. 
It is these purported "benefits" of instalments which lead other 
' sheriffs to ques\t"on their use. They argue that the extended control ,. 
over an offender's lifestyle is unwarranted for a number of reasons. 
For example, sheriffs see it as a good jurisprudential principle that 
punishment should have an end rather than to protract indefinitely. 
"Law implies that proceedings should not go on for 
too long. Decision-making and the disposal should 
be decisive, too long is too onerous." (Sh.1) 
and 
"The fine should have the possibility of being 
paid in a reasonable time, if not then either 
lower the fine or incarcerate in the first place." 
(Sh.?) 
Similarly, these sheriffs worry that the regular payment of 
instalments, by becoming routine, tends to dilute the original 
sanction. By splitting it into a number of easy payments, instalments 
appear to contradict the punitive aspect of the fine. As one sheriff 
put it: "the purpose of the fine is not to take their money away 
gradually, the aim is to pay the fine. Otherwise imprisonment is more 
suitable" (Sh.8). This is seen as inconsistent both with the 
"voluntary" element inherent in the fine and also with the idea that 
the fine ought to hurt. In order to limit this, most sheriffs have a 
definite period in mind over which repayment is allowed. Typically, 
the maximum is set at one year. 
There are other sheriffs who do not feel so constrained and may 
allow payment over a longer period, even up to three years. These 
sheriffs are in a minority and tend to be those who argue for the 
disciplinary "benefits" of instalments. 
There is another general worry sheriffs have about instalments. 
This concerns the persistent offender who collects fines on a regular 
basis. The use of long periods of repayment is said to create a 
situation whereby fines tend to run into each other. Some offenders 
end up paying many fines over long periods, or more realistically, are 
incarcerated for default. For the majority of sheriffs this justified 
the maximum instalment period of one year; as one commented, 
"There has to be an end, not least because there 
is a problem with fines running into each other 
because offenders go on accumulating fines." 
(Sh.9) 
The general worries sheriffs express about instalments are 
reflected also in the process by which they actually set the rate of 
repayment. It is here that the tension between offence related and 
income related criteria reappears. The problem sheriffs face is to 
set a rate of repayment which is realistically related to income 
without this either "softening" or increasing the punitive nature of 
the fine. They manipulate the situation in a variety of ways. 
Sheriffs may set a relatively "low" fine but impose quite severe 
conditions on instalment payments. In doing this they can adjust the 
fine to income, yet still make it "hurt" the offender. Each 
instalment is set so as to maximise its impact on the offender, but as 
the overall fine is relatively low, there is little chan~e that 
default will occur. If it should arise, the instalments can be eased. 
Sheriffs who manipulate in this way, tend to believe that the "real" 
punitive effect of fines lies in the weekly instalment rather than the 
aggregate amount. For example, "the use of instalments can increase 
the magnitude of the fine" (Sh.3), and "the instalment should hurt, 
especially if the offence is serious" (Sh.7). 
Typically these sheriffs are keen to see that fines are paid 
sooner rather than later. They tend thus to set both high instalments 
and limited time to pay. The one year maximum is never exceeded and 
is really only used for those who default. 
By setting a relatively low fine but imposing strict conditions 
on repayment these sheriffs see themselves as combining of fence 
related and income related criteria. The low fine reflects income, 
and the limited repayment period and high instalments reflect offence 
criteria. This allows them to stress the punitive nature of the fine. 
Also the financial discipline imposed on the offender, if he meets its 
conditions, is seen to reassert the voluntary element sheriffs see as 
important in fining. This combination of variables is seen to force 
offenders to recognise their obligations by paying a proper price for 
the harm they have done. 
Other sheriffs pursue these same broad ends by reversing the 
order. They set a high initial fine and then adjust it to income via 
instalments. One sheriff explained it this way, 
"The aggregate amount of the fine must have some 
dramatic impact because weekly instalment must be 
affordable and, therefore, reasonably easy to pay 
off." (Sh.6) 
They see this as marrying both sets of criteria. The size of the 
fine reflects offence criteria, while instalments reflect income 
criteria. These sheriffs are more likely also to extend the period of 
repayment and to welcome the disciplinary effects of instalments. 
This leads them also into approving, as their other colleagues tend 
not to, the introduction of fine enforcement officers. For example, 
"fine enforcement offices are approved because they remind, irritate 
and bother offenders" (Sh.13). 
There is another aspect to setting instalments which is of 
considerable sociolgoical importance. Both sets of sheriffs, but 
especially the second, engage in a form of negotiation with offenders 
in the court over the size of the instalment. If income is relevant 
to the instalment then some information about means must be gained. 
Sheriffs gain it by asking the offender on the spot. This is followed 
by a short negotiation between the sheriff and the of fender over the 
actual size of the instalment. 
The negotiation takes two forms. In one, the sheriff ascertains 
weekly means and then sets both a time limit for repayment and the 
size of the instalment. The offender responds by saying he cannot 
afford the instalment and the time period for repayment is too short. 
The sheriff may in turn respond by asking the offender how much can be 
afforded. The offender replies and then the sheriff may lower the 
instalment, or extend the time period. In the other, the reverse 
happens. The sheriff asks the offender how much can be afforded and 
the offender responds - for example £2 per week. The sheriff then if 
it is thought the offender can afford more, sets the instalment at, 
say, £3 or £4 per week. 
Sheriffs, if they entertain this at all, seem predisposed to 
lower instalments more readily in statutory offences and for the young 
or the "feckless" offender. If the offender is employed and has few 
or limited commitments, then the negotiation probably will not take 
place at all. For this latter group of offenders, adjustments are 
more likely to be made only if default occurs. 
This negotiation is extremely one-sided. Sheriffs are not 
obliged to listen at all. However, when it does occur, and it is 
quite common, then it is of considerable interest. It differentiates 
the fine from other sanctions. One cannot imagine such negotiations 
taking place over a sentence of imprisonment. A sentence of 
imprisonment has an all or nothing quality about it. Offenders cannot 
say that they cannot "afford" to go to prison for six months but would 
prefer three. 
This process of negotiation is unique to the fine. Again, it is 
an example of the extreme flexibility of the fine as a sanction. 
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Also, it is quite consistent with the original meaning of the term. 
It will be remembered that historically the meaning of the term "to 
fine" did not imply a fixed punishment. Rather, one "made fine" with 
the court or the king. The fine thus represented a negotiated 
agreement terminating a dispute. That these negotiations still take 
place, albeit in a much more restricted way, is evidence of the 
continued existence or the fine as "a bi-lateral agreement" (Pollock 
and Maitland, 1898). 
The Fine and Compensation 
The introduction of the compensation order into sentencing has 
attracted some opposition. This can be seen in several sorts of 
objections. The first asserts that sheriffs ought not to get involved 
in judging between the competing claims of victim and offender because 
this is seen to contradict one of the basic functions of the criminal 
law. It introduces "civil" elements into the criminal justice system. 
As one put it, "there is a general reluctance to graft a civil action 
for damages onto a criminal trial" (Sh.11). The second objection 
highlights practical problems. Assessing damages between offenders 
and victims involves the issues of contributory negligence and 
insurance. These are complex and time consuming questions that 
sheriffs fear will delay the business of the court. One sheriff for 
example was" ... reluctant to use compensation orders too freely 
because of the complexities of calculation and the time involved" 
(Sh.6). Another regarded it" ... as a complication •... Is it 
applicable? What is the appropriate figure? Is it commensurate with 
an appropriate fine? What part of the penalty should be given to 
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compensate the victim?" (Sh.10). Again, there was little agreement 
over what sort of situation is suitable for compensation. Some 
sheriffs viewed compensation as eminently suitable for offences 
involving property, while others see this as entirely inappropriate. 
While in property offences there is something which can be measured 
and compensation ordered acordingly, the goods may well be covered by 
insurance. If this is so, sheriffs were worried lest it be the case 
that the victim should benefit twice over. Some sheriffs suggested 
that one way to solve this was to make compensation orders to the 
insurance company as well as the victim. There was little agreement 
over whether such orders should apply to personal injury, chiefly 
because of the difficulty of fixing upon an appropriate figure. 
Moreover, some sheriffs argued that the figures ought to be secondary 
to the atonement or humility that is induced by offenders knowing 
their victims. 
"Compensation is valuable to the victim and the 
offender. The latter benefits from 'atonement' 
and realises the consequencs of his anti-social 
behaviour." (Sh.10) 
"The fact of compensation is much more important 
that the amount involved which, although a token, 
is not derisory." (Sh.11) 
"Compensation is more relevant where there is a 
pre-existing personal relationship between the 
of fender and the victim, especially where personal 
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injury is involved." (Sh.6) 
Sheriffs raised a further related question about the nature of 
the compensation order. Is it, as many sheriffs argued, the fine paid 
to the victim or is it a completely different sort of sanction? Is it 
" ... different from the fine because of the involvement of the 
victim?" (sh.8). Sheriffs did not state conclusive positions on this 
question. 
The compensation order was seen by many sheriffs to be an 
unnecessary complication. It clouds the issue, precisely because the 
boundaries between it and the fine are unclear. Involving the victim 
in the system was seen to have some advantages, but these appear to be 
outweighed in the minds of the sheriffs by the disadvantages ensuing 
from its ambiguity. 
Default 
We have discussed the relationship between the fine and 
imprisonment and the way in which different sheriffs regarded them. 
There.is one stage in the "fine process", however, at which the two are 
naturally joined. This concerns the problem of default and the use of 
prison as a sanction for it. So far as the sheriffs are concerned, 
prison is a "compulsitor" of the fine, a "final solution" (Sh.4). It 
is seen as a necessary back up to the effective use and collection of 
fines. Most sheriffs argue that the "prison is necessary". Sheriffs 
may administer the default process differently, but there is consensus 
over the value of prison. A rather two edged cry by one sheriff 
illustrates this well: 
"Fine defaulters only go to prison because there 
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is no alternative." (Sh.7) 
More pointedly, 
"There is no alternative to prison as a last 
resort." (Sh.9) 
Although one sheriff sees it rather differently: 
"The fine may well shade into imprisonment upon 
default, but this is unnecessary. Default is a 
result of the offender's deceit or the sheriff's 
miscalculation." (Sh.3) 
The threat of imprisonment is seen to make offenders generate 
resources which otherwise they would claim they do not have; the 
threat of imprisonment makes the offender pay. It is true that 
"community service" would be welcomed by some sheriffs, but only in 
the sense of introducing an alternative with prison still as the 
ultimate sanction. The use of community service in this way is seen 
as justified, first of all, on the grounds that it represents payment 
though time or labour rather than money and, second, because it is 
used as an alternative to imprisonment, but its use for default is not 
welcomed. 
"Community service does not provide an equivalent 
alternative to a monetary fine because valuable 
services are skilled services, otherwise they are 
of no use." (Sh.5) 
As always, there are different opinions, one which points out 
that the logic of imposing a fine is that it should be paid. 
Therefore, anything which achieves this should be encouraged. 
"There must be other ways of enforcing the fine 
than imprisonment, for example, a graduation of 
penalties ... the link between the fine and 
imprisonment is completely unnatural." (Sh.12) 
This view i.S off set by those - and this represents the most 
common view - who believe that fine default is a matter of 
unwillingness rather than inability to pay. One sheriff even 
distinguished between "the wicked, on the one hand, and the feckless 
and women, on the other. The latter should not be imprisoned unless 
absolutely necessary" (Sh.3). 
For most sheriffs there is a necessary unbreakable relationship 
between the fine, default and imprisonment. As one sheriff put it, 
"There is a sanctity in the relationship between 
prison and the fine." (Sh.11) 
There is another aspect of the default procedure which sheriffs 
see as important. Although sheriffs said they found means enquiry 
courts "distasteful" they were adamant that they should retain control 
over the process. The issue this raises for them is the scope of 
their discretionary power. Any attempt to take away their control of 
this process was seen to be a major intrusion. By controlling default 
procedure, sheriffs maximise their discretionary powers over the whole 
of the fining process. Default is another chance to adjust the fine. 
Control over it allows them a further opportunity to create a balance 
between offence related and income related criteria; another chance to 
marry substantive and formal legal rules. 
Sheriffs were reluctant to lower the size of the fine in the 
means enquiry court. They prefer to work on instalments by lowering 
them or increasing the period of repayment or both. Furthermore, this 
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wish to retain control over the default procedure, colours sheriffs' 
views on the advantages of fine reinforcement officers. If their 
introduction results in a challenge to their powers, then sheriffs 
would prefer not to see them at all. Fine enforcement officers were a 
move "to social worker control". The main benefit of the officers 
would be to supply better information on means. THis would allow the 
fine to be more realistically adjusted and would enable the sheriff to 
better "rationalise" decisions already made (Sh.4). 
Discussion and analysis 
In this last section, I propose to draw out the implications of 
the arguments developed over these last two chapters and to integrate 
them with the broader themes of the inquiry. The discussion is 
organised under two heads; first, punishment, justice and money; 
second, rationality and the normative practice of sentencing. 
Punishment, justice and money 
The analysis of the sheriff interviews provides abundant evidence 
in support of a claim made earlier - that the primary end sought after 
by sheriffs in sentencing is the achievement of justice through the 
use of punishments. This may seem an obvious or even idle comment to 
make, but it has great import. It shows that sheriffs perceive 
sentencing to be above all else a moral issue. While they have to 
come to terms with the formal legal requirements of their office and 
of the sanctions they impose, they seek after a wider, substantive 
end, justice. For them a "just" system is one which endeavours to 
balance the illegal wrongs done by criminals by an equivalent but 
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legitimate wrong inflicted on the guilty party. Justice and 
punishment are closely connected; the one is the end to the 
achievement of the other. 
The place of the fine in this is central. It is the sanction 
they regard as most easily justifiable in most circumstances in terms 
of their classical views of the nature of punishment and also the one 
most flexible and administratively useful. Partly because of the type 
of of fender and of fence that appears before them, partly because of 
the constraints placed on them by convention and statute, other 
sanctions lack conceptual and ideological purity. They are 
"contaminated" by values (such as treatment) which compromise their 
use with the result that they cannot carry the message of punishment 
the sheriffs wish most to convey. Using the fine on the other hand 
can carry this message. It allows them to achieve their desired ends 
with integrity, and coherence. 
The fine is the most used sanction because it exists at that 
point at which ideology converges with administration. Sheriffs 
approach sentencing in the normal way described, but at the same time 
their actions are limited and constrained. They are charged with a 
dual mandate; achieve justice but do so in the most expedient fashion 
possible. In the vast majority of cases they deal with, the fine is 
the only sanction it is practically possible to use. The great bulk 
of their criminal work is to do with the trivial and the routine and 
to use any sanction other than the fine is either ruled out by statute 
or existing practice. In the more serious, but still relatively minor 
crimes they have a discretion to use other sanctions, but to do so can 
be both troublesome, as it prolongs the process and so slows down the 
system, and also brings them into contact with a set of values about 
which, at best, they are ambivalent. The use of the fine in such 
circumstances meshes the moral message with ·the administrative 
reality. Punishment is achieved but at some cost. 
One of the costs the sheriffs recognise is that the use of the 
fine results in a penal system which in many ways is not as punitive 
as they would like. They perceive the fine as a punishment, but a 
"light" one. If the use of imprisonment did not give rise to the 
administrative and conceptual complications that it is seen to, then 
one was left with the impression, in many circumstances, that it would 
have been preferred. Conceiving of the fine as a punishment is not 
inconsistent with a perception of the prison as a more serious one. 
Their "argument" is not with the scale of values by which seriousness 
is measured, but with the constraints placed on their actions by the 
factors we have mentioned. If these factors were to be removed - for 
example, if the sheriffs were High Court judges dealing with serious 
crimes - then I was left with little doubt that they would use the 
prison. However, they are not in that position and their views on 
what it is practically possible to do alter accordingly. That this 
results in a penal system less punitive than one they would ideally 
like is a "cost" they have to bear. 
There is another cost arising from the use of the fine with which 
they have to live. This is the potentially corrosive effect the fine 
can have on achieving equality in punishment. As we obs{yed, the need 
to take into account the means of the offender in setting the level of 
the fine causes a dramatic shift in favour of offender-related 
criteria at the expense of offence-related ones. This is a problem 
for the sheriffs because, as was explained, their basic inclination is 
to set the level of the fine by offence-related criteria - the 
seriousness of the offence should in principle determine the 
seriousness of the punishment. They hold to this because of their 
underlying retributivism which aims to achieve a proportionality or 
balance between the offender's ill-gotten gains and the victim's 
undeserved losses. However, the statutory requirement to take into 
account offenders' income considerably blunts the realisation of this 
type of proportionality in order to achieve a second type of 
proportionality, that is the degree of pain caused by the deprivation 
of a conunodity like money. Proportionality can thus pull in two 
directions: one towards the achievement of formal equality related to 
seriousness of crme and the other related to the income 
characteristics of the offender. In our analysis of the interviews we 
showed how sheriffs manipulate time to pay and instalment patterns in 
order to relax the tension that can arise from the desire to achieve 
the former and the requirement to achieve the latter. 
This is a real conflict for the sheriffs even if we adopt a 
somewhat less onerous view of what statute actually requires 
sentencers to do. It could be argued, for example as does Black 
(1987), that statute only requires sentencers to have regard to the 
ability of the offenders to pay the fine, rather than requiring them 
to achieve equivalence of impact in the more fundamental sense we have 
described. The difference between the two is that, according to the 
first notion sentencers are not called upon to contemplate the justice 
of their decisions in the broader sense the notion of equality of 
impact suggests, but more narrowly only in terms of the administrative 
problems that can arise if default occurs and this can be seen to be 
connected with an unrealistically large initial fine. However, even 
if it is the ability to pay that is sought after rather than 
equivalence of impact, the same corrosive potential exists. 
Adjustment to ability to pay holds the same dangers. Moreover, the 
two are connected. One of the reasons why it is seen as reasonable to 
adjust the fine to the offender's ability to pay is precisely because 
it is seen as iniquitous that the mere possession of money should 
result in the rich suffering less than the poor. In reality, as we 
showed earlier, little is done to increase fines in proportion to 
income, but to suggest that the modern penal system disregards the 
notion of equivalence of impact altogether, is surely to overstate the 
case. 
However one interprets the burden this requirement to take into 
account income places upon the sentencer, the tension between the two 
directions in which proportionality pulls is ever present. As such it 
marks one of the most dramatic effects of money on the penal system. 
One very concrete way this requirement affects the making of 
decisions can be seen in the relationship that exists between the 
economic resources of the offender and the "going rate" of fines. 
There is a relationship betw~ the income of the "typical" offender 
who appears before the court and the constraints this places upon the 
decision-making of the sheriff. In order to both minimise the 
possibility of default and for the broader reasons described above, 
the sheriff will adjust the fine to income. But the only income many 
of the of fenders who appear before the court have will be social 
security payments of one type or another. Sheriffs were aware that 
any fine imposed on such individuals is a major commitment, not only 
to the individuals concerned but, if they are married, to their 
families as well. Social security payments are so designed as to 
leave little disposable income. How do sheriffs act in these 
circumstances? As was pointed out earlier, sheriffs are more likely 
to lower fines than raise them, but they see there to be reasons of 
justice which put limits on the degree to which they can do this. 
Offender-related criteria cannot be ignored not least because the 
"going rate" is set t:;y.· consideration of them. Nevertheless they must 
and do adjust fines downwards in recognition of the fact that the 
individual is on social security. The end product of this process is 
that over a period, the going rate of fines is dragged down. The 
level of social security payments becomes reflected in the going rate; 
it has a generally depressing effect. 
There are a number of factors which influence this, some of which 
sheriffs can control, others they cannot. As the number of unemployed 
increases the more sheriffs have to deal with individuals on social 
security - as one sheriff put it "how can you run a system which 
depends on money when there is less money around?" There is less 
likely to be any significant adjustment for income in the case of 
motoring offences. The existence of the tacitly recognised "tariff" -
for example so much for every five miles the speed limit is exceeded 
works against major adjustments to income. And sheriffs are only 
likely to deal with fixed penalties if for some reason the offender is 
challenging the decision of the procurator fiscal or the court. 
Hence, the depressing effect of social security payments on the going 
rate of fines is most likely to be found in the middle range group of 
common law crimes. 
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This relationship betw~n the going rate of fines and social 
security payments is a good example of how the sense of justice after 
which sheriffs seek is compromised by money. But it only has this 
effect because of the existence of a formal legal rule which instructs 
sheriffs to take monetary consideration into account. At this point 
the two sorts of rules we have considered come into conflict with one 
another. There is an acute tension between them. 
Although, as has been said, it is in the middling serious common 
law crimes that the influence of social security payments on the going 
rate is most felt, there is a broader knock-on effect. The going rate 
acts as a common denominator no matter what the income of the off ender 
is. Thus even if the guilty offender is employed and "comfortably 
off", the fine would be lower than the sheriff may think is warranted 
if the sentence were to depend just on offence-related criteria. 
Consistency of results in sentencing decisons is a factor in the 
sheriff's idea of justice. 
The reaction of a sheriff in these circumstances is to try and 
increase the punitiveness of the fine by offering a limited time to 
pay and demanding larger instalments. They manipulate the facilities 
of time to pay and instalment payments in order to better realise 
their sense of justice. 
There is another more general dimension to the effect money has 
upon the mechanisms of decision-making which also has implications for 
the achievement of justice as it is understood by sheriffs. This 
centres on the relationships between the nature of the "commodity" the 
deprivation of which constitutes the punishment and the notion of 
formal equality which, as we have seen, forms an important part of the 
sheriff's notion of justice. My point is that because the fine is 
paid in money it introduces an element into decision-making that 
threatens to put in question the degree to which formal equality of 
sentence between offenders can be achieved. To explain this I shall 
contrast what I call the "original position" of a sentencer when 
passing a sentence of imprisonment as compared to the "original 
position" when passing a sentence of fine. 
As was argued in chapter 2, an individual's right to liberty is 
seen, in modern, liberal democratic societies to be near an absolute 
as anything can be, subject only to certain important, bu~ minimal, 
tests such as mental competence. This has a direct bearing on the 
process of sentencing somebody to imprisonment. The sentencer can 
presume each individual is in a formally equal position as each, as it 
were, "possession" the same "quantum" of freedom. The original 
position thus is one of formal equality of all subjects. Because of 
the way we regard liberty the sentencer is acting reasonably in making 
this assumption. Of course, at some later stage, the sentencer may 
wish to vary the sentences of imprisonments as between two 
individuals, but this decision will be made on factors that are 
secondary and extrinsic to the primary original position. For 
example, the sentencer may regard one individual to be more culpable 
than another, or there may be specific factors connected with an 
individual that allow the sentence to be individuated. Hence, 
although the final product of the decision-making process - the 
sentence - may vary between two individuals (we presume they have 
committed the same crime) it began with a presumption of formal 
equality. 
The original position in sentences to the fine is very different. 
A sentencer who presumed any two individuals are in a formal equal 
position as regards that commodity - money - they are about to be 
deprived of would be considered to be acting unreasonably. It is 
acknowledged that money is a commodity each of us "possesses" to a 
varying degree. This, presumably, is one reason why sentencers are 
instructed to take into account offenders' means when levying the 
fine. The original position is thus the reverse of that which can be 
presumed in the use of imprisonment. It is one in which the only way 
of treating individuals equivalently is to presume they are in an 
unequal position as regards that the loss of which will be the 
punishment. 
None of this should be seen as saying that the idea of formal 
equality as a component of justice is absent from the process of 
fining. The exercise of sentencing is carried out with a framework in 
which formal equality is a major consideration. What the above shows 
is, first, that different sanctions have a different relationship to 
the achievement of justice and, second, that money acts as an 
"independent" factor that has a potential to corrode. 
There is an irony here. As we have shown, sheriffs regard the 
fine as the sanction, relative to other available ones, which most 
clearly and easily carries the message of punishment. They see it as 
the only true punishment they have left. This is related to their 
general perception of the purpose of the criminal justice system as 
achieving justice through the use of punishments. However, this 
sanction has an inherent potential to corrode the very purposes after 
which they seek. It drags down the going-rate in the way described; 
it requires them to reason from a position which collides with their 
overall general aims. As a result, "punishment, justice and money" 
can be seen to pull in different directions; to exist in a state of 
permanent tension. 
Rationality and the Normative Practice of Sentencing 
The perception of the fine as a punishment is crucial to its 
place in the penal system. Although, as we have seen, the fine, 
because it is paid in money and because of the formal legal rule that 
directs sentencers to adjust fines to the means of offenders, creates 
tensions that sheriffs endeavour to resolve, it nevertheless functions 
to maintain a broader harmony between the various levels at which the 
system operates. A4£the system's broadest of levels, there exists a 
deep, culturally rooted estrangement of money from punishment. Money 
does not fulfil cultural expectation of what punishment is like. This 
is why in certain symbolically significant crimes there is a 
resistance to using fines or any other monetary sanction. On these 
occasions the prison is used because it meets our expectation of what 
punishment should be symbolically. Yet beneath this, the system uses 
the fine - it relies upon it to deal with the vast majority of cases 
that pass through it. 
We have endeavoured to show in our analysis of the normative 
practice of sentencing how the potential conflict between these levels 
or strata is kept in bounds by the perception of the fine as a 
punishment. In a sense, the fine is always "second best" in this 
regard. It is only relative to the practical constraints sheriffs 
face in using the prison that the fine emerges to be perceived in the 
way it is. Hence, there is always a possibility that the.harmony of 
the system can be disturbed and unsettled. Changes in public policy 
towards certain crimes and offences can call forth adjustments. This, 
however, happens rarely. Moreover, much of the daily work of the 
criminal justice and penal systems is anyway largely invisible to the 
public gaze. Citizen~ rarely have a detailed knowledge of the mundane 
workings of the system. Rather, their "knowledge" of crime and 
punishment rests on these dramatic incidents reported by the media. 
The "routine pricing of inju..r·y" that the fine represents goes on 
unnoticed and unreported. It is neither dramatic, nor sensational. 
It is only on rare occasions, such as when fines are used for rape or 
other serious crimes, and this becomes known, tha$ any potential for 
disturbance is created. However, for those working within the system, 
particularly the sheriffs, there exists a continual task of 
legitimation. Their integrity as legal actors is maintained by them 
viewing the fine as a punishment, second best though it might be. 
From a different point of view, the normative practice of 
sentencing is a good example of the complex relationship between 
different expressions of rationality. As was said in the introduction 
to this chapter, the distinction between forms of rationality is never 
clear cut and simple. Formal and substantive rationality shade into 
one another. The precise social context is always important. Crime 
and punishment always involve substantive reasoning; they are never 
neutral concepts but signify deeply held values central to the very 
possibility of social life. But in Weberian terms, modern society is 
characterised by the progressive spread of disenchantment. The values 
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we hold most deeply are under constant threat by the growth of 
emotionless forms of reasoning and institutional organisation. The 
spiritual and the emotional can be transmuted into the routine. At 
first sight the widespread use of the fine seems to indicate that this 
is what has happened in the spheres of crime and punishment. But as 
we have endeavoured to show in these last two chapters such an 
analysis is too simple and too plain. The fine exists at that point 
where the substantive and the formal touch one another. It apeals to 
both forms of rationality and this can be seen in the reasoning of the 
sheriffs we have studied. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Default and Discipline 
In this chapter we wish to examine the problem posed to the 
Scottish penal system by those who default on the payment of their 
fines. In Scotland this has been, and still is, a matter of pressing 
practical significance. As is well known, a high proportion of the 
prison reception population in Scotland ii composed of fine 
defaulters; currently this figure runs at approximately 45% (1984) of 
the reception population and has been steadily growing in the last 
four decades (approximately, 35% in 1960; 39% in 1970; and 45% in 
1984). In comparison to other countries this is an extremely high 
percentage; in England and Wales the corresponding figure has been 
below 10% for a considerable period (but is growing) and in the case 
of Sweden, for example, imprisonment for default is a rare occurrence 
indeed. Although we need to keep the problem in perspective - 95% of 
those who are fined in Scotland pay - it cannot be denied that 
Scotland has a uniquely severe problem with default. Why is this? 
Why in Scotland does it appear that so many of those who are sent to 
prison are there, not directly for the crime they committed, but 
indirectly because they have not paid a sum of money? 
This is a controversial issue. Politically, it shows Scotland in 
a bad light and has laid successive governments open to criticism. 
For example, the often quoted statistic which describes Scotland as 
having the highest use of imprisonment in Europe per 100,000 of the 
population is closely connected with default (Council of Europe 1985). 
We use the prison so much beCQJ&se we send fine defaulters to jail so 
often. For the administrator it must constitute an endemic worry. 
How can the criminal justice system be run rationally, when there 
appears to be what must be regarded as an irrationality at its very 
core? Yet again, for the judiciary it faces them with business which, 
as we showed in Chapter 4, they consider not to be essentially 
judicial at all; the court is turned for part of the time into a debt 
collection agency, this having little to do with the prosecution of 
crime. And for the offender who for whatever reason does not pay, 
the prospect of being imprisoned for reasons other than the crime or 
offence conunitted appears, as we shall show, an absurdity. To 
paraphrase one particularly eloquent defaulter (who was interviewed), 
"what sort of value for money is this?" 
Like many controversial issues there is a high degree of 
uncertainty prevalent in discussions of it. Is the default problem 
due to a lack of political will to promote legislation making 
imprisonment for default more difficult? Are the Scots less 
responsible, in the sense that they do not recognise the obligation to 
put right wrongs they have committed? Or, are we faced in Scotland 
with a particularly draconian judiciary who too readily use the 
prison? And, what practical measures are there available to solve the 
problem? 
In what follows, we shall endeavour to bring greater clarity into 
the discussion by trying to identify more closely what sort of issue 
default is. We will do this first by sorting out conceptually where 
the problem lies and then, secondly, by putting the default problem in 
an historical and social context. Finally, we will discuss what sort 
of solution is most likely to be effective. 
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Who says default is a problem? 
The reason why default is considered a problem in Scotland is 
that so many defaulters are imprisoned, not because a large proportion 
of those who are fined do not pay. If this is kept firmly in mind, it 
does alter what sort of problem default is seen to be. First, as has 
already been pointed out, 95% (approximately) of those fined pay 
without there having to be recourse to enforcement procedure. This 
does not necessarily mean that the fine is an "effective" sanction, 
but that the default problem is one of limited scope. If we pose the 
problem in the following way, that only 5% of those fined do not pay, 
rather than there are great numbers of recalcitrant offenders who need 
to be imprisoned, then the problem is kept in proportion. Could it 
not be argued, for example, that a 5% failure rate is acceptable in 
that it shows the fine is "working well"? If, for instance, we were 
to perceive the fine as simply a way of collecting money rather than 
as a legally imposed punishment, a 95% success rate would be seen as 
an achievement. Credit companies would most probably find such a high 
percentage of voluntary payment more than satisfactory (see B. Doig, 
C.R.U., 1981, p.44). 
If default is viewed in this light, it can be seen that there 
exists no essential problem with the process of fining itself. 
Rather, the issue of default ought to be kept separate and in 
perspective. 
There do, however, remain several issues. First, of those who do 
default, is this because of an unwillingness or an inability to pay? 
Second, and this is, it is contended, the more important question, why 
are defaulters imprisoned in Scotland rather than being dealt with in 
some other way? 
Much time has been devoted to answering the first of these 
questions. From surveys done, it appears that the defaulter is liable 
(a) to be unemployed and receiving benefits, (b) to be younger rather 
than older, and (c) is more likely to have committed a drink related 
offence than a serious crime. The relationship of these 
characteristics to default, however, is complex. One cannot conclude 
that defaulting is causally related to any one of them; rather, they 
describe a general profile of interacting circumstances. For example, 
from interviewJ conducted with a group of imprisoned defaulters, it 
appears that some simply regard a fine as a part of living life on 
"the dole". They are unwilling to pay because they see the money 
received from benefits as being too low to enable them to pay. 
Others, for example, make different types of rational calculations. 
If they had a family and were on benefit, then it was seen as being 
preferable not to pay fines rather than lower further their families 
standard of living. Prison becomes a preferred option. Others paid 
for a time - for example, if Christmas was near - but thereafter chose 
not to pay. Others simply saw fines, as one put it, as "deferred 
prison sentences" and so could see no reason to try and meet the 
obligation at all. 
Two general conclusions were apparent. First, if the fine was 
above £50, then the type of calculations offenders make changes. £50 
was seen as affordable, if difficult to meet, over £50 was seen as 
being too large to try and pay. This may seem to the outsider a 
relatively small sum of money which any "rational" person would pay 
rather than risk the stigma of imprisonment. However, this clearly 
was not the case; some offenders who default chose to go to prison; 
for them this is the rational option, both in terms of "cost-benefit" 
and more general evaluative criteria, such as it causing "less 
bother". Second, and following on, the prospect of imprisonment did 
not seem to work as a deterrent. The offenders were normally 
knowledgeable, in that they realised that default could result in 
imprisonment, but this did not appear to impinge greatly on their 
consciousness. For many, the discipline imposed by deprivation of 
liberty for a definite period was seen to be "less painful" than that 
which can follow from having to pay a large fine over a lengthy period 
of time. Long instalment periods were perceived as a pervasive 
interruption of life style. Prison, on the other hand, because it 
means a total change of circumstance and routine was seen as neither 
being as pervasive nor as "oppressive". 
It is against this background that the debate over unwillingness 
or inability to pay must be set. Clearly, for the interviewed 
offenders the two are not antithetical. Rather, inability and 
unwillingness shade into one another. The relationship between them 
is mediated by a perception of low income, not in the absolute sense 
of a complete lack of available money but more in the sense of 
offenders seeing their resources as putting them in a relatively 
deprived position. It is because they see their available resources 
as not allowing them to live on equivalent, not necessarily equal, 
terms with the better off that they see themselves as deprived, 
disadvantaged and therefore as unable and unwilling to pay the.sum 
owed in fine. For them, unwillingness and inability are connected 
with tacitly held ideas of a society characterised by relative 
inequality and lack of social justice. How can the relatively poor 
meet financial obligations that they perceive to be out of proportion 
to the style of life their limited means allows? These feelings were 
more pronounced amongst those on benefit - and as these constituted 
over 90% of the group interviewed - was one of the most notable 
features of the interviews. 
If the offenders themselves do not see inability and 
unwillingness as opposed, it makes little sense to approach the issue 
of default in a way which treats them as such. This does have 
ramifications for the attitudes expressed by some sheriffs. Some 
sheriffs treat unwillingness and inability as opposed to one another. 
As we illustrated in Chapter 4, some sheriffs see defaulting offenders 
as deliberately recalcitrant. The sheriffs view offenders as having 
enough resources to meet the fine. The two groups, sheriffs and 
offenders, thus come into both the fining and the default process with 
antithetical attitudes. What one group sees as reasonable, the other 
may see in a very different light. 
The position is made more complex when it is remembered that the 
fine is, as we have argued, a voluntary sanction. Save for the 
limiting cases of the court forcibly removing money from the offender 
or using civil diligence to compel payment, every fined offender is 
put into the position where there is a choice. This voluntary 
element is part of the conceptual and practical structure of the 
process of fining. Historically, as we have already argued, the 
voluntary element entered in in the original conception of "making 
fine", i.e., making a bargain with the court to settle harm done. 
Today, voluntariness remains as one of the principles upon which the 
fine works. Sheriffs see it as important both because it allows the 
offender to chose to recognise his obligations and it is perceived to 
underlie the instalment and enforcement procedures. It is also clear, 
but indirectly, in the sheriffs' conception of the fine as the only 
"true" punishment they have left. As we explained before, by this, 
sheriffs seem to mean that the fine is the only sanction available 
which they do not have to justify in terms of "rehabilitation" or 
other "social work" type criteria. At base, most sheriffs are 
retributivists and this is why the voluntary element inherent in 
fining appeals to them. It meshes with their conception of the 
individual as a rational agent, capable of responsible action and thus 
able to accept the punishment imposed. 
The voluntariness of the fine therefore complicates the default 
issue because it reinforces the sheriffs' perception of defaulters as 
recalcitrant. It is only if the offender can demonstrate specific 
material reasons for not paying that sheriffs will move away from 
their perceptions of defaulters as choosing not to pay. This does not 
mean that sheriffs readily jump at a chance to imprison a defaulter; 
rather, they are conceptually pushed in this direction. It is part of 
their conception of the inner morality of law and punishment. 
The two primary groups involved in the default process thus face 
one another with markedly different attitudes about what is 
"reasonable". On the one hand, for the offenders there appears to be 
no sharp distinction between unwillingness or inability; these simply 
do not describe the complexity of attitude and perception. On the 
other hand, for the sheriff, the offender is in court not simply for 
defaulting on a certain sum of money, but also because this amounts to 
an evasion of responsibility and of respect for the judicial process. 
We can now approach the second and more important question. Why 
is it that so many defaulters in Scotland are imprisoned? We claim 
this to be the more important question for two reasons. First, it 
appears to be the case, if the problem is measured by its effect on 
the prison reception population that the Scots judiciary do use the 
sanction of imprisonment for default proportionately more than do the 
judiciary in other jurisdictions. Following on from this and second, 
it ought to be clearly recognised that imprisonment is neither a 
necessary response to default nor, if we accept the evidence of the 
interviewed, imprisoned offenders, does it appear to be a deterrent. 
We have advanced evidence which goes some way to explaining why 
the Scots judiciary use imprisonment for defaulters. As was contended 
above, the relationship between the voluntary aspects of the fine and 
the apparent judicial preference for retribution pushes the judiciary 
in the direction of perceiving default as a serious matter which 
justifies using a serious penalty like imprisonment. Although this is 
relevant to an explanation of the use of imprisonment for default, it 
does not necessarily explain why in Scotland imprisonment is used 
proportionately more than in other countries for default. Although we 
have not undertaken a comparative review of judicial attitudes, there 
is indirect evidence to suggest the judiciary in other jurisdictions 
are also retributivist. For example, the general scheme of sentencing 
described by David Thomas in The Principles of Sentencing (1970), 
leads one to believe that at least appeal court judges in England are 
retributivists. The primary decision they are described by Thomas as 
making - setting the tariff - is normally based upon retributivist 
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principles; they see the tariff as reflecting the seriousness of the 
harm done. The punishment is calculated to redress the balance by 
causing an equivalent harm to the offender. Of course, as Thomas 
states, a secondary decision may be taken on other principles, such as 
criteria in mitigation or extenuation, and those may modify the 
primary decision, but such criteria only come into operation within 
the context set by a retributivist calculation. 
Retribution appears to be part of the general legal culture of 
professionally trained lawyers. For example, the attitudes expressed 
by FitzJames Stephens in the nineteenth century are, as we pointed 
out, a rather extreme version of retribution. Furthermore, Packer's 
important discussion in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) of 
Hart's definition of punishment is also good evidence for this 
argument. Packer contends that to Hart's five characteristics of 
punishment, there must be added a sixth - that the reason for causing 
pain to the offender be justified in retributivist terms. At issue 
here is not whether Packer is correct in wishing to so extend Hart's 
work. Rather, the point is that for Packer retribution was intimately 
tied in with prevailing western legal culture; he portrays it as part 
of the legal tradition and perceives himself as merely making explicit 
what was implicit in Hart's scheme anyway. Yet again, the re-
emergence in America of the just-deserts model can be seen as the most 
recent invocation of retributivist principles. The idea of just-
deserts, briefly, is that the only coherent justification for 
punishment is to inflict an equivalent degree of pain on the offender 
as was caused to the victim. Not only is this seen as a better 
explanation for the offender, but also has the added advantages, 
purportedly, of being fairer to the victim and of setting clear limits 
on the discretion of the judiciary and executive who run the criminal 
justice system. 
If this evidence is accepted then we can see the retributivist 
principles of the Scots judiciary as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of their propensity to use imprisonment for default. The 
judiciary in other jurisdictions is similarly oriented, yet do not 
seem proportionately to use imprisonment for defaulters to the same 
degree. Hence we must seek further for a fuller account of why in 
Scotland imprisonment is used. 
If the problem is examined historically, it can be seen that it 
is not a recent phenomenC1A1 In the early part of this century, 
observers of the Scots system were very aware of the serious nature of 
the default problem. For example, in 1902, the collllJ1entator to the 
judicial statistics argued, 
"This point has been dwelt upon at some length, 
because the non-payment of fines is for some 
reason an outstanding feature of Scottish Criminal 
Statistics when compared with those of other 
countries, and it may not have received that 
amount of attention which it, deserves." (p.11) 
The conunentator then proceeded to compare the Scottish situation with 
the Irish and concluded, first that fines "imposed in Scotland are 
much higher than in Ireland" (p.11) and that this was directly 
connected with the greater use of imprisonment in Scotland. Finally, 
the writer contended that if 
" ... prison expenditure (could) be reduced without 
any disadvantage to the moral well-being of the 
state, it is clear that a general improvement in 
administration of the law would be effected." 
(p.11) 
The same theme is related time and again in the conunentaries to the 
statistics. In 1906, a particularly heartfelt outburst was made. 
"It will be seen that those sentenced to 
imprisonment remain at the previous figure of 
nearly 11,000. It has often been pointed out that 
the sentences of simple imprisonment give no idea 
of the numbers received into prison, as they are 
increased five times their number by the addition 
of persons sentenced to pay a fine, but who fail 
to do so, and are on that account imprisoned in 
lieu." (p.10) 
The conunentator went on to quote an "American writer", who said, 
"There is something essentially unreasonable and 
absurd in the effort to collect a fine from men 
and women who have just spent their earnings in a 
drunken debauch. Such a demand on the morning 
after arrest is, in the case of many working 
people, a formal mockery; and the imprisonment 
which is yearly meted out to tens of thousands of 
poor people for failure to make such immediate 
payment is little less than imprisonment for debt 
under peculiarly exasperating circumstances." 
(p.10, Cmnd. 3829) 
These quotations show that the use of imprisonment for default is 
not a new problem but one that has bedevilled the Scots penal system 
for a considerable period. Also, it is interesting to note the degree 
of concern, even exasperation, expressed by the observers. It is rare 
for civil servants to make such bold, public statements which 
necessarily imply criticism of the judiciary. Indeed, on occasion, 
the criticism becomes explicit. Although part of the background to 
default was seen to be the prevalence of drink and drink related 
offences, the commentators also clearly "blamed" the judiciary. In 
1-. 
1914, it was argued, 
"From the Report of the Judicial Statistics of 
England it would appear that only 14 per cent of 
those sentenced to pay a fine go to prison and 
serve the full sentence in default. This appears 
to indicate that the fines imposed in Scotland 
are. as a rule excessive and out of proportion to 
the means of the persons fined. In the year 1912, 
£48,000 was paid by offenders as fines and 
forfeited pledges, with most of the offenders 
belonging to a class little able to afford such an 
expenditure. The commissioners continue to 
believe that were greater care taken to assess 
fines which would bring them within the reach of 
offenders, the number going to prison in default 
would be greatly reduced ... and the sentence 
which presumably was intended for one of fine 
would be more generally carried out." (p.10 Cmnd. 
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At the time these statements were made approximately 50% of those 
fined defaulted and were imprisoned. Of course, there has been a very 
great improvement on this and now, as we have established, about 95% 
pay their fines. However, what is clear from the above is that there 
appears to be a much more severe attitude in Scotland towards default 
than elsewhere. This "culture of severity" is embedded in the Scots 
system and forms the context within which the Scots judiciary operate. 
Further evidence for the existence of this culture of severity 
can be found in the differential development of legislation 
facilitating time to pay and instalment payments for fines as between 
England and Scotland. The Scots legislated for instalment payments 
before the English. The possibility of payment on instalments was 
introduced first in Scotland in the 1879 Swmnary Procedure (Scotland) 
Act, and time to pay, as a separate facility, was confirmed in the 
1881 Act. However, instalment payments were cancelled by the major 
1908 Swmnary Jurisdiction Act. Renton and Brown, in the first edition 
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of their bookt( conunent that the facility to pay on instalment "was not 
repeated" in 1908 because it was found "to be inconvenient". Rather, 
only time to pay was repeated in the Act and Renton and Brown continue 
their commentary by arguing that nothing precludes of fenders making 
private arrangements to borrow money to pay their fine. 
In England, legislation developed differently. Although the 
problem of imprisonment for default was not as serious as in Scotland, 
the 1914 Criminal Justice Act did introduce instalment payments. 
Parts of this Act applied to Scotland but the provision regarding 
instalments was expressly confined only to England. Thus in the case 
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of summary procedure, instalment payments for fines were not 
reintroduced into Scotland until 1938 and for cases taken on 
indictment not until 1948. 
These different patterns of development are important and 
interesting. Clearly, there existed a resistance to easing the way in 
which fines could be paid in Scotland. It is suggested that this is 
connected with the much more prominent role legally trained, 
professional judges occupy in the Scots system. The sheriff court is 
staffed by professional judges who are trained in and exposed to the 
full canopy of legal tradition and culture. This is not the case in 
England, where the magistrates' court is staffed by lay personnel. In 
a special sense, the Scots criminal justice system is more "legalist" 
than the English one. 
This structural difference underpins the culture of severity and 
has the consequences for the wider penal system that we have 
discussed. Because the culture of severity prevades the Scots 
system, offenders who default are much more likely to be imprisoned. 
Default is, as we have said, considered a serious matter in Scotland. 
Nevertheless, as compared to the early years of this century, there 
has been a marked improvement. Proportionately fewer people are now 
imprisoned for default than then were. But the issue remains a 
problem; indeed, there are grounds for predicting that the increase in 
the proportion of defaulters in the prison reception population will 
continue. 
We complete this section of the Chapter by reiterating the need 
to keep the problem of default in perspective. First, there appears 
to be in principle no weakness with the fining system itself. As we 
showed in Chapter 6, sheriffs do, albeit sometimes a little 
unwillingly, adjust fines, as they must, to the means of the offender. 
Second, a very small proportion of offenders who are fined default; as 
we pointed out earlier, if the fine is considered only as a means of 
collecting cash owed, then it is remarkably efficient. Third, "the 
problem of default" is not just the number who do not pay but the 
"disproportionate" use of imprisonment in enforcement. This is to be 
explained not by portraying the Scots judiciary in a draconian way. 
Rather, the culture of severity, as we call it, is part of what we 
previously described as the "normative practice of sentencing". As we 
argued in Chapters 5 and 6, this is a rule governed process; 
sentencers must follow the rules of the system if they are to be seen 
as legitimately fulfilling their role as "judges". The culture of 
severity could only be altered by intervening in this wider normative 
practice and as we shall argue this is a politically controversial 
thing to do. 
There is one final conunent to make. If it is accepted that the 
fine is voluntary then we ought to expect default to occur. It would 
only be by transforming the nature of the fining process into a 
directly coercive one that the possibility of default could be ruled 
out. However, to do this would be to change the very nature of 
monetary sanctions. It would not be an incremental, but a 
revolutionary change. This ought to warn us to keep the default 
problem in perspective. If people are given a choice then one must 
accept that some will always exercise it in a way found to be 
unacceptable. Default is seen as a problem, in part, because of the 
tendency to see punishment as coercive. But the clash b' atween our 
expectation of what punishment is and the principles upon which the 
most conunon sanction, the fine, works serves to show how complex the 
penal system is. As we argued in Chapter 1, the fine questions our 
conception of the nature of punishment; it raises ambiguities and 
questions that force us to think again about how we conceive of the 
penal system. 
Solutions 
Typically three different sorts of suggestions are made about how 
to improve upon the problem of default. The first is to find a better 
mechanism by which to adjust fines to offenders means. Secondly, 
attempts have hen made to improve the enforcement process - such as 
the introduction in Scotland of fine enforcement officers. Thirdly, 
it is often proposed that a day fine system such as operates in Sweden 
and other continental countries should be introduced into Scotland. 
What light does our analysis of default throw upon these? (In our 
discussion we shall not pay much attention to the second proposal both 
because this has been explored more than adequately elsewhere by Ann 
Millar (1985) and also because, for reasons that ought to be clear, we 
see it as less likely to have a marked effect on the system.) 
The third proposal, the introduction of a day fine system, is the 
most radical and comprehensive. It combines the first suggestion with 
the far more radical idea of introducing fetters upon the discretion 
of the judge. It fetters judicial discretion by separating the 
process of fining into two parts. First, in the day-fine a decision 
is made about the number of units of fine a particular offence 
warrants. In making this decision the judiciary exercise the full 
discretion allowed them by law. Second, ~ decision is made about the 
monetary value of each unit and this is calculated according to the 
means of the offender. Thus offenders X and Y, X being much richer 
than Y, could end up with the same number of units of day fine for the 
same offence but actually pay very diferent sums of money. Because Y 
has ten times less daily disposable income than X, then, within 
certain statutory minima and maxima, Y will pay ten times less than X 
in fine. This fetters judicial discretion somewhat because the 
calculation of money equivalence is made, normally, according to a 
formula which the judge cannot vary. The day fine thus divides the 
process into judicial and "executive" spheres. 
Great claims have been made for the efficacy of the day fine 
system and certainly in the case of Sweden, it seems to have made a 
major impact on imprisonment for default. However, one must be 
cautious in interpreting these claims. It appears that in Sweden no 
record of imprisonment is made if the offender spends less than five 
days in prison. If this were to be replicated in Scotland then, of 
course, it would create a considerably more satisfactory picture. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the day fine system into 
Scotland is seen by many as advantageous. By fine tuning the money 
paid in fines to the offenders' means it could well reduce 
dramatically the number of offenders who default. The use of a pre-
set formula that is easy to administer (as the day fine system appears 
to be) would control the judicial use of power in setting the actual 
monetary value of the fine but allow them to exercise their discretion 
over setting the the level of the fine. Thus offence related criteria 
could be satisfied but this not mean that disproportionately large 
fines be set. 
There are several traditional objections to the day fine. It has 
been argued that the day fine could not be introduced into Scotland 
because (a) we lack a codified system of criminal law, and (b) we do 
not possess the means necessary adequately to confirm offenders 
income. The second of these objections is the weaker. From 
interviewing members of the Swedish judiciary, it apears that they 
confirm offenders' income in the same way as do sheriffs. They ask 
offenders in Court what their income is, and unless there are reasons 
to disbelieve what is said, accept it as a fair account. It is true 
that in Sweden there exist central records of income upon which the 
court can draw, but it seems that resort to them is made only when 
there exists doubt over the veracity of the verbal statement of income 
provided by the offender. Certainly the impression given by the 
Swedish judges spoken to was that the on-the-spot confirmation of 
offenders' income is a perfectly reasonable way to proceed. Scots 
courts do not have the access to the computerised records of income 
the Swedish courts do, but it would be wrong to exaggerate the 
problems that flow from this. It is difficult to see why this should 
stand in the way of introducing a day fine system in Scotland. 
The first objection does have more substance to it but again its 
force tends to be overstated. The point of the objection is that the 
equality of impact sought after by the day fine can be compromised 
unless there exists clear criteria provided by a codified criminal law 
guiding the number of units of day fine to be awarded for particular 
crimes. For example, if judge A awards five units of day fine to 
offender C for a crime, but judge B awards ten to offender D, then 
even though each unit will be adjusted to the two offenders' income, 
offender D will end up paying more in total and so equality.of impact 
will be lost. There are two views on the problem that this creates. 
The first contends that the day fine system must work mechanically if 
it is to achieve its ends; judicial discretion must be limited at both 
stages of the decision-making process. The other view states the 
oposite; if this is how the day fine system works then it is 
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objectiona~precisely because it robs the judiciary of the discretion 
necessary to the operation of a sophisticated legal system. Either 
way, in as much as we do not have a codified system of criminal law, 
and, given that traditionally great discretion has been . 
constitutionally vested in the judiciary, the day fine system could 
not, it is argued, take root here. 
The system does not work in Sweden in an entirely rigid way. 
Judges do have the discretion to vary the number of day fines awarded 
for particular crimes as this is seen to be essential to achieving 
just and fair administration of the criminal law. Although equality 
of impact is seen as a desirable objective it has to be 
counterbalanced by other desirable ends such as the recognition of 
degrees of culpability and mitigating and extenuating circumstances. 
It is thus an exaggeration to portray the day fine as so rigid and 
inflexible as to place severe limits on judicial discretion. 
There exists a tendency, it is contended, to overstress the 
distinctiveness of the day fine. The way in which the fine operates 
in Scotland is not qualitatively different. For example, the 
statutory requirement to take into account offenders' income when 
assessing the level of the fine does push the Scots system some way 
down the same road. This statutory requirement is aimed at the same 
goal as the day fine - the achievement of equality of impact. Also, 
judicial discretion has been limited in Scotland. We have discussed 
the process of rationalisation that has taken place in the Scots 
criminal justice system. While this process has resulted in the 
professionalisation of the judiciary it has also placed limits on the 
"arbitrary power" once seen to be possessed by them. Indeed, one of 
the worries commonly expressed by the sheriffs we interviewed was that 
their discretion was continually being eroded by the civil servants in 
Edinburgh. For example, several sheriffs were very cautious about 
being interviewed as it was funded by the Scottish Home and Health 
Department. It was only when they learned I approached the matter as 
sociologists that they became convinced the project was relatively 
harmless. 
Although there exist differences between the way in which the 
fine operates in Scotland and the day fine system of Sweden, these are 
of degree not kind. The day fine thus is better understood as a 
"finely-tuned" example of a monetary sanction than as being completely 
different. Undoubtedly it does achieve greater equality of impact 
because of the limits placed upon the discretion of the judiciary in 
setting the actual amount of money fined. If this is seen as the 
desired objective - and, as Sheriff Black's recent paper demonstrates, 
(1987) there does not exist consensus on this - then the day fine is 
to be recommended. 
We should, however, be cautious in assessing its likely impact on 
the rate of imprisonment for default. The day fine may cut down the 
numbers of offenders who default, but it can have no direct effect on 
whether the judiciary send defaulters to prison. All the day fine 
does is closely to adjust the fine to income; it is not directly 
involved in dealing with default. Hence, the day fine could be 
introduced into Scotland and there still exist a relatively high rate 
of imprisonment for default. While the introduction of the day fine 
may affect the culture of severity by influencing the level at which 
fines are set, it would not influence it at the stage of default. The 
day fine is not an enforcement procedure; it was not designed as 
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sucli. 
How then are we to explain the low level of imprisonment for 
default in Sweden as compared to Scotland? Clearly, the day fine is 
involved but only to a limited extent. By better adjusting fines to 
income, it may well lessen the risk of default, but beyond this its 
influence cannot spread. Rather, in Sweden what appears to be of more 
relevance is the lack of an equivalent culture of severity; also 
Sweden is a much richer country. The Swedish judiciary do not seem to 
take as serious a view of default as do the Scots. It must be 
admitted we have only limited evidence directly to support this 
proposition. It was pointed out to the researcher, for example, that 
it is quite common to remit fines in Sweden; it was argued that the 
contact an offender has with the court both at the stage of 
prosecution and then at the stage of default is sometimes seen as a 
"punishment" enough. This was seen to be the case especially for 
first offenders. Also, the opinion was expressed that when the sum of 
money defaulted on is small, then it is simply neither financially nor 
administratively worthwhile to pursue the offender to the bitter end 
of imprisonment. When the situation in Scotland was described to 
them, the Swedish judiciary expressed surprise; to them it was clearly 
an irrational situation. "Why", one asked, "bother with small 
fines?" The Swedish judges could not see why their lenient attitude 
necessarily led to disrespect for the court or the criminal law. 
Indeed, it was forcibly contended that to pursue to the bitter end of 
imprisonment those who had defaulted on small fines was more liable to 
create disrespect bec~use it is absurd. 
It is emphasised that while this is "impressionistic" evidence it 
is nevertheless valuable in highlighting what appears to be the 
problem in Scotland. As we argued earlier, default is a problem not 
just because people do not pay their fines, but also because the Scots 
judiciary use imprisonment for default "disproportionately". It is 
the culture of severity that stands as much as an obstacle to further 
improvement as does any other factor. 
It is, of course, possible to attempt to change this culture. 
One way would be to set severe limits on the discretion of the 
judiciary by promoting legislation that laid down very restrictive 
conditions in which imprisonment for defaulters could be used. 
Indeed, this has already happened to some extent. The provision to 
give time to pay instalments, to take in offenders' means, as well as 
changes in the enforcement process over time, such as the creation of 
the means enquiry court, the requirement to place young offenders on a 
fine supervision order before imprisonment and so on, are all examples 
of previous legislative activity that has resulted in limits being 
placed on judicial discretion. Further legislation, however, may 
encounter problems. First, it would meet with, it is suggested, 
resistance from the judiciary. As we pointed out in Chapter 'and 
above, the judiciary already see there existing quite severe limits on 
the exercise of their powers. Such resistance by itself need not, of 
course, be final, but it would be a factor that could militate against 
successful legislation. Moreover, although fines and default are 
rarely seen as controversial political issues, attempts to legislate 
against the wishes of the judges very often are. As a collective, the 
judiciary are a powerful political group; indeed lawyers as a whole 
run one of the most powerful closed shops in Britain and possess many 
ways of influencing government (very often by becoming M.P.s). What 
any government would have to weigh is the advantages that could follow 
from dealing with the problem of default (such as no longer possessing 
the highest rate of imprisonment in Europe) against the disadvantages 
that could arise from possibly alienating the judiciary. 
There is a second broad factor which may limit the desire to do 
more to deal with default. Rusche and Kirchheimer (193f) argue that 
the state is slow to deal with default because to do so can change one 
of the advantages of the fine from the state's point of view. 
According to Rusche and Kirchheimer, one of the reasons why states 
generally favour monetary sanctions is that it relieves government of 
the responsibility to deal with the offender while undergoing 
punishment. As contrasted to the prison, the fine "privatises" 
punishment; once fined the government has no more to do with the 
offender unless default occurs. This offsets the fiscal cost of the 
penal system. However, if the state has to accept responsibility for 
the defaulter the financial advantages of fining are decreased. 
Hence, they argue, governments only endeavour to reform the system on 
those occasions either when political embarrassment becomes too great 
to bear or when the cost arising from imprisonment for default, in 
combination with the revenue lost through defaulted fines, becomes 
unacceptable financially. 
Rusche and Kirchheimer wrote before many of the more recent 
provisions dealing with default developed. However, the underlying 
point of their analysis merits further consideration. The argument 
that the fine saves money - in the sense of offsetting some of the 
costs of the criminal justice system - is one still made in support of 
the fine and other monetary penalties. Further, they are correct in 
suggesting that governments do place fiscal considerations to the fore 
(quite naturally perhaps) when deliberating over whether.to legislate 
on the penal system (the call for value for money). The more general 
thrust of their argument also still bears consideration but stands in 
need of some revision. 
It could be argued that the provisions allowing time to pay, 
instalment payments, together with the fairly strict procedures that 
must be gone through before imprisonment for default, all show the 
state is now much more concerned with the social position of the fined 
offender. In a sense this is true. Indeed, this development is 
clearest, not in measures designed to offset default, but in the 
statutory requirement to take into account the means of the off ender 
in assessing the level of the fine. All these provisions do seem to 
make awareness of the offender's social position an important element 
in decision-making and therefore mark the "concern" of the state with 
criminals. These observations do not necessarily constitute a major 
challenge to Rusche and Kirchheimer's thesis; what they do show is 
that it is in need of some reworking. 
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They do not constitute a major challenge because the provisions 
do not amount to a continuing and major involvement of the state with 
the day-to-day lives of those fined. Taking into account income, time 
to pay and instalments may make the fine reflect resources better and 
so ease payment, but do not operate in a way which necessitates 
constant supervision directly by the state or its agents. Offenders 
are "free" in the sense that there is no direct coercion by an agent 
who controls how offenders should organise their lives. 
However, from the point at which default occurs, the potential for 
supervision increases. The means inquiry court, the inquiry, albeit 
sometimes very limited, into why the offender has not paid, the 
possibility of supervision orders for the young offender and the 
possible involvement of a fines enforcement officer do denote a much 
greater involvement of the state. But the issue has to be kept in 
perspective. Rusche and Kirchheimer's general argument appears to 
hold good for the majority of those fined; the vast majority pay up 
without direct coercive supervision. For those who do not pay, as in 
any other form of debt, the situation changes and the degree of 
coercion heightens. However, even in these circumstances it is too 
easy to exaggerate the degree of coercion. The means inquiry court 
can imprison the offender immediately, but if the sheriff readjusts 
the fine then voluntariness re-enters. Similarly, neither the social 
worker who administers the supervision order, nor the enforcement 
officer who inquires into income can forcibly extract money from the 
offender. These agents report to the court and it is the court which 
coerces if it so wishes. 
Rusche and Kirchheimer's argument therefore does still apply. To 
be more precise one aspect of their thesis is relevant - that which 
describes the way in which the state is, or is not, directly involved 
in the fine. The other part of their argument concerning the reasons 
which lie behind non-involvement is, however, a different matter. As 
was explained, for Rusche and Kirchheimer the lack of state 
involvement is to be accounted for in fiscal terms; to set up an 
apparatus to administer the payment of fines would be too costly. 
This emphasis, on the fiscal motive, stems from Rusche and 
Kirchheimer's overall argument concerning the economic basis to penal 
measures and thus is to be expected. 
Its strengths and weaknesses as an explanation hinge upon whether 
one accepts the economic argument put forward. The argument is 
compelling in as much as it purports to offer clear "material" causes 
for social behaviour; reducing complex relationships to an underlying 
"economic" foundation, like a concern with the cheapness of the penal 
system, certainly has an admirable clarity. It also apears to accord 
with the Machiavellian motives popularly seen to be part of political 
behaviour, and anyway, there is a certain prima facie credibility in 
the idea that cost-effectiveness is a cause of political action. 
However, it is the very simplicity of the argument which is its 
limitation. Can complex political behaviour be reduced to a singular 
underlying cause? Is it possible to explain adequately the actions of 
government, including within this the civil service and bureaucracy, 
by one particular end - the marginal costs of institutions? To raise 
these questions is to bring into debate the charge of economic 
reductionism often made against Rusche and Kirchheimer (Melossi 1977, 
)~· 1979 and Garland and Young 1983 . This is not the place to enter in 
detail into the pros and cons of reductive arguments and the 
particular variant of it found in Rusche and Kirchheimer's thesis. 
And, at the end of the day, even if one was to conclude that Rusche 
and Kirchheimer's reductive thesis is inadequate, it would not mean 
one had to reject completely the empirical claims made. As we have 
said, there is every reason to suppose that at some point a concern 
with the fiscal costs of a particular penal sanction will affect what 
happens. 
Power, Voluntariness, Discipline and the Fine 
The issues raised by Rusche and Kirchheimer have a parallel in a 
more recent debate about the nature of the fine. In an important 
article, Bottoms (1983) has suggested that the fine is a non-
disciplinary sanction. The significance of this claim is best 
explained by placing Bottoms' argument in a context of the wider 
discussions and theories that characterise contemporary penology. 
In 1978, Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish was published, 
translated into English. In this important book, Foucault argued a 
complex case about the relationship between power and punishment in 
contemporary society. One of his most influential theses was that 
punishment, as a mode of power, can be understood as a type of 
discipline. By discipline, Foucault means the physical surveillance 
of of fenders by an agent in order to instil in them socially 
acceptable values through the regulation of their behaviour. The 
disciplines train offenders and "normalise" them. Thus, the general 
"functions" or purposes of the penal system are portrayed by Foucault 
as the regulation and control of the population so as to produce a 
compliant citizenry. 
This idea of the way penal sanctions work has been immensely 
influential. Discipline and Punish is typically regarded as a master 
work, which captures the essence of both how the penal system works 
and how it will develop in the future. Bottoms' article is a major 
empirical assessment of Foucault's thesis. The central point Bottoms 
makes is that if we examine the most common of all sanctions, the 
fine, then we find it does not operate in the way Foucault's 
description requires as the fine is non-disciplinary. By this he 
means that no penal agent is actively involved in the supervision, 
training or control of the offender. Rather, the fined offender is 
left to pay the sum owed. If this is so, Bottoms asks, how can the 
Foucauldian account of the penal system as disciplinary be acceptable 
as a general description? 
The contest between Foucault's account of the penal system and 
Bottoms' objection to it has an obvious relevance to the arguments 
developed here. First, Bottoms' description of the non-disciplinary 
nature of the fine is similar to our argument stressing its 
voluntariness. Second, the questions Bottoms raises about the 
validity of Foucault's scheme as a general account of penal practice 
blends with themes developed first in Chapter 1. Here we argued that 
a study of the fine brings into question the way in which the penal 
system has been conceived and explained. However, both these broad 
topics have yet to be fully discussed. We propose to take our 
arguments further by reviewing in greater depth the debate between 
Foucault and Bottoms. We begin by considering the issue of power and 
its relationship to discipline and voluntariness. 
Although Foucault emphasises the diffuse nature of power in 
modern society, he nevertheless perceives social relationships as 
dependent upon it. Relationships are expressions of power in both its 
positive (facilitative) and negative (inhibiting) forms. Power is 
like the Aristotelean "prime mover" or "cause" - it undercuts and 
creates what is possible. For Foucault, the penal system is an 
important modality of power, as it has the wider functions of being 
one of those mechanisms that organise and control the population. 
Bottoms' argument, which says in effect that power is not of the 
essence in the most common of all sanctions, the fine, thus can be 
seen to bite deeply into the Foucauldian scheme. 
To be fair both to Foucault and to Bottoms, the aim of the latter 
is not directly to assess the viability of the farmer's original work. 
Rather, his aim is to attack the work of those like Cohen (1979, 1985) 
and Mathiesen (1983) whom he sees as illegitimately extending 
Foucault. However, by implication, Bottoms does raise an issue for 
Foucault. The precise point seems to revolve around how Foucault 
conceives of the relationship between power and penal sanctions. What 
Bottoms brings into question is not so much Foucault's description of 
power in general, but how it is connected to penal practice. 
Foucault's general analysis of power could be seen as adequate, yet 
his description of its expression in penal sanctions be wrong or at 
least partial. If the focus is only upon the prison, then the 
portrait of the penal system as a disciplinary form of power is 
acceptable; if, however, the focus widens to include the fine and 
other monetary sanctions, then it is less so. 
This leaves us, as we have noted, with the tantalising suggestion 
that Foucault's account of the penal system is partial and importantly 
one-sided. In one sense its failings can be seen to be a special case 
of the more general problems already pointed out in Chapter 1 in our 
discussion of the "prison-centred thesis". Here we pointed out that 
it is the tendency of much penological literature to take the prison, 
or more generally deprivation of liberty, as the historically emergent 
characteristic of punishment. The explanatory agenda is set up with 
the prison at its centre, and other penal sanctions come to be 
characterised in its terms. Consequently, penal sanctions come to be 
perceived as inherently coercive. Indeed, the criminal law itself 
becomes so conceived. The literature talks of "the power to 
criminalise" - this standing as shorthand for a series of broader 
social relationships involving the state, the ruling class and the 
instrumental use of power. Although Foucault's work is innnensely more 
sophisticated, not least because one can interpret him as in part 
carrying on the Durkheimian tradition of perceiving punishment as 
symbolic (for example, the opening description of regicide), it is 
prone to exaggerate the extent to which power can be used in 
explanation of penal practice. This is because he too takes the 
prison and its regimes as the object to be explained. The prison and 
its associated disciplines are portrayed as the epitome both of 
contemporary penal practice and of the nature of power in modern 
society. And, although, as we have seen, Foucault is careful to talk 
of the positive, facilitative and creative role of power, the 
overwhelming impression to be gleaned from Discipline and Punish is 
that penal power is n~gative; prisons are the "dark side of 
democracy"; punishment is a "political tactic" or "technique". 
Strictly speaking there are three different issues in Foucault's 
work to keep separate. First, there exists an outline of a general 
theory of power in which it is conceived as the fundament of social 
relationships; it is here that Foucault develops his thesis of the 
positive and negative nature of power. Secondly, there is a more 
"empirical" thesis of the relationship between power and one of its 
modalities, punishment, which, in modern society, is symbolised by the 
prison. Third, there exists a more general thesis about the spread of 
"discipline" throughout the institutions of contemporary society; the 
disciplines radiate from the prison to create the "carceral 
archipelago". At each stage of the argument, Foucault moves from 
generalities to particulars in an exciting, but unsystematic fashion. 
Conventional rules of how to use evidence are deliberately effaced in 
the name of an alternative, non-systematic mode of social analysis. 
The result is to produce a text which creates a sense of wholeness by 
implication - modern society, modern punishment are disciplinary. The 
focus on power is unevenly developed but forms the thread which holds 
the various stages of the argument together. 
It is as a result of this unevenness that Foucault comes to 
portray the prison and punishment as instruments of power; as tools 
that are part of a broader strategy whose purpose or function is to 
regulate the population by disciplinary means of training. It is in 
this context that Foucault's description of penal power highlights its 
negative, repressive and coercive side. It is this impression of what 
Foucault is saying that allows Cohen and Mathiesen to extend his 
argument into what Bottoms calls the "dispersal of discipline thesis" 
- the idea that punishment/discipline is being extended in an 
increasingly invisible way into the fabric of the community. Like 
Foucault, both these writers appear to distrust power - to see the use 
of power as always worrying, illiberal and repressive; the "punitive 
city" (Cohen, 1979) is a harrowing place to live; traditional freedoms 
become eroded as power contaminates the capillaries of social life. 
It is to this context also that Bottoms argument concerning the 
non-disciplinary natu~e of the fine appeals. His argument works by 
finding an empirical exception to the received version of Foucault 
manifest in Cohen and Mathiesen and by alluding to more general 
theoretical questions. These questions, however, are never fully 
followed through but rather remain implicit. For example, Bottoms 
never outlines what follows from his description of the non-
disciplinary nature of the fine, nor does he really face the issue of 
why it is non-disciplinary. Rather, his argument rests upon empirical 
propositions about how the fine happens to be administered. This, of 
course, is reasonable but limited. Is the non-disciplinary nature of 
the fine a contingency or is it an inherent feature of this type of 
monetary sanction? Could a system of fining be introduced which is 
disciplinary? Also, even if we accept Bottoms' argument, there 
remains the question of how the fine is related to power. 
Demonstrating the non-disciplinary nature of the fine is one thing; 
analysing its relationship to power is quite another, yet this is the 
very issue raised by the structure of Bottoms' analysis. 
The reason we raise these issues is not simply to castigate 
Bottoms for leaving unanalysed some questions. Rather, it is to take 
further the case we have presented. While there is a similarity - a 
family resemblance - between Bottoms' description of the fine and our 
own assertion of its inherent voluntary nature, there exist also clear 
differences. The import of our thesis is that the fine is non-
disciplinary in the Foucauldian sense because of the voluntary 
element. 
When they have been fined, except for the limiting cases we noted 
earlier, all offenders are placed in a position where they are treated 
as if they have a choice to pay. This choice may be hedged by various 
constraints, including lack of money, but these are contingencies and 
do not alter the conceptual point we are making. Neither the 
phenomenological perception the offender has of the fine, nor the 
offender's objective, structural position, removes the voluntary 
element. Offenders may see, for a variety of different reasons, not 
just lack of money, that they cannot pay the fine. For example, 
imagine two hypothetical offenders, X who is on benefit and so sees it 
as impossible to pay the fine and Y who is fined for an act of 
conscience that is judged to be criminal, but who will not pay as this 
would be inconsistent with the original act. While at first sight we 
would probably say Y has exercised a choice and X realistically has 
none, this would miss the point of our argument. As far as the legal 
system is concerned, both in principle have the same freedom to pay. 
If they do not, severe coercive measures, such as imprisonment may 
follow. The judiciary may accept both grounds for non-payment as 
reasonable but still they must approach the issue of default as though 
both X and Y have made the same choice. If, for example, the judge 
accepts lack of resources as a better excuse, then X may be dealt with 
more leniently. But the arguments in mitigation or excuse enter in at 
a later stage of decision-making. The original decision made by the 
judge presumes a choice to pay, not the ability to pay. The offender 
stands before the court as a full rational agent. 
So the voluntary element in the fine is not affected by the 
perception of the offender. Rather, the voluntariness is a structural 
principle that governs how the fine works within the criminal justice 
system. The way in which fines are imposed and administered depends 
on it; also, as we argued earlier, it underlies the enforcement 
process. We have elaborated this point, because in claiming that 
there exists a voluntary element in fining, we are not arguing a 
metaphysical or philosophical point about human nature or law. Ours 
is not a Kantian or Hegelian argument about the principles of free 
will or determinism. It is a sociological point dependent upon how 
the fine works in the criminal justice system. Others may wish to 
extend it into a more general argument about free will, but we do not 
and nor should we be seen as so doing. 
The description we have given of fining bears a close resemblance 
to those commonly given of civil, monetary remedies. MacCormick 
(1982), for example, has argued that civil remedies are not premised 
upon coercion but rather upon the presumption that citizens sometimes 
need to be reminded of their obligations. As he puts it, there exists 
an obligation of reparation to put right damage done to another 
individual: citizens always have a choice to recognise this 
obligation; all that the law does is to remind them of this. It 
forces "someone to fulfil a duty which it is still open to him to 
fulfil". (p.229) 
MacCormick develops this argument into a broader one in which 
coercion is seen not as a fundamental attribute of law, either 
criminal or civil, but as one of its contingent features. Coercion 
can be used, is often used, especially in the criminal law, but is not 
necessary to the concept of law. Hence, according to MacCormick, 
theories which portray law as a coercive sanction, such as those of 
Bentham and Kelsen, are wrong. For example, in talking about Bentham, 
MacCormick argues, 
"What is wrong with Bentham's account is not his 
insistence on the coercive quality of law, but 
that he misconceives the way in which it is 
coercive" (1982, p.228) 
and more generally, 
" ..• once we have ditched the misleading notion of 
'sanction' which we have inherited, we can 
usefully speculate upon the extent to which 
positive law is actually sanctioned by rewards and 
other inducements built into the social structure 
of state societies, rather than by pains and 
penalties alone." (1982, p.246) 
There are two points of particular relevance in this. First 
MacCormick's insistence on the contingent nature of coercion converges 
with the analysis of the criminal justice system and the place of the 
fine in it developed here. Coercion, repression, are not the defining 
features of criminal justice. The example of the fine demonstrates 
and supports this. In many ways fines are like civil remedies; the 
individual is given the chance to meet the obligation and it is only 
if there us a failure to do so, that coercion comes in. Admittedly, 
there are differences between civil remedies and fines; the latter is 
the result of a criminal prosecution and the former the consequence of 
a private action, but there exist also striking resemblances. In both 
there exists a presumption that the "of fender" is obligated and has a 
choice to pay. The fine thus brings into question the conceptual 
differences commonly seen to exist between civil and criminal law. 
Whereas it is often assumed the criminal law is by definition 
coercive, the civil is seen as not being so. Our analysis of fines 
challenges this conceptual package. 
Second, MacCormick's more general case about the nature of law 
does resonate at certain points with Foucault's analysis of power, law 
and punishment. It will be remembered that Foucault describes power 
as having two sides, the positive and negative. While undoubtedly, 
for the reasons advanced, it is the negative side that is exploited 
both by Foucault and his disciples in their analysis of criminal law 
and punishment, the positive side ought not to be forgotten. The 
positive nature of power refers to its facilitative, creative role. 
This can be captured in commonsense terms, in expressions such as "the 
power of love" or "the power of God", where clearly the implication is 
that power is beneficent; it is conceived (perhaps wrongly but that is 
a different point) as creative. MacCormick's rendition of law, as a 
non-coercive force that facilitates the possibility of individuals 
recognising ends valued as good or at least worthy of approbation, 
dovetails with the Foucauldian positive conception of power. In both 
law rests upon power, but suggests that power ought not be conceived 
of only as an illiberal, repressive force. 
Of course, for the Foucauldian there always exists paradoxes -
stings in the tail. Power may be facilitative but it still works to 
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regulate, to produce the obedient, "normalised" productive citizen as 
a cog in the capitalist machine. For MacCormick, this too may be the 
case, but the focus is more restricted and the "ends" or "purposes" 
differently valued. But analytically there is this convergence. 
If we follow through this line of analysis then it is possible to 
extend and refine our conception of the relationship betwen the 
exercise of power and the fine. If we concentrate on the positive 
aspects of power then we can perceive the fine as voluntary yet still, 
in important ways, disciplinary. This is not necessarily 
contradictory to our earlier argument. Bottoms' thesis of the non-
disciplinary nature of the fine appeals to the negative conception of 
power. However, can it not be argued that the financial constraints 
imposed by the fine upon the offender are as much a "discipline" as 
the physical training of the body by an agent? Of course, the careful 
way in which Bottoms constructs his argument by quoting Foucault's 
definition of discipline and then showing clearly that in this strict 
sense the fine is non-disciplinary, is well taken and accurate. Yet 
there exists the possibility to argue in Foucaul4ian terms in the way 
just suggested. In a capitalist society what better way to discipline 
than by depriving individuals of that commodity - money - which is a 
prerequisite for effective citizenship? Moreover, the arrangement 
whereby the individual is allowed choice about whether to meet the 
obligation imposed by the punishment, can be seen as quinessentially 
capitalist. The offender faces the court, as Pashukanis noted, as the 
rational contracting agent who can "will" his fate. If the choice is 
to disregard or "contract-out" of the obligation, then unpleasant 
consequences follow, but this is taken to be the individual's choice. 
Hence there is no necessary incompatibility between stressing the 
voluntary element in fining and arguing for its disciplinary nature. 
The form this discipline takes is to require the of fender to 
comply by an act of will with an obligation that is imposed only 
because some harm has been intentionally committed. This, as much as 
directly imposed coercion, is an exercise of power and discipline. In 
a sense, it is a test of virtue. Those who accept the obligation and 
pay the fine, show by that that they recognise at least a minimal 
reciprocity. In refusing to meet the obligation, in defaulting on 
their fine, individuals show a manifest disregard for this minimal 
reciprocity; they demonstrate they lack virtue and in consequence they 
open themselves to compulsion and coercion. 
That this process works within a context of wider coercion cannot 
be denied. Offenders are required "to make fine'f' and if they do not, 
then again they may well be coerced by imprisonment. This wider 
coercive context clearly establishes a relationship between liberty, 
choice and money. The legal system presumes actors intentionally 
commit crime that causes some other actor,· the victim, to suffer loss 
and disadvantage. In return, the legal system offers the criminal the 
possibility of foregoing money and voluntarily accepting the pain it 
is assumed this will cause. If he "declines" this offer, money - a 
material resource - is transposed into loss of liberty. 
As Sinunel (1978) argues, money continually requires actors to 
calculate upon the relative value of objects they desire. It requires 
them to estimate how valuable a particular thing is to them. It also 
puts a definite measure, the cost, on this value. But the individual 
is free to chose whether or not to bear the cost. If the cost is too 
high then the desired object must be given up or the individual accept 
a lost opportunity. It is because money enforces this continual 
process of evaluating different courses of action upon individuals 
that it can be seen as disciplining them. As Simmel puts it in a 
rather metaphysical way, money causes continual motion. It never 
accepts repose or stillness; it renders every thing relatively 
valuable to everything else (1978, Ch.6 section III). 
This process of evaluation is of course carried out in a social 
context where some individuals possess more money than others. While 
this does not free them from the discipline money imposes on all, it 
does mean they are better able to withstand the vicissitudes that can 
arise from not having enough of it. Hence being rich, or at least 
better off, does mean one can ride the storm more easily. One is 
better able to indulge a greater range of desires. One has more 
control over the process of evaluation that money calls upon us all to 
make. 
To transpose this into Foucauldian language, money is a form of 
power in its own right. It has an "internal logic" that controls 
those who come into contact with it. The fine, as a legal punishment, 
brings to the situation its own internal logic as well. The two mesh 
in a continual process which requires individuals to make choices and 
evaluate the outcome of their actions. In this sense, it may properly 
be regarded as a discipline. 
As a form of disciplinary power, money operates independently of 
social class. All individuals, as we have said, are subject to its 
~ 
discipline. Empirically and conceptualy, as Reddy (1987) has recently 
argued, it is wrong to reduce money just to an expression of the 
relationship individuals have to the mode of production. While it is 
true there tend to be clusters of relationships between class· 
position, ownership of property and access to money, there is no 
reason to se these all in terms of social class itself. Rather the 
realtionship between social class and money is a contingent, not a 
necessary. 
This does not mean that social class is irrelevant. Rusche and 
Kirchheimer argue, for example, that the fine exemplifies a class 
based sanction in that it allows the rich to buy their way out of 
punishment. This access to money places them beyond incrimination. 
And, as was noted, in the medieval and early modern legal system, 
payment of money could be used to settle disputes and thereby either 
forestall prosecution or be seen as an adequate form of penance in its 
own right. As relevant as these observations are, they do not meet 
the point made above. Money acts as a form of discipline independent 
of class because all are subject to the same process of evaluation 
that it enforces. In consequence, the way the fine fits into the 
criminal justice system - the emphasis on voluntariness - the presumed 
freedom of "choice" whether to pay - means all individuals are treated 
as if they can make the necessary evaluations on the same basis. The 
facility to adjust fines to income reinforces this assumption. It is 
a way of acknowledging the relative access individuals have to money 
on the basis of factors such as social class, but at the same time, 
"abstracts" them from these relationships. Thus, even in the light of 
the recognition of material inequalities, all those fined are treated 
as if they are able to calculate and reason from the same foundation. 
Once this happens, they become subject to monetary discipline in the 
~oo 
sense described above. 
If we return briefly to the interviews with sheriffs it will be 
remembered they saw one of the "advantages" of the fine to be that it 
teaches offenders to manage a budget, and this they saw as part of its 
punitive effect. Also earlier in this chapter we briefly alluded to 
interviews conducted with imprisoned defaultets, where we recorded the 
views of some offenders on the effects of the imposition of fines. 
They saw fines as having a pervasive effect on their lives; they 
continually were forced to forego that which they wished to do. 
Indeed, some saw imprisonment for default as preferable to continued 
payment. Both the views of the sheriffs and those of the offenders 
are evidence: of the disciplinary nature of the fine. They show how 
money carries its own disciplinary force. Offenders are forced 
continually to calculate on the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of their actions past, present and future. They must evaluate which 
course of action is most desirable to them. Some sheriffs recognise 
this and use it in the way we described. 
This process of disciplining is more than a simple technique of 
compliance (cf. Bottoms, 1983). It aims not just to produce an 
ordered population who recognise that the breaking of rules can cause 
them disadvantages and pain. Rather it requires individuals 
themselves to make decisions that directly influence the form their 
own punishment takes. To an extent this is true of any sanction, but 
the fine does this within a context premised upon voluntariness not 
coercion and this changes the situation. The final irony is that the 
fine is the only sanction another individual can "pay" for you. 
While it is impossible for another to go to prison in your place or 
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to serve your probation order, it is quite possible for another to pay 
your fine. But this is your choice. If another pays your fine you 
presumably stand in debt to them and your future relationship could 
well be different. This is just another evaluation you have to make. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of default has aimed to show the ways in which power 
is related to the fine. We have argued that the fine is neither 
directly coercive nor can it be understood just as an instrument of 
class. Rather, because money has its own type of power, its own 
calculus of discipline, the fine has a much more complex relationship 
to power than normally imagined. The relationship to power is complex 
and, in some ways, elusive, but it constitutes a sociolo~ical 
phenomenenof the first order of importance. 
CHAPTER 8 
Conclusions 
I began this thesis by introducing the reader to a Martian. After 
surveying our penal system, the Martian left us with a puzzle. Why is 
it that we endeavour to explain the nature of punishment with hardly 
any mention of the sanction most commonly used, the fine? A deceptively 
simple question. Nevertheless, I have tried to answer a~d go beyond it, 
and to show how that commodity in which the fine is paid, money, enters 
into penal relations. My analysis has been complex, but that is 
because the questions t~e study of the fine gives rise to, are not in 
fact simple ones at all. They concern the very basis of the penal 
system and of aur knowledge of it. Indeed, looking back over the 
project as a whole, this really ought to have been evident from the 
beginning. 
I do not intend simply to summarise what has gone before, but also 
to reflect a. little on the significance of my argument. This can, of 
course, easily spill over into an intellectual onanism <to over-extend 
a metaphor), but there are some issues that deserve to be taken a 
little further. 
My argument has worked at two inte~lated levels. First, at the 
level of our knowledge of the penal system; why do we conceive of 
punishment in particular ways, and what are the consequences of this? 
Secondly, at the level of describing the penal system. The two are 
interrelated in as much as we approach the second level through the 
conceptual lens·.a we acquire in the first. The two levels become fused 
in the general images we have of the nature of punishment and of penal 
+- • prac..,1ce. 
In the introduction and the first chapter, I tried to prise open 
the relationship between these levels, as it exists in the contemporary 
:::;ociology of punishment. My aim was deliberately to make this 
relationship problematic, and the Martian was very useful in this. I 
tried to show that the literature explores punishment along one vector 
only - the relationship between punishment and various aspects of the 
body. It is in this context that the concentration of the literature on 
the prison has to be understood. The prison constitutes the present 
stage of development that bodily punishments have reached, although, as 
we saw, some now argue that we are on the point of another penal 
revolution concerned with the "dispersal of discipline" into the 
community. But in the literature, this revolution, if such it is, is 
c. 
discussed in the same broad coneptual framework as is the prison. By ,. 
thi:::; I mean, it is discussed against a background, in which it is 
assumed that the most fruitful way of explaining punishment is to 
~ 
perceive it in terms of
4 
power affect:; the body. 
I set out to question this framework in two ways. First, by 
showing that it contained the paradox referred to in the introduction 
to this chapter; how can an explanation of the penal system be 
adequate, if it ignores that sanction most commonly used? Of course, 
one reply to this would be that the theories I review in the first 
chapter are rather modest in their scope; they do not claim to be about 
punishment in general, but only about the prison in particular. This 
objection cannot be seriously sustained. Even a cursory glance at work 
in this area shows that, even if the intention was not to construct 
such a general account, the end product certainly ends up making such 
general claims. And, if +.his is so, ·then the question I pose is one 
that cannct be ignored or wished away. Second, I questioned the 
framework by ca.lling for a reexamination of the assumption that the 
best way to explain punishment is in terms of, or as a derivative of 
power. Al triougn, I argued, it is difficult to imagine a discussion of 
punishment that neglects power altogether, there are equally important 
sociological questions to explore. And one such set of questions 
concerns the relationships between punishment and the moral sentiments; 
between punishment and the collective conscience, to use a Durkheimian 
term. There are few studies these days which systematically discuss 
punishment in this way, and this seems strange, because it is a very 
traditional way of talking. Of course, what one would hope for, would 
be a framework that takes up both. This is a grand task, and I 
certainly make no claims for this thesis in this regard. But, as they 
say, once the question is posed, at the very least, a search for 
answers can begin. I hope it does. One issue that ought to figure very 
large on this new agenda, would be the relationship between symbols and 
practices. In terms of my work here, this is almost a shorthand way of 
capturing the relationship I see to exist between the prison and the 
fine. Prison symbolises our idea of punishment, but by and large, our 
practice is defined in terms of taking money away from people for the 
crime:; and offences they commit. The trouble with posing the issue this 
way is that some may quickly seek for a "gap" between the two and, 
thus, we would end up with a rather tired story - what happens in 
"theory" is different from what happens in "practice". Surely, it is 
time to stop thinking in these crude dichotomies? But these dichotomies 
do have a hold on us, because they simplify things; they, for example, 
allow us ta talk about "unmasking" or "decanstructing" ideologies. An 
accompanying advantage of this is that it also allows us ta be 
"critical" and, at the same time, sound very profound. 
Thi::; all seems second best to the more difficult task of actually 
unravelling the relationships between ideas we have of punishment and 
the use of sanctions. If the aim of deconstructing things is to do 
this, then it is ta be welcomed. But all too often, it turns out to 
stop short of this by confining itself ta an analysis of "discourse" 
without playing the language back into its context of use. 
The other two chapters in part one continue themes raised in the 
general introduction and the first chapter. In chapter two, I examine 
that phenomenon called the "cultural estrangement of punishment from 
money". My objective here was to capture what I see as the crucially 
important principle underlying the use of money in the contemporary 
criminal justice and penal system. The system both relies heavily an 
the fine, and in certain circumstances refuses ta recognise it as a 
punishment. One such circumstance is the perceived inappropriateness of 
fine in cases of rape. In analysing why fines are not used in these 
circumstances, I was able to show the importance of "the moral 
sentiments" to understanding the penal system. I endeavoured to shaw 
that the phenomenon of estrangement could not be explained 
satisfactorily in terms of a vocabulary of power. I tried also to shaw 
that estrangement is related ta broader cultural views of the nature of 
money and how money is seen ta be connected with some of the 
fundamental conditions of modern social life. Again, a paradox appears; 
money is seen as central to the way we live, but it is also kept at a 
distance from the values we esteem most highly. A similar ambiguity is 
said to exist in our attitude toward punishment. Although it is 
i:::ommonly tied to resentment and hate, punishment can also be seen as an 
expression of love and fraternity. These broader ambiguities feed into 
the criminal justice system through the process of estrangement. This 
makes estrangement crucial to its legitimacy. 
The final chapter of part one looked at historical patterns in the 
use of monetary sanctions. My point was to question the received 
version of penal history in two ways. First, by showing that earlier 
systems of punishment did in fact rely heavily on all manners and sorts 
of monetary settlements. Second, by briefly considering the 
significance of this for the received ideas of the pattern and course 
of penal history. My point here was to suggest that we need to 
reconsider what I called the "rupture" model of penal history. This 
model perceives the history of punishment to move forward by a series 
of fundamental changes or revolutions. Underpinning this model is the 
thesis that each "mode of production" has its unique "mode of 
punishment". While it would be quite wrong to simply invert this model, 
the time has come, I believe, at least to question it. As was said in 
chapter 3, the medieval and contemporary systems have a similar 
"sanctioning structure"; heavy reliance on monetary sanctions for most 
crimes and offences with a much smaller category of serious crimes 
being dealt with by some type of bodily punishment. I hasten to say 
that these similarities are superficial. The "logic" underlying these 
sanctioning structures is very different. But, if we pause a moment and 
approach the question without prejudice, then these broad similarities 
are striking. They certainly show how important the use of money has 
been to deal with crime. Perhaps, they also suggest the need for, what 
could be called, a "developmental" model of historical change <see 
Spierenberg, 1984). One which is at least willing to consider 
continuity over time. Such models, actually, do abound in sociology, 
although they seem, at the moment, to have a bad press because of their 
association withwith nineteenth century ideas of progress. But, a 
developmental model need not read in ideas of progress. Weber's model 
of the gradual unfolding of rationality in the West, does not. If 
anything, it is a deeply pessimistic view of history. It. shows that we 
are all damned by the very forces which also liberate us. Rationality 
and individualism constrain us; the more rational our institutions 
become and the more we premise our forms of reasoning on a principle of 
formal rationality, the more we deny the substantive and the emotional. 
In a very real sense, we become less free. 
Of existing work, the most relevant is Rusche and Kirchheimer's 
"Punishment and Social Structure" <1938). They discuss the fine in 
three places; first, in their introduction <pp.6-7), then in a short 
section on "Penance and Fines" in the chapter 2 (7-11), and at greatest 
lengb,h in chapter 10 <pp.166-177>. The difficulty that arises in 
assessing the significance of my work for their argument, is that one 
is faced with a "moving target". Their book seems to work at several 
different analytical levels. At one level the text can be read as a 
straightforward piece of economic reductionism. In this interpretation 
their thesis concerning the fine is devastatingly simple; they can be 
read as arguing that the fine has a necessary connection with the 
capitalist mode of production. To be a little fairer to them, they say 
two things; first, that the use of the fine as a general sanction 
presupposes a fully monetised economy; second, they ~ to be saying 
that these conditions are only met within capitalism. If one adds to 
this the rather self-conscious marxism of the introduction, one ends up 
with the view recorded above. If this is what they are arguing, then 
the Bvidence adduced in this thesis is a serious challenge. The mere 
fact that fines and other monetary sanctions were used so widely in 
medieval society casts serious doubt on the idea that it is only in 
capitalism that the fine <and other monetary sanctions) becomes a 
general sanction. It is as well to say at this point, that the 
individuals who appear in the examples quoted in chapter 3, were in all 
probability not members of the nobility. One can be fairly sure that, 
if they were "titled", this would have been recorded. Also, we ~st 
remember, we looked at the use of sanctions in the ordinary courts. It 
would be stretching matters a little too far, to contend that, on the 
one hand, the medieval aristocracy were all powerful <see their chapter 
2), and yet on the other, that they were quiescent enough to subject 
themselves to the ordinary courts of the land. 
But there is another more subtle interpretation of Rusche and 
Kirchheimer. If we see them as arguing that the important variable is a 
fully monetised economy, but that this is not restricted to capitalist 
society, then a more interesting thesis emerges. My point is that 
Rusche and Kirchheimer are ambiguous about the second of these factors. 
They create the impression that they believe it is only in capitalism 
that a full money economy exists, but they do not explicitly state it. 
This does change how one interprets parts of their work. For a start, 
it means that their thesis is no longer a specifically marxist one 
because they have shifted the explanatory weight away from the mode of 
production onto money as a variable with its own "history". This is a 
more discriminating and interesting thesis. Of course, there are 
problems with it, but it does mark a significant move away from the 
simple idea that every "system of production tends to discover 
punishments which ·:orrespond to its productive relationships" (Rusche 
and Kirchheimer, 1938 p.5). It moves Rusche and Kirchheimer closer to 
Sim.mel. 
In his "The Philosophy of Money" (1978), Sim.mel traces the 
development of money as an autonomous force. By this, I do not mean he 
suggests money can be explained without relating it t.o broader changes 
in the social order, but that he treats money as representing a 
particular type of social relationship found in all societies. The 
relationship it represents is economic exchange. Simmel tries to show 
how and in what ways humans exchange valued objects. Money is the 
medium by which incommensurable objects are given a common value. He 
endeavours to trace how changing perceptions of value arise, and how 
these influence the nature of economic exchange. He then tries to 
demonstrate the effect money has on social order generally. 
Simmel's work is very complex, but one can see how it can be made 
to converge with a certain interpretation of Rusche and Kirchheimer. 
One can see how Rusche and Kirchheimer's arguments can be extended and 
developed. There remain problems with what they say; for example, their 
comment that, "the law of feud and penance was essentially a law 
regulating relations between equals in status and wealth <p.8) 
seriously misrepresents the importance attached to ideas of penance for 
the medieval population in general, but a new subtlety does emerge. 
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However, as was said, with Rusche and Kirchheimer one is faced 
with a moving target, and one wonders where to aim. 
My thesis does create difficulties for the general image of penal 
<:hange that underlies Foucault's work. His general formula - from the 
corporal to the carceral - does need to be looked at afresh. 
Furthermore, it is not simply that one wants to question his view of 
the modern penal system as disciplinary. As I tried to show in the last 
chapter, this particular idea can be extended, although with reference 
to a different object than he envisaged. It is rather the broad context 
of his work; the casting of punishment as a "political tactic" that my 
work questions. This is, of course, to return to the theme about the 
role of moral sentiments. While I am not suggesting that one can drop 
the emphasis on power, I do suggest that we need to work out far more 
carefully the relationship between the political and the moral. This 
task requires that we become far more sensitive to the nuances of 
vocabularies and of how different vocabularies intermingle. The tracing 
of the histories of those vocabularies used to discuss punishment is a 
job for the future, but this thesis has endeavoured to put the question 
on the agenda. 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the place of the 
fine in the modern Scottish criminal justice system. First, the context 
is set by an analysis of sentencing patterns in the criminal courts 
from 1897 until 1978. Then, in chapters 5 and 6, I looked at sentencing 
practice from the point of view of the sentences. My aim was to try and 
understand the rationale - the forms of reasoning - that lay behind the 
use of the fine. These two forms of analysis, it is suggested, are a 
reasonable basis upon which to reflect more widely about the 
relationship between the fine and "modernity" - that is between modern 
c:riminal justice and it.:; most typii:al sanction, the fine. 
Before discus::;ing tb.i:;; relationship, it is worth reviewing the 
more particular points of interest that arise from these three 
chapters. First, at the methodological level, chapter four shows the 
important difference that including or excluding the "miscellaneous 
of fence" has upon our knowledge of the penal system. This class of 
offences and lesser crimes has an obvious importance; it is a record of 
the bulk of the business that passes through the criminal justice 
::;ystem. Thus, if we are to obtain knowledge of the system as a whole, 
it must be included. However, it is regrettable, that the opposite 
tends to be true. Normally, this class is excluded both from the 
commentaries on the 11 crime problem" and from those on the penal system. 
As a consequence, it is doubtful if such accounts can be taken 
seriously as general ones. I place emphasis on the latter part of my 
argument. If others wish to confine their attention to particular 
crimes, or move broadly to the whole category of serious crimes, that 
is all well and good. But, if they then wish to claim a greater 
generality for their arguments, much, I claim, begins to "fall apart". 
How can such accounts claim, either implicitly or explicitly, that they 
are general ones, if they exclude the bulk of the "business" with which 
the courts deal? This is an excellent example of the effect that the 
cultural estrangement of punishment from money can have on sociological 
and criminological knowledge. It shows how preconceived ideas of the 
nature of punishment and the penal system influence the stories we tell 
about it. 
312. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are in the way of being an experiment. By this I 
mean, I tried to synthesi::,e two traditions of literature - empirical 
description of sentencing practice and the analysis of legal reasoning 
- that, :ire normally kept separate. My starting point was a puzzle; both 
traditions explore legal deci:3ions, but do so in markedly different 
ways; both have limitations, but also strengths; in the light of this, 
why not try and forge links? The way I went about this was by using 
Rawls' famous di:~tinction between two ways of conceiving of rules and 
making it "empirical", the result being what I called a "normative 
practice". The next stage of my argument was to play this into the 
specific, empirical context of the Scottish criminal justice system. I 
endeavoured to show that sentencing took place in the context of a 
normative practice composed of substantive and formal legal rules. 
Particular decisions are a construct of the relationship drawn between 
those rules by sentencers. 
Retrospectively, from the point of view of this conclusion, I 
think, perhaps there is a tendency to overemphasise the formal aspects 
of the process. Perhaps, to lay a little too much stress on its "rule-
like" nature. This is partly due to the conceptual language used -
which is an adaptation of the Weberian notion of rationality. But this 
is a matter of stress and emphasis, not, I believe, of getting it 
wrong. Using Weberian language was useful. It allowed connections to be 
made between t.he wider processes of rationalisation described in part 
one and the effect of this in the contemporary system. It also allowed 
me to emphasise the roles that substantive values play in sentencing 
decisions. The Scots sheriffs have a clear idea of the purposes and 
ends of the criminal justice system. They see the purpose of criminal 
justice to be the achievement of justice by the meting out of 
punishment. For them, the objective is to punish people for the crimes 
and offences they coIDJDit. By punishment they mean retribution first and 
deterrence second; they are "classical" in their views. They see this 
to be just. 
Their use of the fine is obviously influenced by this conception 
of punishment. The fine is easier to justify in a language of 
retribution than the other sanctions that are available to them for the 
type of crime and offence and for the type of offender with which they 
normally deal. This does not mean that they see the prison as "less of 
punishment". Rather, in the circumstances in which they work, it is 
more difficult to justify easily and clearly in retributive terms. 
Their use of imprisonment is constrained by circumstance, not 
necessarily by desire. One consequence of this is that the system is in 
many ways more lenient than they would ideally like. Also, as we saw, 
the fine has a potentially corrosive effect on their broader ideas of 
justice. The need to take into account the offender's income 
compromises the punitive effect after which they seek. 
The analysis in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrates broader theoretical 
themes. It shows how different types of rationality intermingle and co-
exist; it shows how substantive aims are conditioned by formal 
requirements and by the social context in which action takes place. 
This has implications for the extent to which we can use vocabularies 
which are premised in rationality to describe the criminal justice 
system. One view of law sees it as an exemplification of rationality. 
This view is in Weber and it is also the broader ideological view 
legitimating the system. The implication of my analysis is not that we 
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must give up this language and see the system as irrational or as a 
gigantic con-trick; rather, we must carefully analyse the ways in which 
rationality is used in practice. How s11bstantive and formal rationality 
are brought together in practice; how they "play off" of one another in 
the process of making decision and delivering justice. 
Chapter 7 looked at default. The number of criminals imprisoned 
for non-payment of fines in Scotland is a problem, but one, I suggest, 
to keep in perspective. Most people pay their fine voluntarily and 
without the use of default procedures. Yet at the same time, fine 
defaulters constitute a good proportion of the prison reception 
popu:ation and certainly make a notable contribution to Scotland having 
one of the highest rates of imprisonment per 100.000 of the population 
in Europe. My analysis suggests that this is due to a "culture of 
severity"; that sheriffs see default as a serious issue with which they 
:rnu:::;t deal harshly. However, I argued also, that default is related to 
the voluntary nature of the fine. I contend that the fine is a 
voluntary sanction. Sheriffs see offenders as having a choice, whether 
to pay. Although the fine is situated in a larger coercive context, it 
is not directly coercive itself. Coercion only arises after the 
offender is regarded as having exercised a choice not to pay. Then, the 
defaulter can be imprisoned. 
The voluntary nature of the fine is crucial to its place in the 
modern system of punishment. In the first place, it means the "state" 
has a minimal direct involvement in the process of punishment. Not only 
does this mean that the fine, as Rusche and Kirchheimer argued, is 
"cheap", but also it means that the state only very rarely has to 
actively use its coercive institutions. But, second, there is another 
way in which the voluntary nature of the fine is crucial. As I argued 
at the end of chapter 7, the fine may be understood as a type of "auto-
discipline". Offenders accept the responsibility for the administration 
;:Jf their own punishment. If they pay their fines, that is the end of 
the :rriatter; their freedom is limited in the most rudimentary sense; if 
they do not, as we have said, coercion can and will be used. But the 
system regards them as having the power to make the decision; they 
' d6Y=;c i pl i ne the mse l ve::;. 
There is a second sense, in which the fine is an auto-discipline, 
which arises from the fact that it is paid in money. Following Sim.mel, 
I argued that money places the individual in a position where he or she 
has continually to make choices about the value things have. Offenders 
can exchange their freedom for money, if they wish, by not paying their 
fine. Indeed, they do this also when they pay. Given the extensive use 
of the fine, this is the typical, most common way individuals 
experience the penal system. It is in this way that we ought to talk of 
the penal :5ystem as disciplinary. Di sci pl ine is not about "normalising" 
people's behaviour. Rather, in my view and in the light of the analysis 
of the fine contained herein, it presumes "normality"; it presumes that 
individuals are disciplined not by the mechanism of power, but by the 
medium of money. And in doing this, it both treats them with ultimate 
respect - it allows them choice, it presumes their rationality - and 
yet, at the same time, accepts that they are trapped by the need to 
engage in exchange. 
Footnotes 
Chapter One: 
1. I do not pretend that what follows is a full account of 
the sociology of punishment. I have not tried to trace every 
nuance of what is a rapidly expanding discipline. Rather, I 
confine my attention to certain key texts and modes of 
explanation which I see as existing as the heart of the 
discipline. 
2. Sociological explanation is not, of course, confined to 
making and constructing empirical statements - although, as 
a matter of judgement, I regard the best ones as always 
being empirically rich. My point is that, normally, 
empirical regularity is held to be an essential stage in 
identifying the wood from the trees; sorting out what is 
important to study and that which can wait. An explanation 
then builds on this but still, as is said, empirical 
comprehensiveness comes in at the end, when judging how 
'good' the result is. The sociology of punishment appears 
not to recognise these conventions. 
3. There has been a long-running debate in criminology as to 
how to conceive of the role of the victim in crime. Debate 
seems to divide along two lines: a causative type analysis 
in which assessment is made of whether the victim 
'precipitated' the crime; the other type of analysis is 
more evangelical to try to get the victim recognised in 
penal policy. Sche.,ffer's work (1968) belongs to this second 
line. 
4. This, of course, is not a narrow question at all. But it 
was seen that way by those who endeavoured to break out of 
correctional penology. 
5. The phrase is from Foucault Discipline & Punish (1977). 
That the history of the prison is rendered in Foucauldian 
language shows the extent of his influence. 
6. Foucault does pay some attention to fines, but only in a 
rather marginal way. 
7. This is a problematic method. It assumes both some sort 
of continuity over time and that different different 
cultures can be understood. But unless such an assumption is 
made it is difficult to see how anthropological or 
cross-cultural work could ever be possible. 
8. Such explanations are not solely concerned with power. 
Rather it forms the presumed context. Hence if attention is 
given to symbols then this is interpreted as an aspect of 
power. Foucault is particularly prone to this, but the same 
tendency can be seen in Cohen ( 1985). 
9. To reinforce my point, I think Cohen is very aware of the 
Kuhnian overtones; i.e. he sees. analysis of the penal system 
in terms of the prison as 'normal science'. 
10. My point is that 'going native' does not solve the 
problem. One can understand a practice from the inside but 
still see its limitations. If one sees its limitations, then 
it iS I thereafter, difficult to put them to one side. 
11. Fint}_s (1972) argues that all sentences used by a 
criminal'°" court must have some punitive element to them. He 
argues that this follows from them being used in a criminal 
court. 
Chapter Two: 
1. Once money was commonly used; see Chapter Three. 
2. See discussion of focal meaning in Chapter One. 
3. If this were not so then we would be faced with an 
interesting idea; we would have to say that, for most of the 
time, the penal system does not deliver punishment. This is 
a tempting position to advocate, but I do not think the 
criminal justice system could retain its legitimacy and 
admit that it is not concerned with punishment. See footnote 
11, Chapter One. 
4 . I a m not s u g g e s t i n g t h at t h&i who 1 e o f mode r n po 1 i t i c a 1 
theory can be understood this way. Nevertheless, it is an 
interesting way of thinking about one of the central issues 
of political theory - that is the proper balance to be drawn 
between individual freedom and legitimate ..:ollective 
control. Being something of an anarchist, I have some 
sympathy with Nozick, but would ask to distance myself from 
the conservatism of his approach. 
5. An effective modern adaptation of this Aristotelian idea 
is produced by Finnis (1983 - chapter on pur1ishment). 
6. For the Englis~ delict is broadly similar to tort. 
7. I am aware of the work of American scholars 
who has endeavoured to do something like this. 
such work has great influence in America. It is 
that is has yet to have the same influence 






1. As I argue later, too sharp a 
between Royal justice and local 







2. As we shall see, the story is not completely wrong. 
Argument at this level of generality must be 'right' some 
of the time.My point is that the notion of compensation as 
work is a very_modern one which carries a whole associated 
conceptual baggage. It is this which constitutes the 
problem. 
3. The English pattern is different. Although it is probably 
wrong to see England as totally isolated from the rest of 
Europe (Reynolds 1986), Royal Justice, the King's Peace, 
developed earlier than in other jurisdictions. This meant 
prosecution on a developed system of indictment emerged 
v e r y e a r 1 y o n ( 1 3 t h c e n t u r y ) O n t h i s s e e fVv_.,\_ s t..rfv\ ( 1 9 7 6 ) . 
4. There is a debate, as I indicate, over how independent 
the Regalities were. Some regalities were tiny affairs and 
it is difficult to imagine them as 'sub-kingdoms'. Also, the 
strength of the Sovereign can be seen in that the grants 
setting up the Regality could and were sometimes reduced 
(see Ka 'Iles, 1792). Much probably depended on how powerful 
the noble was: if the noble was on good terms with the 
monarch or seen as necessary to the governance of the realm. 
5. During the interregnum the sheriff court did come more to 
prominence (see Davies 1980). 




contemporaries kept to this way of putting the 
used the notion of Delict and then subdivided 
(crime) and private (see Pitmedden 1699). The 
adopted may well be related to the attitude held 
to Roman Law. 
7. It is instructive to note that Duncan translates 
Vin8ictam as "to the public compensation". He says: "I have 
translated vindictam as 'compensation' because this is a 
meaning allowed by the Medieval Latin Word List; it has the 
sense of 'surety' here. I doubt if the translation 
·~engeance' is meaningful in this context". (Duncan 1975, 
p 2 0 1 ) • 
8. Of course, the distinctions used between public and 
private contain the germ of the modern division between the 
criminal and the civil law. But this is a different point. 
9. There are many cases in Pitcairn of prosecution for 
bringing in Englishmen. This was a treasonable act. 
10. Other terms used include fredus and freum. As von Bar 
(1916 p61 n13) argues, the fredus is thought to have been a 
v o 1 u n t a r y pay me n t o r p re s e n t g iv e n t o the· ch i e f o f th e 
tribe. Ka~.mes uses fredus in a law tract as the name for 
'making fine' (Ka.'mes 1792). 
11. At the risk of speculation, the feudal superior standing 
surety may have been one way in which the system dealt with 
those who did not have money. Also this practice emphasises 
how much weight was put on main~aining peace. 
1 2 . Do l e i s d-e r i v e d f r om th e 
elaborate, esoteric discussion, 
Roman dOlus. For a somewhat 
s e e v on B~ ( 1 9 1 6 p 1 1 - 1 2 } • 
1 3 . Far a 
Scotland, 
more sustained attempt to apply 
see Brown, Chap. 7 (Brown 1986}. 
Bessy's ideas to 
14. For more on 
Church see Wormald 
the nature and 
(1981 part II} 
effects of the Reformed 
and Donaldson ( 1980). 
15. For a more discriminating discussion 
Kirkheimer see the conclusion to this thesis. 
Chapter Five: 
of Rusche & 
1. I say this because the existing literature acts as a sort 
of 'fair-witness' against which to test the credibility of 
~e's own interpretation. This gives the exercise a greater 
sense of 'objectivity'. 
2. Sentencers do see themselves as 'weighing the importance 
of different factors' when making a decision. My pointis 
that they do not see this as a determinate process. Rather, 
when they use the term 'factor' they are drawing analogies 
with a logic exercise or just meaning meaning item of 
information. This is a quite different sense than that in 
which the term is used in factual explanations in a 
behavioural framework. 
3. Practitioners of the 
reject the use of the 
their approach. My use 
critique of the approach. 
b 
empirical tradition would pro~baly 
term 'behaviourism' to characterise 
of it is influenced by Hogarth's 
4. Those who work in the area seem to prefer 
'hermeneutic', presumably to distance themselves 
school of phenomenology associated with Husserl. 
the term 
from the 
5. This paradox shows how loosely all the terms, 
particularly positivism, are used in the literature. 
Po s i t i v i s m me a n s v a r i o u s l y a co ~-Bm e n t t o ' s c i e n c e ' , 
advocacy of the 'is' versus the 'ougtit' distinction, to the 
more 19th century notion that knowledge leads to progress. 
it is in the latter sense that, for example, Durkheim is a 
positivist. 
6. This is, perhaps, a little unfair. MacCormick also sees 
deduction of this sort as 'minimal'. His discussion of legal 
reasoning is much richer than I have time to demonstcro_.te 
here. 
7. I think Atiyah is being a little unfair in the sense I 
decsribe above. 
8. In some ways it is unnecessary to preface the notion of 
'practice' by the adjective 'normative'. A practice, in the 
sense I devel-op the term, must be normative. I use the 
adjective to reinforce my argument. 
9. Rawls' discussion is set in th context of a debate about 
different aspects of unilateralism. I have rather ignored 
this side of Rawls' essay as I want to develop his argument 
in line with my broader purposes. Carlen ( 1976) uses Rawls' 
work as well but, I submit, does not fully develop its 
potential. 
10. The more recent sociologists I refer to may well reject 
this association. I do not mean to imply that the work of 
Carlen and McBarnet is related to American legal realism is 
a 'history of ideas' sense. Rather, i mean an analagous type 
of antiformalist argument is at work. However, I do think it 
is reasonable to use the term 'legal realist' or 'realism' 
precisely because the purpose is to demask and demystify. 
There is an implicit dichotomy at work; formalism versus 
realism. There are clear political and ideological overtones 
at work also. Realism is, in some ways, as asault on 'rule 
of law' idea logy. 
/ 





as formalists if this is an implication ;f my 
jurisprudential terms, 
away from a narrow 
I am aware that within 
is an attempt to move 
1 2 . This is an important question. Very often the notion of 
rule as used in jurisprudence seems very narrow. To be a 
rule a statement is treated as if it must contain i".n 
imperative 'you will do I I 'you will not do I • It is 
interesting to reflect on how closely this trait is tied up 
with the need for precision in actual leg a 1 
decision-making. 
Chapter Seven: 
1. The interviews conducted with imprisoned defaulters 
probably deserve greater analysis than I have time and space 
to provide here. They were conducted in sometimes very 
difficult conditions on the 'wings'. One reason I have not 
paid them too much attention is because the 'quality' of the 
tape recording proved poor due to technical difficulties. I 
use them thus to ilustrate rather than as a source of data 
to analyse deeply. 
2. The earlier volumes of judicial statistics contain 
extremely useful commentaries in the preface. They are often 
fine examples of descriptive sociology. The quality of 
these commentaries declnes after the statistics are divided 
into the criminal and civil judicial statistics. This 
happened in the mid-1920s. Could this be as aspect of the 
growing secrecy of the system? 
3. This may seem rather obvious, but, in discussion, I have 
found that others do regard it as an enforcement pro~edure. 
4. I do think, now, that this traditional charge or 
criticism of Rusche & Kirkheimer is too easily overstated. 
Part of the problem is the unevenness of thebook. It was 
written by the 'authors' separately and not in 
collaboration. As I understand it the chapter on the fine 
and the introduction were added by Kirkheimer after Rusche's 
death (Melossi). In actual fact I think the book is a good 
deal less Marxist than reputation suggests. 
5. I am not suggesting that 'nothing has changed' 
historically. I use the old term to emphasise a point. 
"322. 
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